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PREFATORY NOTE

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF THE PROMETHEUS VINCTUS	I
By J. A. K. Thomson.	
"Υστερον πρότερον Ὁμηρικῶς	39
By Samuel E. Bassett.	
THE SPIRIT OF COMEDY IN PLATO	63
By William Chase Greene.	
ITHACA: A STUDY OF THE HOMERIC EVIDENCE	125
By Frank Brewster.	
INDEXES	167

THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF THE *PROMETHEUS VINCTUS*

By JAMES ALEXANDER KERR THOMSON

A. THE SECRET OF PROMETHEUS

THE play is not primarily concerned with the Stealing of Fire or with the Invention of the Arts or with the Destiny of Man. These three matters (especially the last two) interest the poet deeply, but they are not the heart of the drama. The action not only of the *Vinctus* but clearly of the *Solutus* too, and possibly of the whole trilogy, has for its spring the fact that Prometheus knows who is destined to overthrow Zeus, and refuses to tell. That is why — and not, after all, because he stole the fire — that he is punished in the play. And that is why, when he reveals the secret, he is released.

It is desirable at the outset to be quite clear what the secret is. It is not that Zeus is destined one day to be overthrown by his son; Zeus knows that already. The secret is, which son. The most helpful commentary on this is the *Theogony* of Hesiod. Whatever else may be sophisticated or moralized in the *Theogony*, it is certainly not the matter with which we shall be dealing here.

1. οὐτάρε ἔπειτα [sc. Γαῖα]

Οὐρανῷ εἰνηθεῖσα τέκ' Ὀκεανὸν βαθυδίνην
Κοῦν τε Κρῦν θ' Ὑπεριόνα τ' Ἰαπετόν τε
Θειαν τε Ἄρειαν τε Θέμιν τε Μημοσίνην τε
Φοιβην τε Χρυσοστέφανον Τηθύν τ' ἐρατεινήν.
τοὺς δὲ μεθ' ὀπλότατος γένετο Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης,
δεινότατος παιδῶν· θαλερὸν δ' ἥχθηρε τοκῆα. (132-138)

Observe that Kronos (*a*) is the youngest son, (*b*) is the most ‘terrible,’ (*c*) hates his father. We shall find these three points recurring.

2. Three other children were born of Ouranos and Gaia, namely Kottos, Briareos, and Gues, ὑπερήφανα τέκνα (147 f.).

δοσοι γάρ Γαῖης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἔξεγένοτο,
δεινότατοι παιδῶν, σφετερῷ δ' ἡχθοντο τοκῆι
ἔξ αρχῆς.

(154-156)

Accordingly Ouranos resolved to 'hide them away',

τῶν μὲν δύων τὰ πρώτα γένοιτο,
πάντας ἀποκρύπτασκε, καὶ ἐς φάσι οὐκ ἀνίσκε,
Γαῖης ἐν κευθμῶνι, κακῷ δ' ἐπετέρπετο ἔργῳ.

(156-158)

3. Gaia instigates her children, particularly the 'Titans,' of whom Kronos was the youngest, to avenge her on their sire. This Kronos does by means of a sickle (*ἄρνη*) (176 f.).

4. Rhea bears to Kronos (now King of the Gods) Hestia, Demeter, Hera, Hades, Poseidon and, finally, Zeus. It is a notable point that Zeus is the youngest son. The method of Kronos in dealing with his dangerous progeny was different from that of Ouranos, for as each child was born, Kronos swallowed it. The difference is less than it appears, if one supposes that the swallowing was only a method of 'hiding away.' But in dealing with so crude a savagery it seems more reasonable to assume that the motive of Kronos was the characteristically savage one of appropriating the *mana* of his enemies. Hesiod of course does not recognize this; indeed it would have been unintelligible to him. But at all events he tells us that Kronos, for some reason, swallowed his children. And this point too we shall find recurring.

καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατέπινε μέγας Κρόνος, ὡς τις ἔκαστος
νηδὸς ἔξ ιερῆς μητρὸς πρὸς γονινάθ' ἰκοιτο,
τὰ φρονέων, ίνα μὴ τις ἀγανῶν Οὐρανῶνων
δῆλος ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἔχοι βασιληΐδα τιμήν.

(459-462)

The passage proceeds,

πείθετο γάρ Γαῖης τε καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερέντος
οὖνεκά οἱ πέπρωτο ἐψ ὑπὸ παιδὶ δαμῆναι
καὶ κρατερῷ περ ἔσντι, Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλᾶς.

Accordingly Rhea, when about to give birth to Zeus, sought the aid of Gaia and Ouranos against her lord. They conveyed her to Crete,

where Zeus was born and hidden in the cave, while Kronos was beguiled into swallowing a stone wrapped in swaddling clothes. Afterwards, when Zeus had grown up, Kronos *νυκτεις τέχνησι βίηφι τε παιδὸς ἔωι* spewed forth the stone and the swallowed children.

5. The Titans, who maintained the cause of their brother and former enemy Kronos, fought against the Gods, the children of Kronos, who maintained the cause of Zeus. The war lasted ten years without a decision. Then Zeus released Briareos and Kottos and Gues, and by their aid defeated the Titans and cast them into Tartaros. Thus he became the new King of the Gods (617 f.).

6. After Zeus had driven the Titans from Heaven, Gaia bore Taphoeus, her youngest child, to Tartaros. Here was a new rival and a very dangerous one,

καὶ νῦ κεν ἐπλετο ἔργον ἀμήχανον ήματι κείνῳ
καὶ κεν δ γε θνητοῖσι καὶ ὀθανάτοισι ἄναξεν,
εἰ μὴ δρ' ὅξεν οὐδησε πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. (836-838)

After a dreadful battle Taphoeus was blasted and cast into Tartaros.

7. Zeus now took Metis to wife,

ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ δρ' ἔμελλε θεὰν γλαυκῶπιν Ἀθήνην
τέξεσθαι, τότ' ἔπειτα δόλῳ φρένας ἔξαπατήσας
αἰμαλίουσι λόγουσιν ἔην ἐσκάτωτοιον ηῆδν
Γαῖης φραδμοσύνησι καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερβεντος.
τὼς γάρ οἱ φρασάτην, ἵνα μὴ βασιληΐδα τιμὴν
ἄλλος ἔχοι Διὸς ἀντὶ θεῶν αἰειγενετάων.
ἔκ γάρ τῆς εἵμαρτο περίφρονα τέκνα γενέσθαι·
πρώτην μὲν κούρην γλαυκωπίδα Τριτογένειαν
ἴσον ἔχουσαν πατρὶ μένος καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν.
αὐτῷ ἔπειτ' ἀρα παῖδα θεῶν βασιλῆα καὶ ἀνδρῶν
ἥμελλεν τέξεσθαι, ὑπέρβιον ήτορ ἔχοντα. (888-898)

Allowing for a certain amount of reduplication in the text, one cannot read these seven passages together and fail to be struck by their insistence on a peculiar situation — the feud between the ruler of the gods and his son. The theme — one can hardly call it the plot — of the *Theogony*, so far as it is not a mere catalogue, may be fairly described as the rebellion of the young king against the old. On the

principle, recognised by the ancients themselves,¹ that the life of the gods is a reflection of the life of their worshippers, we may infer that the situation which recurs so often in the *Theogony* represents the normal relations of earthly kings to their successors at the time when the legends with which Hesiod deals first came into existence. The researches of Sir James Frazer fully illustrate this view. To examine it would take us too far, and it seems more relevant to the present enquiry to insist on something rather different, the importance of which appears to the writer to have been somewhat overlooked by students of Greek religion. For if any one will read the *Theogony* carefully, he will find not only the recurring feud, but the recurrence of the trinity of Father, Consort, and Son. Other factors no doubt come in — allies on either side — but the situation is always really determined by the mutual relations of these three. The part of the Consort is usually the most obscure and ambiguous; she seems to take the side now of her husband and now of his son. But this is perhaps intelligible without having recourse to the explanation that under primitive conditions of kingship she would be the prize of victory, and marriage to her the title to the throne.

Again, the King may have to face the rivalry, not of one son, but of a succession of sons. That also is perfectly intelligible. With whatever variety of incident the situation may repeat itself, it is always the same situation.

The importance of this consists in the fact that it is now perfectly clear that such a trinity as we have been describing was worshipped with a singular uniformity in prehistoric times all through Aegean lands and Asia Minor. The monuments and other evidence naturally vary in the emphasis they assign to the different members of the trinity, but the trinity appears to be always implied. Thus we hear not only of the youthful Attis but of Attis Παταῖος, that is Attis grown up and become in turn the Father-God. And in Crete, where the supreme goddess, later called Rhea by the Greeks, had for her husband the god identified by them with Zeus, we see her upon the seals occasionally accompanied by a youthful male divinity.² We may see

¹ Arist. *Pol.* 1, 2, 5: ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδη ἑαυτοῖς ἀφομοιώσων οἱ ἀνθρώποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

² J. H. S. xxi, p. 48, 56.

all three on Hittite reliefs. A great deal of Greek art seems to acquire an additional significance if we keep this conception of the divine trinity in our minds.

We may now turn to Aeschylus:

1. ή μὴν ἔτ' ἐμοῦ, καίπερ κρατεραῖς
ἐν γυιοπέδαις αἰκιζομένου,
χρείαν ἔχει μακάρων πρύτανις,
δεῖξαι τὸ νέον βούλευμ' ἀφ' δτού
σκῆπτρον τιμάς τ' ἀποσυλάται. (P. V. 167-171)
2. ΧΟ. τί γὰρ πέτρωται Ζηνὶ πλὴν ἀεὶ κρατεῖν;
ΠΡ. τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀν ἑκτίθοιο μηδὲ λιπάρει.
ΧΟ. ή πού τι σεμνόν ἔστιν δ ἔνναμπέχεις.
ΠΡ. ἀλλοι λόγου μέμνησθε, τόνδε δ' οὐδαμῶς
καιρὸς γεγωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ συγκαλυπτέος
δον μάλιστα· τόνδε γὰρ σφέων ἔγώ
δεσμοὺς ἀεικεῖς καὶ δύνας ἐκφυγγάνω. (519-525)
3. νῦν δ' οὐδέν ἔστι τέρμα μοι προκείμενον
μόχθων, πρὶν ἀν Ζεὺς ἐκπέση τυραννίδος. (755-756)
4. ΙΩ. πρὸς τοῦ τύραννα σκῆπτρα συληθήσεται;
ΠΡ. πρὸς αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ κενοφρόνων βουλεύματων.
ΙΩ. ποίω τρόπῳ; σήμηνον, εἰ μή τις βλάβη.
ΠΡ. γαμεῖ γάμον τοιοῦτον ὡς ποτ' ἀσχαλᾶ.
ΙΩ. θέορτον ή βρότειον; εἰ δητόν, φράσον.
ΠΡ. τί δ' ὄντιν'; οὐ γὰρ δητὸν αἰδάνοθαι τόδε.
ΙΩ. ή πρὸς δάμαρτος ἔξανισταται θρόνων;
ΠΡ. ή τέξεται γε παῖδα φέρτερον πατρός. (761-768)
5. ή μὴν ἔτι Ζεὺς καίπερ αἰθάδης φρέων
ἔσται τακεινός, οἷον ἔξαρτίσται
γάμον γαμεῖν· δις αὐτὸν ἐκ τυραννίδος
θρόνων τ' διστον ἐκβαλεῖ· πατρὸς δ' ἀρὰ
Κρόνου τέτ' ἥδη παντελῶς κραυθήσεται,
ἥην ἐκπίτνων ἥρατο δημαίων θρόνων. (908-913)
6. πατήρ ἀνωγέ σ' οὖστινας κομπεῖς γάμους
αἰδᾶν, πρὸς ὃν ἐκεῖνος ἐκπίπτει κράτους. (947-948)

7. οὐκ ἐκ τῶνδ' ἔγω
δισσοὺς τυράννους ἐκτεσθεῖς ησθμῆν;
τρίτον δὲ τὸν νῦν κοιρανοῦντ' ἐπέβομαι
αἰσχιστα καὶ τάχιστα. (956-959)

8. γνάμψει γάρ οὐδὲν τῶνδέ μ' ὄστε καὶ φράσαι
πρός οὐ χρεών τιν ἐκτεσεῖν τυραννίδος. (995-996)

These passages bring out with increasing distinctness the danger threatening Zeus. It is the custom to say that the feeling of insecurity which Zeus experiences in the *Prometheus Vinctus* is due to the fact that he has so recently made himself King of the Gods. That no doubt is indicated by Aeschylus; but there is more in it than that. That the rule of God should be precarious is not so strange a thought to the ancient mind as it is to us, although reflective people must always have rejected it. The Zeus of Homer does not feel perfectly secure; he threatens too much. And there was a widespread popular fancy that some day a new order of things would come into being, with the return of Kronos or the advent of some divine child. Shelley's Demogorgon, in spite of his absurd name, is imaginatively right. The 'Bibliotheca of Apollodorus' says of the marriage of Zeus and Metis,

Δεγε (i.e. Μῆτις) γενήσεω παιδα μετὰ τὴν μέλλονταν ἐξ αὐτῆς γενέσθαι κόρην, δις οὐρανοῦ δυνάστης γενήσεται (1, 3, 6), and regarding Zeus and Thetis,

Ἐνιοι δὲ φασι, Διὸς δρμῶντος ἐπὶ τὴν ταύτης συνουσίαν, εἱρηκέναι Προμηθέα τὸν ἐκ ταύτης αὐτῷ γεννηθέντα οὐρανοῦ δυναστεύσειν.

It is this latter passage, of course, which tells us the special secret of Prometheus.

B. THE WEAPONS OF THE GODS

This is an extremely curious subject, which is touched upon here because Hesiod and Aeschylus regard it as of real importance.

1. With regard to Ouranos, it is not clear that he had any weapon at all. He is as vague a figure as Death in Milton.

2. Kronos is armed with a *ἀρπη* of 'adamant,' apparently flint (*Theog.* 161).

3. Poseidon wields the trident, a fish-spear.

4. What gave Zeus the throne of Heaven and maintain him there are Thunder, Lightning, and, above all, *Keraunos*, the Thunderbolt. In *Keraunos* lies his strength and, as a savage would think, his life or 'soul.' Some such primitive notion may have helped to originate the cult of *Zeus Keraunos* in Arcadia.¹ To 'steal the thunder' of Zeus was in effect to kill him. Just so, the theft of fire by Prometheus was perhaps regarded at first as an attempt on the life of the divine being whom later ages called Hephaistos. All this is no doubt foreign to the mind not merely of Aeschylus but of Hesiod; yet it may not have been so to the minds of the first makers of legends so much older than Hesiod. At any rate when he says that the motive of Zeus in swallowing Metis was μὴ τέξῃ κρατερότερον ἄλλο κεραυνόν, we have something that looks like personification (*Theog.* 937a). Aeschylus makes Prometheus say of Zeus,

τοῖον ταλαιστήν νῦν παρασκευάζεται
ἐπ' αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, δυσμαχώτατον τέρας·
ὅς δὴ κεραυνοῦ κρείσσον' εὐρήσει φλόγα
βροντῆς θ' ὑπερβάλλοντα καρτερὸν κτύπον·
θαλασσίαν τε, γῆς τινάκτειραν νόσον,
τρίαιναν, αἰχμὴν τὴν Ποσειδῶνος σκέδη. (920–925)

C. KRATOS AND BIA

Kratos and Bia are also, as it were, external embodiments of the might of Zeus as King of the Gods. According to Hesiod they were the children of Stux ('Shuddering') and Pallas, son of Krios the Titan. He also says of them,

τῶν οὐκ ἔστ' ἀπάνευθε Διὸς δόμος, οὐδὲ τις ἔδρη,
οὐδὲ δόδος, δπηη μὴ κείνοις θεός ἡγεμονείη,
ἄλλ' αἰεὶ πᾶρα Ζηνὸν βαρυκτύπω ἔδριώνται. (386–388)

They came to the help of Zeus in the war against the Titans. Hence it is natural that they should appear at the beginning of *Prometheus Vinctus*.

Along with Kratos and Bia we must take Zelos and Nike, who are equally the children of Stux and Pallas. Zelos is the Spirit of Com-

¹ *Bull. Corr. Hell.* 1878, p. 515. Cf. Usener, *Kleine Schriften*, iv, p. 471.

petition, which in the case of Zeus (who has no equals) is equivalent to Phthonos.¹ Nike is a conception of the highest importance, and requires special consideration.

D. NIKE

Nike is the result of an *ἀγών*. The right way then of understanding the meaning of Nike is to understand what the Greeks meant by an Agon.

'*Ἀγών*' properly means 'an assembly.' Then, because an assembly in ancient Greece usually met to engage in or to witness some contest actual or dramatically represented, the word came to mean 'a contest.' It is well to remember the history of *ἀγών*, if we wish to enter into the Greek feeling about it or about the *νίκη* in which the Agon resulted.

An ancient assembly, as distinguished from a chance-created mob, had apparently always a religious character more or less clearly emphasized. The proceedings were opened by some form of consecration. The effect of this was to create in the members of the assembly a sense of communion. The intensity of this feeling doubtless tended to grow faint or even disappear, but the further back we go the more definite it becomes; and we must take account of this when we are tracing the history of so ancient a conception as Nike. Just as the Agon had a religious character, so had Nike. Accordingly Nike, in the fundamental conception of it, had two elements characteristic of ancient religion: (a) it was magical or (if the word be preferred) supernatural; (b) it was shared. These two elements cannot be shown separately in quotation, for they go together.

The case of the Olympic Victor may be taken as typical. The facts are too well known to require detailed restatement. After his victory at Olympia the Victor led a Komos of his friends to the altar of Zeus, himself striking up the Kallinikos-hymn of Archilochos. He was feasted in the Prytaneum and distinguished with divine or semi-divine honours. On his return to his native city he was drawn, drest in purple, by white horses through a breach made for him in the walls. He had brought not merely a victory but victoriousness. This is evi-

¹ Hyginus translates Zelos by *Invidia*.

dently the meaning of the little figure of a winged Nike which accompanies victorious persons in ancient art with a frequency that we find monotonous. The Nike of Zeus, the Victoria of Augustus, means and can only mean their 'victoriousness.' It is a quality, a virtue.¹ Their worshippers and subjects shared in the benefits of their victoriousness.

It is now possible to consider this in greater detail. Normally a *níkē* involved a *kámos*. We are therefore led to take some account of the Komos.

a. *The Komos*

It was in essence a joyous company of singing and dancing people. Doubtless, if the company were drunk, as sometimes happened, the singing and dancing would tend to become confused and ineffective; but probably a Komos was always supposed to sing and dance. It was a *χορός*. There was often an element of masquerade or *μίμησις*, and it was common to carry torches.

The *Etymologicum Magnum* says, *κώμος*: εἶδος δρχήσεως. κωμάζειν τὸ ποιῶν δρχεῖσθαι. Hesychius says, *κώμος*: εἶδος δρχήσεως ποιμένος τινος. κωμάδειν δρχεῖσθαι. Suidas says *κώμος*: ἡ μέθη, καὶ δρχησμός and μεθυστικὸς αὐλός, ἐγχρονίζοντος τοῦ οἴνου ἐρεθίζων τὴν ἡδυπάθειαν, καὶ θεατρον δσχημον ποιῶν τὸ συμπόσιον, κυμβάλοις τισι καὶ δργάνοις καταβέλγων τοὺς δαιτύμονας. These explanations clearly relate to some degraded form of the Komos and do not help us to understand what it meant to Pindar. We may begin with his evidence.

1. <ω> πότνι' Ἀγλατα

φιλησίμολπέ τ' Εὐφροσύνα, θεῶν κρατίστου
παῖδες, ἐπακούΐτε νῦν, Θαλλα τε
ἐρασίμολπε, ίδοισα τόνδε κώμον ἐπ' εὐμενεῖ τύχᾳ
κοῦφα βιβῶντα·

(*OI.* 14, 13-17)

This is clearly a band of dancers.

2. σὺν δὲ φιλοφροσύναις εὐηράτοις Ἀγησία δέξαιτο κώμον

οἰκαδεν οἰκαδ' ἀπὸ Στυμφαλίων τειχέων ποτινισσόμενον,
μάτερ' εὐμήλοιο λείποντ' Ἀρκαδίας.

(*OI.* 6, 98-100)

¹ Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 298 thinks that every combatant had his own Nike.

Here the Komos is more like a procession. It is however none the less a *χορός* on that account. We have a good parallel in the dramatic Chorus with its *πάροδος* and *στάσιμον*.

3. Τὸ μὲν Ἀρχιλόχου μέλος
φωνᾶεν Ὄλυμπίᾳ, καλλίνικος δὲ τριπλός κεχλαδώς,
ἀρκεσε Κρόνιον παρ' ὅχθον ἀγεμονεῦσαι
κωμάζοντι φίλοις Ἐφαρμόστῳ σὺν ἑταῖροις. (Ol. 9, 1-4)

The scholiast comments on this: *κωμάζει* δὲ πρὸς τὸν τοῦ Διὸς βωμὸν διηκήσας μετὰ τῶν φίλων, αὐτὸς τῆς φύης ἔξηγος μενος. The emphasis here is chiefly on the singing. The same may be said of the following passage,

4. Σάμερον μὲν χρή σε παρ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ
στᾶμεν, εἴτεκτον βασιλῆι Κυράνας, δόφρα κωμάζοντι σὺν Ἀρκεσίλᾳ,
Μοίσα, Δατοῦδαισιν ὀφειλμενον Πιθάνῃ τ' αὔξεις οὐρον ὕμινα. (Pyth. 4, 1-3)

5. μάκαρ δὲ καὶ νῦν, κλεεννᾶς ὅτι
εὐχος ἥδη παρὰ Πιθιάδος Ἰπποις ἐλῶν
δέδεξαι τόνδε κῶμον ἀνέρων,
Ἄπολλάνιον ἄθυρμα. (Pyth. 5, 20-24)

The joyous character of the Komos is here chiefly insisted upon.

6. ἐγκιρνάτω τίς νω, γλυκὸν κώμον προφάταν,
ἀργυρέασι δὲ τωμάτω φιάλαισι βιατὰν
ἀπτέλουν παῦδ', (Nem. 9, 50-52)

This is like 5.

7. ἀλλ' ὁ Πίσας εἰδενδρον ἐπ' Ἀλφεῷ ἀλσος,
τόνδε κῶμον καὶ στεφαναφορίαν δέξαι. (Ol. 8, 9-10)

The Komos is here referred to as garlanded. Other references in Pindar are *Pyth.* 3, 72 f.; 8, 18 f., and 70 f.; *Nem.* 3, 3 f.; 9, *ad init.*; 10, 34 f.; 11, 27 f.; *Isthm.* 7, 20 f.; 8, *ad init.*. Also *Ol.* 4, 7 f.; 6, 17 f.; *Pyth.* 9, 89; *Nem.* 2, 22 f.; *Isthm.* 2, 30 f.; 3, 8.90; 6, 57 f.

Quotations from other ancient writers on the subject of the Komos may of course be made in great numbers. But Pindar is perhaps a sufficient witness, and there is a special appositeness in the quotations

from him. The Komos here was definitely celebrating (as we express it) a Victory and its song was an *ἐπωϊκος ὕμνος*. The purpose was to honour the Victor, but also to communicate, as it were, his victoriousness to the City.

The present enquiry is limited to the consideration of Nike, not as an achievement but as a power — not as *νίκη* but as *Nίκη*. In particular we are concerned with the Nike of Zeus. Hesiod, as we have seen, calls her the constant companion of Zeus, and Bacchylides thus addresses her,

Νίκα γλυκίδωρος
ἐν πολυχρόνῳ δ' Ὁλύμπῳ Ζηνὶ παρισταμένα κρίνει τέλος
ἀθανάτοις τε καὶ θνατοῖς ἀρετᾶς. (Fr. 9 Bergk)

The association of Nike with Zeus in art is too familiar to require more than just this reference.

β. Athena as the Nike of Zeus

There is one aspect of Athena in which she appears as Nike. The exact measure of independence to be assigned to Nike has been a matter of controversy and need not concern us here. The cult of Athena Nike is characteristically Athenian and we can hardly be mistaken in assuming that normally she embodies not Victoriousness in general but the Victoriousness of Athens. But the relation between Athena and Zeus is of so intimate and special a character that she often appears definitely as the Nike of Zeus. She does so, for instance, in the *Ion* of Euripides,

1. μὰ τὴν παρασκήζουσαν ἄρμασίν ποτε
Νίκην Ἀθηνῶν Ζηνὶ γηγενεῖς ἔπι. (1528-1529)

This is an important passage because it shows us that in the War with the Giants, which was the great episode in the mythology of the goddess and as such was embroidered on the *peplos*, she was recognized as the Nike who stands by the side of Zeus. The story of her birth is a mythical way of stating the same thing.

2. ἔμδν
'Αθανῶν ἵκετείω
Προμαθεῖ Τιτᾶνι λοχεῦ —

θεῖσαν κατ' ἀκροτάρας
κορυφᾶς Διὸς, ὡς Πλόντα Νίκα.

(Eur. *Io* 453-457)

The story, we may recall, was that Zeus swallowed Metis, fearing lest she should bear a child mightier than himself. Then in due season Athena sprang in full armour from his head, being brought to light by the stroke of an axe on the head of Zeus delivered by Prometheus or, as some said, Hephaistos. (The story is clearly of Athenian origin). Here again Athena is plainly just the Nike of Zeus.

3. θέας δὲ ἀξιον τῶν ἐν Πειραιῇ μάλιστα Ἀθηνᾶς ἔστι καὶ Διὸς τέμενος·
χαλκοῦ μὲν ἀμφότερα τὰ ἄγαλματα, ἔχει δὲ ὁ μὲν σκῆπτρον καὶ Νίκην, ἡ
δὲ Ἀθηνᾶ δόρυν.

(Paus. 1, 1, 3)

γ. The Nike of Zeus

i. In a description of the War with the Giants, Nonnos says

ἔμβεβανία δὲ Νίκη
ἵλασεν οὐρανή πατρώιον ἵππον ἴμασθλη.

(2, 843)

Here Nike performs the office traditionally assigned to Athena in the War. It is the same on the later vases.

2. καθέξεται μὲν δὴ ὁ θεὸς [i.e. Zeus at Olympia] ἐν θρόνῳ χρυσοῦ
πεποιημένος καὶ ἐλέφαντος· στέφανος δὲ ἐπίκειται οἱ τῇ κεφαλῇ μεμιμένος
ἔλασις κλῶνας. ἐν μὲν δὴ τῇ δεξιᾷ φέρει Νίκην ἐξ ἐλέφαντος καὶ ταύτην καὶ
χρυσὸν, ταυτὰν τε ἔχουσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ στέφανον· . . . Νίκαι μὲν
δὴ τέσσαρες χορευούσων παρεχόμεναι σχῆμα κατὰ ἔκαστον τοῦ θρόνου τὸν
πόδα, διον δέ εἰσιν ἀλλαὶ πρὸς ἔκαστον πέζη πόδες.

(Paus. 5, 11, 2)

The dancing Spirits of Victory here described are instructive. They help us to realize better what one might almost call the social character of Nike. She has the characteristics of the Komos. This comes out clearly in ancient art.¹ The vases show her not only as the Bringer of Victory but as a cupbearer on Olympus or pouring a libation. She does not help in battle, except that on comparatively late vases she drives the car of Zeus in battle with the Giants. She often appears

¹ Nike and Athena-Nike have been exhaustively discussed by students of ancient art e.g. Kekulé, *Athena Nike*, Baudrillart, *Les Divinités de la Victoire*, Knapp, *Nike*, Studniczka, *Die Siegesgöttin*, Farnell, *Cults*, I, 311 f.

to balance Eros¹ and to represent victorious feminine beauty. She also appears in the circle of Dionysos. She may carry a drinking-cup or a torch, like a κωμάστης. And we have this *χορός* of Νίκαι by Pheidias. In literature she is associated with Eirene, Ploutos and similar figures. The recurring prayer of the Chorus in Euripides,

ὦ μέγα σεμνὴ Νίκη τὸν ἔμπορον
βιοτον κατέχοις
καὶ μὴ λήγουσι στεφανοῦσα,

expresses very well the normal Greek conception of her as a spirit which may possess one's life. The Chorus in the *Knights* of Aristophanes addressing πολιούχος Παλλάς says,

δεῦρ' ἀφικοῦ λαβοῦσα τὴν
ἐν στρατιαις τε καὶ μάχαις
ἡμετέραν ἔυνεργὴν
Νίκην ἡ χορικῶν ἐστιν ἑταῖρα
τοῖς τ' ἔχθροῖσι μεθ' ἡμῶν στασιάζει.

(581 ff.)

Here again Nike is thought of as in a *χορός*.

E. ZEUS AS THE YOUNG KING

This has partly been discussed already. The successful revolt of Zeus against his father Kronos and his accession to the sovereignty among the Gods are fully described in the *Theogony* ascribed to Hesiod. It was a notorious story, as one may gather from Aristophanes and Plato. It is referred to in a famous passage of the *Agamemnon*,

I. οὐδὲ δοτις [οὐλός τις Headlam] πάροιθεν ἦν μέγας,
παμμάχω θράσει βρέων,
οὐδὲ λέξεται πρὶν ὅν·
δε δ' ἔπειτ' ἔφυ, τρια-
κτῆρος οἴχεται τυχών·
Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως
ἔπινκια κλάζων
τείξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν.

(177-185)

¹ J. H. S. 1886, tab. 63.

The expression *ἐπινίκια κλήσων* suggests a Victory-Komos like that which followed victory at Olympia. And Pausanias found at Olympia a legend which told of a wrestling match there between Zeus and Kronos,

2. Δία δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐνταῦθα ταλαῖσαι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ Κρόνῳ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς,
οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ κατεργασμένοις ἀγωνοθετῆσαι φασιν αὐτόν.

(5, 7. Cf. 8, 2, 2)

3. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλα Αἰγιεῦσιν ἀγάλματα χαλκοῦ πεποιημένα, Ζεὺς τε ἡλικίαν ταῖς καὶ Ήρακλῆς, οὐδὲ οὐτος ἔχων τῷ γένει, 'Δυελάδα τέχνη τοῦ Ἀργείου.
(*ibid.* 7, 24, 4)

F. ZEUS AS OLD KING

This paragraph is added merely for the sake of clearness and completeness. There is of course an aspect of Zeus in which he appears as the Old King — in relation namely to the unborn Son who threatens to supplant him. All editors of the *Vinctus* have observed that the newness of the rule of Zeus is much insisted upon in the play. That is true, but a more deeply permeating sentiment is the acute anxiety of Zeus about his successor. The fact is that to become King of the Gods is *ipso facto* to be thrown into the defensive attitude of the Old King awaiting his destined successor. But while we recognize this, and see that in a certain point of view — namely in relation to Kronos — Zeus may be considered as representing the Young King, while in another point of view — relatively to his unborn dispossessor — he appears as the Old King; Zeus is characteristically and typically the actual King of the Gods.

G. ZEUS AS KING OF THE GODS

Evidence of the fact is unnecessary. But something may be said of what the fact implied to the Greek mind. It is for instance as Basileus that Zeus is accompanied by Kratos and Bia, by Nike and Zelos. The best way, in fact the only way, to understand the religion of Zeus is to recognize that it has been developed and refined out of a distinctly primitive stratum of thought. No one probably would directly deny this; it is in the application of a general maxim that

differences of opinion arise. We have at least a rough idea of how a primitive people regards its king. On the assumption then (which seems inevitable) that the Greeks at first regarded Zeus as a monarch of a type we should now regard as primitive, we may explain his chief characteristics. Nike and his invincible weapon of the Keraunos belong to him as King. It is as King also that he is *rēλeios*. The whole of the *Golden Bough* might be taken as a commentary on this. But *rēλeios* implies complete physical and mental development, marriage and fatherhood. So Zeus *Tēλeios* is the God of Marriage; and so he is *Πατήρ*. At any rate, for the question here discussed — the relation of Zeus as King and Father to the Son who will one day reign in his stead — the use of an explanation which covers the immediate field of discussion seems legitimate enough.

It is at least illuminating to think of the three great functions of Zeus (as King, as Husband or Bridegroom, and as Father) as intimately connected with one another. The *lepos γάμos* is just as much in its own way an assertion of the new *régime* as is the deposing of Kronos. And as for the *γάμos* itself we with our comparatively romantic conception of marriage tend to forget that it was contracted for no other purpose than the begetting of a child. Just as with an earthly king the child was desired in order that he might preserve the royal seed and continue the magical efficacy of the royal race, so the King of the Gods must beget a Child to succeed him. The intimate connexion of these various aspects of the Father God comes out with eminent clearness in the religions of the non-Hellenic peoples who surrounded early Greece, especially in the Anatolian religions, whose analogies with Greek religion, although very differently estimated, are not totally denied by anyone. What these religions are constantly harping upon are the interrelations of the Divine Father, the Divine Consort, and the Divine Son; or if you like of the Old King and the Young King. It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the religion of Zeus has been developed and refined out of a similar stratum of thought. The narrative of Hesiod is thus seen to be what anyone reading it without preconceptions would say it is — a narrative of the relations between the Divine Father, the Divine Consort, and the Divine Son.

H. HERAKLES AS THE YOUNG KING

Herakles played an important part in the completed *Prometheus* trilogy. It is therefore desirable to grasp his exact relation to Zeus and his significance as a *dramatis persona*.

Before entering upon this part of the subject, it is necessary to make two statements. The first is, that no suggestion will be made that more than a limited portion of the mythology of Herakles can be explained by his relation to Zeus as Young King to Old. The second is this, that the relation is obscured by the fact that Zeus is never actually deposed. Zeus indeed is, so to speak, stereotyped for Greek thought as the reigning King of the Gods: Ζεύς ἦν, Ζεύς ἦτοι, Ζεύς ἤσσανει. Kronos never was for the Greeks *actually* King of the Gods; he always *had* been King, just as the Young King, who was to succeed Zeus, was always *to be* King.

About Herakles the two dominating facts are (*a*) that he is the son of Zeus, (*b*) that he embodies *Nikē*. With regard to (*a*) it is unnecessary to adduce evidence. With regard to (*b*) it seems possible to show how completely he realizes all that the Greeks understood by *nikē*.

a. *Herakles Kallinikos*

Ι. . . νεογάμου ἐπιγράψαντος ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν·
δὸ τοῦ Διὸς παῖς καλλίνικος Ἡρακλῆς
ἐνθάδε κατοικεῖ· μηδὲν εἰσίτω κακόν. (Diog. Laert. 6, 50)

The inscription has been found often. It is very important for the understanding of Herakles.

2. τὸν καλλίνικον μετὰ θεῶν ἐκώμασεν. (Eur. Herc. 180)

These two quotations out of a very great number may serve as texts. They appear to be perfectly representative and typical. Herakles as Victor is leader of the Komos which celebrates, and, in celebrating, disseminates in some magical way — according to the original unenlightened view of it — Ploutos, Eirene, Eunomia, all that Nike was supposed to bring with it.

β. Herakles as Komastes

We began by saying that Nike was the result of an *Agon* and was celebrated in a *Komos*. Of Herakles as the typical *Agonist* it cannot be necessary to say anything here. But his character as *Komastes* is equally distinct. The practice of the Olympic Victor in celebrating his victory by marching at the head of a *Komos* intoning the *μέλος* 'Αρχιλόχου (*vide supra*), ὡ καλλίνικε χαῖρ' ἀναξ Ἡράκλεος implies the belief that Herakles, who was the first Olympic victor, himself led such a *Komos*. The comic Herakles is just this Komic Herakles. Rooted in the same conception, though with a natural refinement of the grosser elements in the *Komos*, was the cult of Herakles *Mousageletes*, for the Muses were a *χορός* singing ἑγκώμια of Gods and famous men (*Theog. ad init.*). Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Μουσαγέτῃ Μηνόφιλος *C. I. G.* 5987.¹ M. Fulvius Nobilior erected at Rome a statue of *Hercules Musarum*, for "in Graecia cum esset imperator acceperat Heraclem Musagetem esse, id est comitem ducemque Musarum." (*Eumenius, de restaur. schol.* 7; *Suet. Aug.* 29, etc. Cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 6, 799 f.) The very frequent representations in ancient art of Herakles entering Olympus in a triumphant *Komos* or feasting in company of the Muses or some other gods show him in the same light. The curious institution of the παράσιτοι of Herakles at Athens (*Athen.* 6, 26, p. 234 E; 6, 27, p. 235, quoting the *Tetrapolis* of Philochoros) implies the conception of him as a fellow-feaster, a *Komastes*. Usually, however, it was more convenient to represent him as feasting or reclining at his ease alone; and this of course is an extremely common subject.

γ. Herakles and Zeus

1. *C. I. G.* 2358 (Paros) τοῦ Διὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ Ἡρακλέους Καλλινίκου. The association of Zeus Basileus and Herakles Kallinikos is also found on at least one vase (*Panofka, Zeus Basileus*, 1847).

2. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους [*i.e.* τῶν Γιγάντων] κεραυνοῖς Ζεὺς βαλὼν διέφθειρε. πάντας δὲ Ἡρακλῆς ἀπολλυμένους ἐτόξευσεν (*Bibl. Apollod.* 1, 6, 1-2). Herakles played almost the chief part in the war with the Giants, after which τὸν καλλίνικον μετὰ θεῶν ἐκώμασεν. Nike belongs especially

¹ Cf. *Pausanias*, 4, 31, 10, at Messana.

to Zeus and Herakles, as to Athena. Zeus conquering Titans and Giants is paralleled by Herakles conquering his uncouth enemies. Herakles is often in company with Athena, Nike, and Hebe on fourth century vases. Once Athena is called Ἡρακλέους κόρη. (P. Gardner, *Cat. Gk. Vases in Ashmol. Mus.*, n. 212, pl. 2).

3. τρίται ἀνομένου· Ἡρακλεῖ ἐς Κο[[νισαλο]ν ἀ(ρ)ην καυτός. τὰν
ἀβρᾶν ἀμέραι· Ἡρακλεῖ ||[ἐς Κονισαλον βοῦς. (Paton and Hicks,
Inscr. of Cos. p. 90, n. 39; Ditt. 2, 618. *καυτός* is explained as porcus
qui comburitur). This Herakles *Konisalos* is regarded by Nillson,
Griech. Fest. p. 453, as an ithyphallic marriage-god. (*κονισαλος* meant
an indecent dance.) This is uncertain, but there is no doubt of the
close connexion of Herakles with Hera and Juno, marriage-goddess.
He appears to have been Hera's consort at Argos.¹ The view has been
taken that Hercules Genius and the Italian Juno are marriage-gods.²
This, so far as it can be made out, serves to emphasize the parallel
with Zeus, the god of marriage and the husband of Hera. The evidence
for Herakles' being, if not definitely a god of marriage, at least in
some sense γαμήλιος is convincing. Hence the inscription which the
νεύγαμος wrote above his door.

The most significant evidence, however, is found in the triumphal
Entrance into Olympus of Herakles and his Marriage to Hebe. Both
are favourite subjects of ancient art. There is a vase at Munich
showing Herakles burning on the pyre, on which a woman (*Αρεθοσα*)
pours water, while another (*Πρεμνοσια*) approaches carrying a hydria.
Above, Athena conducts Herakles with his club in a quadriga to
Olympus (*Ἡρακλης, Αθηναα*). A laurel tree is growing behind the
horses. Herakles is represented as young. (*Monumenti*, Institute of
Rome, 4, pl. xli). A kelebe discovered at Bologna in 1879 shows
Zeus offering a cup to Herakles, who is being received into Olympus.
Athena stands between them. Behind Herakles is Hermes, behind
Zeus, Apollo. (*Monumenti*, 11, pl. xix). A kalpis at Naples shows
Herakles with cornucopia and club seated between Zeus, Athena, and
Hermes, who are all standing. (*Annali Dell' Instituto Di Corresp.
Arch.* 1869, pl. 9, H. Ruvo). A krater at Bologna shows the apotheosis
of Herakles. He is seated in a quadriga beside Hebe, both of them

¹ A. B. Cook, *C. R.*, 20, nos, 7 and 8 'Who was the Wife of Zeus?'

² Reifferscheid in Roscher's *Lexikon*, 2258 f.

garlanded, while Hermes leads the way. (*Annali*, 1880, pl. N.). A black-figured vase shows three goddesses (*Ἄθερατα, Ήφεστος, Ήρη*) carrying garlands and advancing towards Herakles (*Ηερακλῆς*), who follows in his quadriga driven by *Ιόλεως*. Herakles is holding out a garland in his right hand. (*Archaeol. Zeit.* 1866, pl. 209, Vulci). On another vase Herakles is mounting a quadriga, driven by Nike, and preceded by a running Silenus. Above, we see Aphrodite, a doe and an Eros; beneath, the Hyades bearing water to quench the pyre. (*Bulletino Napolitano*, new series, III, pl. 14. Ruvo). A black-figured lekythos shows Herakles being led to Zeus by Athena and Hermes. ('Εφημ. Ἀρχαιολ. 1890, suppl. pl. p. 10, n. 3). On a vase in the British Museum, Nike is seen receiving into Olympus Herakles followed by Zeus (Gerhard, *Auserles. Vasenb.* 143); and on another vase at Berlin Herakles is received into Olympus by Zeus, attended by Artemis, Athena, Apollo, Hebe, Poseidon, Hermes, Dionysos, Doris, Nereus and two Nereids. Herakles is between Athena and Apollo (Gerhard, 146–147). Similarly a krater at Vienna represents Herakles being conducted into Olympus by Nike, who drives the quadriga, and Hermes, who follows (Laborde, *Collection de Vases Grecs*, I, pl. 73, 74). For other instances one may consult Furtwängler in Roscher's *Lexikon*, 2218 f. Once the horses of the chariot are inscribed *Διός* (*B. M.* 567). Ovid refers to the scene in the *Metamorphoses*,

quem pater omnipotens inter cava nubila raptum
quadriu curru radiantibus intulit astris.

(9, 271–272)

The marriage of Herakles to Hebe does not seem to be a favourite subject with the vase-painters, although they constantly associate the two. On the other hand literature, which in classical times does not say so much about the apotheosis as we might expect, has much to say about the *Ἡβης Γάμος*. It is in the *Odyssey* and Sappho, and later became a favourite subject in comedy. As a matter of fact the apotheosis and the marriage go together.

The Greek conception of Herakles then is fairly evident. He is the victorious Son of Zeus (*Διὸς Παῖς*. Cf. *Ζεὺς Πατήρ*), who after a bitter struggle finally enters Olympus in triumph. This may seem too obvious to be worth repeating, but its very obviousness may blind us to its significance for minds steeped in the atmosphere of the *Theogony*.

and the *Prometheus Bound*. The legends make Herakles the favourite son of Zeus and represent Hera as the enemy. Otherwise the parallel between Zeus as the Old King and Herakles as the Young King is worked out to the point when Herakles enters Olympus. Then, instead of the deposition of Zeus, follows an arrangement by which the newcomer is seated in glory by his father's side. That, as we see from many evidences — Hittite sculptures will give us a parallel — was a possible, as it is clearly a natural, solution of the tension involved in the very existence of the trinity. It is an arrangement like that which Homer describes in speaking of Aigaion,

Ἄγαλων' — δὲ γὰρ αὐτεῖ βίην οὐ πατρὸς ἀμείνων —

οἵ τα παρὰ Κρονίωνι καθέστο κύδεῖ γάλων. (A 404, 405)

There we have even in Homer the persistent fancy of the son mightier than his father, the son who under different circumstances would displace his sire. Both the dethronement and the compromise are possible ways of resolving the tension, and piety would come to lean more and more on the theory of accommodation. The thing to observe is that there is a tension to be resolved. It is so even in the case of Herakles. This appears from the *Vinctus* and what we know about the rest of the *Prometheia*. Prometheus says plainly that (1) Zeus will be undone by his own son, and (2) that he (Prometheus) will be released by a descendant of Io. With these two pieces of information in his possession Zeus, one might suppose, must have felt a little nervous when a descendant of Io did finally bear him Herakles. It should be remembered that Zeus did not know what son was destined to overthrow him until Prometheus spoke, apparently after being released by Herakles, who did so (if we accept the natural meaning of the words *ἄκοντος Διός* in *P. V. 771*) against the will of his father. Thus we see the full appropriateness of the part played by Herakles in the lost play. He is eminently fitted not merely to set free Prometheus but also to act as an intercessor or intermediary between Prometheus and Zeus. And we can reconcile the quotations,

1. ἐχθροῦ πατρὸς μοι τοῦτο φίλαταν τέκνον (P. S. vi)
2. τίς οὖν δὲ λίσσων ἔστιν ἄκοντος Διός; (P. V. 771)
3. οὐκ ἀέκητι Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ὑψηλέσσοντος. (Theog. 529)

One may borrow a pertinent illustration from the ancient religion of Anatolia. It seems to be clearly made out that this religion practically amounted to the worship of a Father God and a Son God, together with a Divine Mother. The Hittite Father God has all the characteristics of the Baal of Tarsus, while the Hittite Son is identical with Sandan. Now the Greeks identified this Baal with Zeus, and Sandan with Herakles.¹ This shows that the natural tendency of the Greek mind was to look upon Herakles as *par excellence* the Son of Zeus. It is I think a real piece of evidence that a Greek, seeing, let us say, the procession-scene in the rock-sculptures at Boghaz-Keui, would naturally call the Father deity *Zeus* and the Young God *Herakles*. It illuminates many similar scenes in Greek art where Zeus and Herakles appear together. If then we think of Herakles, at last received into Olympus as the beloved Son of Zeus and reconciled to Hera, in the spirit of that Hittite rock-sculpture where the Father, the Son, and the Mother meet in amity, we shall evidently be thinking as the Greeks themselves did. And the more we reflect along these lines the better we appear to see why Herakles intercedes for Prometheus.

One last point about Herakles. In freeing the Titan Prometheus he is following precedent. The Young King naturally appears as the Avenger of the Old King's predecessor. Both Hesiod and Aeschylus mention the curse of the fallen old god. Zeus fulfils upon Kronos the curse of Ouranos. The anticipated successor of Zeus will fulfil upon him the curse of Kronos. Zeus set free the *Hekatoncheires*, who had been maltreated by Kronos, to aid him against his father. It is therefore in accordance with precedent that Herakles should release Prometheus. Only now, instead of war, there follows the reconciliation which ends the ancient recurring strife between the Old and the Young Kings of Heaven.

I. THE TITANS

The Chorus of *Prometheus Solutus* was composed of Titans (Arrian, *Peripl. Pont. Eux.*, p. 19), and Prometheus himself is a Titan. The reason why they appear in the play is that they have been released by Zeus and are sympathetic with their brother.

¹ See Frazer, *Adonis, Attis and Osiris*, p. 48, n. 4; 50 f.; 60; 78; 81.

1. Τιτάνες θ' ὑποαρχάριοι Κρόνον ἀμφὶς ἔβατε. (Theog. 851)
 2. λῦσε δὲ Ζεὺς ἄφθιτος Τίτανας. (Pind. Pyth. 4, 518)

We are reminded by (1) that Kronos was himself one of the Titans and was imprisoned in Tartaros along with them.

3. Ιν' Ἰάκερός τε Κρόνος τε
 ἥμενοι οὐτ' αύγγις 'Τπερλονος ἡλιον
 τέρποντ' οὐτ' ἀνέμοισι, βαθὺς δὲ τε Τάρταρος ἀμφὶς. (Θ 479)

Of course it is not to be supposed that Kronos appears in the Chorus of the *Solutus*.

The Titans represented, we might almost say symbolized, to the Greek mind the old order of things superseded by the reign of Zeus. Their ruler Kronos is the Old King in relation to Zeus, and that has moulded the conception of all the Titans.¹ The proof of this is written all over Greek art and literature. But it seems worth recalling that there were always two, apparently contradictory, ways of regarding Kronos and the Titans. Usually in literature, and regularly in art, they are the representatives of lawlessness, violence, and a rude way of life. But then, on the other hand, the reign of Kronos is often represented as the Golden Age, full of peace and plenty and a virtuous simplicity. The contradiction need not trouble anybody; but when scholars, eager to justify the Zeus of the *Prometheia*, say that he brings in a better order of things, it is just as well to remember that it is the sympathetic view of the Titans which prevails in all we know of the trilogy. The beautiful lament of the Okeanides over τὰ πρὸν τελώνια marks this sympathy, which indeed is felt throughout the *Vinctus*. And it is difficult to imagine how it could have been lost in the *Solutus*, where Titans formed the Chorus, coming perhaps to admonish, but surely also to comfort Prometheus.

J. PROMETHEUS AS THE OLD KING

Prometheus is a Titan and may therefore on that ground be regarded as in some sense an Old King. But there is much more par-

¹ It is possible that the word Τίταν itself means 'King.' See Solmsen, *Indog. Forsch.*, 1912, xxx, 35, n. 1, quoted by A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, I, p. 655, n. 2.

ticular evidence than that. A *scholium* on Soph. *Oed. Col.* 56 says that at the entrance to the shrine of Athena in the *Akademia*,

1. συντιμάται [δὲ Προμηθεὺς] τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ, καθάπερ δὲ Ἡφαιστος. καὶ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ παλαιὸν ἔδρυμα καὶ βωμὸς ἐν τῷ τεμένει τῆς θεοῦ. δείκνυται δὲ καὶ βάσις ἀρχαῖα κατὰ τὴν εἰσόδου, ἐν γὰρ τοῦ τε Προμηθέως ἐστὶ τύπος καὶ τοῦ Ἡφαιστοῦ. —

This part of the scholium is derived from Apollodorus. The scholiast proceeds, πεποίηται δέ, ὡς καὶ Λυσιμαχίδης φησίν, δὲ μὲν Προμηθεὺς πρώτος καὶ πρεσβύτερος ἐν δεξιᾷ σκήπτρον ἔχων, δὲ δὲ Ἡφαιστος νέος καὶ δεύτερος· καὶ βωμὸς ἀμφοῖν κοινὸς ἐστιν ἐν τῇ βάσει ἀποτετυπωμένος.

Here Prometheus is visibly the Old King with the Young King by his side.

2. ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ ἐστὶ Προμηθέως βωμὸς καὶ θεουσιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντες καιομένας λαμπάδας.¹ (Paus. I, 30, 2)

3. θεῶν Προμηθεὺς ἦν τις, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρώτων. (Babrius, *Fab.* 66)

He is sometimes called θεός, sometimes and usually Τιτάν, sometimes both.

4. δὲ πυρφόρος θεός

Τιτάν Προμηθεύς

(Soph. *O. C.* 55, 56)

It is clear that Prometheus was quickly superseded in the cults by Hephaistos and ceased to be much regarded even in Athens.

5. καὶ γίγνεται αὐτῷ λαμπάς, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲ εὐ
ἀγαθόν

(Menander, *Frg.* 535 Kock)

But this makes it the more imperative to grasp the significance of their relation.

K. HEPHAISTOS AS YOUNG KING

We have already seen part of the evidence. A good deal might be added. Hephaistos says in *Prometheus Vinctus* 39,

1. τὸ συγγενές τοι δεινὸν ή θού δυσλία.

This is explained by their relation to each other in the common cult at Athens.

¹ For the torch-race and its significance see Frazer on the passage in Pausanias.

2. Τιτρος ἐν ἀ τῶν Ἀπθίδων, εἰπὼν ὡς ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀπατουρίων ἑορτῇ
 Ἀθηναῖων οἱ καλλιστας στολὰς ἐνδεικότες, λαβόντες ἡμιένας λαμπάδας
 ἀπὸ τῆς ἑστίας, ὑμοῦντι τὸν Ἡφαιστον θύοντες ὑπόμνημα τοῦ κατανοήσαντα
 τὴν χρέαν τοῦ πυρὸς διδάξαι τοὺς ἄλλους (Harpocr., s.v. Δαμπάς).

There is really very little difference between the claim made by Prometheus in the *Vinctus* and the claim made for Hephaistos here. An unsophisticated mind would make no such distinction.

3. (Hephaistos) δος μετ' Ἀθηναῖν γλαυκωπίδος ἀγλαὰ ἔργα
 ἀνθρώπους ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ χθονός, οὐ τὸ πάρος περ
 ἀντροῖς ναιεράσκον ἐν οὐρεσιν ἤντε θῆρες. (Hymn to Heph. xx)

This (if we leave out Athena) is precisely what Prometheus did for men (*P. V.* 436 f.). Both claims may be regarded as true if we believe that we are dealing with a *μύθος* arising out of a common worship. The Young King will naturally have the story told about him as well as about the Old King.

The notion of Hephaistos as the Young King or Young God strikes us as a little incongruous. We are apt to think of him as an elderly bearded person with the air of a respectable workman. But the ancients did not always so think of him. He is represented as young on a coin of Populonia, for instance,¹ and he was young in the sculpture mentioned by the scholiast on Sophocles, the significance of which has already been discussed. That significance is of course very great not only in relation to Prometheus, but for the god himself, since this was a cult-image in one of the few genuine cults of Hephaistos in ancient Greece. Again, a favourite subject of the vase-painters is the triumphant Entry of Hephaistos into Olympos; just as similar entries of Herakles and Dionysos are very favourite subjects with them. These Entries are, I think, usually explained in a quasi-historical way. Herakles, it is said, and Dionysos and Hephaistos were not originally Olympian Gods; Herakles was at first a mere 'hero,' Dionysos came from Thrace, Hephaistos perhaps from Lemnos; accordingly a kind of memory of this lingered in the belief that they were at some definite time formally introduced into Olympus. But who, one would like to know, *were* the original Olympians? It seems a very difficult ques-

¹ *B. M. Cat.*, Italy, p. 5.

tion. The historical explanation appears to have quite an insufficient basis of knowledge. On the other hand to anyone carefully reading the *Theogony*, a document bearing in parts the most evident signs of antiquity, with every allowance for interpolation and 'writing-up' the most authentic and authoritative statement of Greek doctrine about the Gods, it is clear that the really operative factor in Olympus is just such a trio of Father, Son, and Consort as we find in the religions of those ancient peoples who surrounded early Greece. We have Ouranos, Kronos, Gaia; followed by Kronos, Zeus, Rhea; followed by Zeus, Herakles . . . Hera. The Young King who succeeds Ouranos will be Kronos or one of the Titans; the successor of Kronos will be Zeus or Poseidon. I mean, the fact that it is Kronos and not Enkelados who succeeds Ouranos, the fact that it is Zeus and not Poseidon who succeeds Kronos, are probably historical accidents. The names are nothing; the relation of Father, Son, and Consort is everything. So when we come to Zeus, we find that the Son is called now Apollo, now Dionysos, now Herakles, now Hephaistos. These no doubt were originally local names for the Son-God. This would explain the extraordinary similarity, indeed the fundamental identity, of the mythology of Apollo and Dionysos and Herakles. About Hephaistos we know very little. But what we do know is perfectly consistent with the assumption that he is a Son-God of the type we have been discussing. He is cast from Heaven by his Father for taking the side of Hera (A 590). He enters Heaven in triumph. If he is usually represented as bearded and elderly, it is for the same reason that Herakles and Dionysos are often represented as bearded. In time the Young King becomes the King. Thus the grown Dionysos is apparently sometimes identified with Zeus himself. A *scholium* on Apollonios Rhodios (1, 977) says *οἱ δὲ δύο πρότερον εἶναι τοὺς Καβεῖρους, Δία τε πρεσβύτερον καὶ Διένυσον νεώτερον* — a sentence which inevitably reminds one of the sculpture in the Academy.

What we may call the static conception of the Gods is largely an illusion due to the necessary limitations of art and to a different theology. Ancient Gods were not eternally fixed in an unchanging form and age. They changed, Plato complained, 'like wizards.' The ancient God grows and develops. The essence of his ritual was a celebration — usually in the form of some kind of mimetic dance —

of his whole life-history. Thus the *μύθος*, which explains the ritual, usually tells what he suffered and achieved. The truth appears to be that the worshipper did not engage in the ritual with some fixed ideal picture of the God in his mind; the ritual itself would prevent that. If for instance he participated in a Dionysiac rite in which the story of the God's birth and all his history until his final assumption into Olympus was enacted, it is clear that he must have thought of Dionysos as first a baby and afterwards a youth and a man. Art, however, cannot represent the process of growth, but only stages in that process; while we, who possess the remains of ancient art but have lost the mental attitude of the ancient worshipper, are apt to think of Dionysos as eternally young and beautiful. Yet even in ancient art he is not always so represented. In fact the type of the bearded Dionysos is normal in the early vases. Nor is the infant Dionysos unknown. It is clear that the ancient artist did not feel himself bound by any sacred, ideal, unchangeable form. In the same way we have a young and even an infant Zeus and a mature Zeus, a young Apollo and a bearded Apollo. And so we have a youthful Hephaistos and an elderly Hephaistos. It simply means that in the early part of his life-history he played the part of the *θεὸς νεώτερος*, the Divine Son, the Young King; and that he grew out of the part. Meantime, in relation to Prometheus in the particular Athenian cult we are considering, he is the Young King.

L. ATHENA AS CONSORT

If Prometheus normally is the Old King and Hephaistos the Young King, it is natural to ask who is the Consort; for then we should have exactly such a trinity as we find in the case of Kronos—Zeus—Rhea and in the other cases we have observed. The suggestion that Athena may be the Consort in the Prometheus-Hephaistos complex has a startling appearance at first, because she is so predominantly the Virgin Goddess. Or perhaps it is not startling at all, since it is now recognized that, even if her virgin character be not a later refinement upon the original conception of her — and some think it is —, at any rate she was at a very early period identified with certain divinities, whose original character was not virginal. It is clear for instance that she was, up to a point and in certain aspects, identified with Ge at

Athens: the story of Erechtheus-Erichthonios shews this. We may therefore proceed at once with the evidence connecting her with Hephaistos and Prometheus.

1. συντιμάται (δὲ Προμηθεὺς) τῇ Ἀθηνᾶ, καθάπερ δὲ Ἡφαιστος
(Schol. Soph. O. C. 56. See above.)

This establishes at any rate the existence of the trinity Prometheus-Hephaistos-Athena in the *Akademeia*.

2. Ἡφαιστία· Ἀθηνᾶ (Hesychius, s.v.)

3. in templo Vulcani et Minervae quod ambo unum habebant Athenis (August. *de civ. Dei*, 18, 12),

4. ὑπὲρ δὲ τὸν Κεραμεικὸν καὶ στοὰν τὴν καλουμένην βασιλειον ναὸς ἐστιν Ἡφαιστον· καὶ διὰ μὲν ἀγαλμά οἱ παρέστηκεν Ἀθηνᾶς, οὐδὲν θαῦμα ἐποιούμην τὸν ἐπὶ Ἐριχθονίῳ ἐπιστάμενος λόγον. (Paus. I, 14, 6)

The story to which Pausanias refers is related by 'Apollodoros' (*Bibl.* 3, 14, 6) as follows,

τοῦτον (τὸν Ἐριχθόνιον) οἱ μὲν Ἡφαιστον καὶ τῆς Κραναοῦ θυγατρὸς Ἀτθίδος εἶναι λέγουσιν, οἱ δὲ Ἡφαιστον καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς, οὕτως. Ἀθηνᾶ παρεγένετο πρὸς Ἡφαιστον, δύλα κατασκευάσαι θέλουσα. δὲ ἐγκαταλειμμένος ὑπὸ Ἀφροδίτης εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν δώσθε τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, καὶ διώκειν αὐτὴν ἤρξατο· ηδὲ ἔφενγε. ὡς δὲ ἔγγὺς αὐτῆς ἐγένετο πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ (ἥν γὰρ χωλός), ἐπερῆπτο συνελθεῖν. ηδὲ ὡς σώφρων καὶ παρθένος οὖσα οὐκ ἤτέσχετο, δὲ ἀπεσπέρμηνεις τὸ σκέλος τῆς θεᾶς. ἐκείνη δὲ μυσταχθεῖσα ἐριψίᾳ πομπέασσα τὸν γόνον εἰς γῆν ἔρριψε, καὶ Ἐριχθόνιος γίνεται.

This looks marvellously like an attempt to reconcile a tradition that Erichthonios was the son of Hephaistos and Athena with the belief in her virginity. In any case, as Apollodoros says, Erichthonios was their son, although in an abnormal way (οὕτως).

5. Χαλκεῖα· ἐορτὴ Ἀθήνησι, ἡ τινες Ἀθήναια καλοῦσιν . . . ὅστερον δὲ ὑπὸ μόνων ἥγετο τῶν τεχνιτῶν, διτὶ Ἡφαιστος ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ χαλκὸν εἰργάσατο. έστι δὲ ἐνη καὶ νέα τοῦ Πιναρεψιῶνος, ἐν ἥ καὶ ἕρεια μετὰ τῶν ἀρρηφόρων τὸν πέπλον (the Peplos) διάζονται . . . Φανόδημος δὲ φησιν οὐκ Ἀθηνᾶ ἀνεσθαι τὴν ἐορτὴν, ἀλλ' Ἡφαιστῷ.

(Suidas s.v. Cf. Harp. Et. M.)

Plato describing primeval Attica says,

6. Ἡφαιστος δὲ κοινὴν καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ φύσιν ἔχοντες, ἡμα μὲν ἀδελφὴν ἐκ ταῦτον πατρός, ἡμα δὲ φιλοσοφίᾳ φιλοτεχνίᾳ τε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐλθόντες, οὗτω μίαν ἀμφοι λῆξιν τὴν χώραν εἰλήχαστον ὡς οἰκεῖαν καὶ πρόσφορον ἀρετῇ καὶ φρονήσει πεφυκύναν.

(*Critias*, 109c)

These passages clearly show that Athena could be regarded at Athens as intimately associated with Hephaistos and, in the Erichthonios story at least, definitely as his 'consort.' Let us now consider her relation to Prometheus.

We have already noted that the birth of Athena was facilitated by a blow on the head of Zeus by Hephaistos or Prometheus. The alternatives are interesting; but we learn more from a passage in the myth related by Protagoras in the Dialogue named after him. It has been suggested, with considerable probability, that the myth is derived more or less directly from a treatise of Protagoras *περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς καταστάσεως* (Diog. Laert. 9, 55). In any case it should be remembered that we are not dealing here with a historical record, but with a story embellished and adapted to a special purpose. Yet such a story is clearly best adapted to its special purpose when it least violates the current tradition; and the Greek habit was to respect the tradition as much as possible. It is therefore worth while to consider what Protagoras (or Plato) says, even if we cannot make any certain inference.

The story is that Prometheus and Epimetheus were commissioned by the gods to assign suitable 'powers' (*δυνάμεις*) to the animals (including men), who had just been created. Epimetheus used up his store of powers before he came to mankind,

7. ἀπορίᾳ οὖν ἔχόμενος δὲ Προμηθεύς, ἤντινα σωτηρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὔροι, κλέπτει Ἡφαιστον καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἐντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρὶ — ἀμήχανον γάρ ἦν ἀνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητήν τῷ ή χρησίμην γενέσθαι — καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ. τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἀνθρώπους ταῦτη ἔσχεν, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχεν· ἦν γάρ παρὰ τῷ Διὶ· τῷ δὲ Προμηθεῖ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ Διὸς οἰκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν· πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν· εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς καὶ Ἡφαιστον οἰκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐφιλοτεχνεῖτην, λαθὼν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τὴν τε

Ἐμπυρον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἐφαίστου καὶ τὴν ἀλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορίᾳ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθέα δὲ δι' Ἐπιμηθέα ὑστερον, ὥπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δικη μετήλθεν.

(*Prot.* 321c-322a)

The first thing to remark about this is that it is not from Zeus that fire is here said to have been stolen by Prometheus. The current view, however, was that Prometheus stole the fire from Zeus or, more vaguely, from heaven,

8. κρύψε (Ζεὺς) δὲ πῦρ· τὸ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔνις πάσι Ἰαπετοῖο
ἐκλεψύ ἀνθρώπουσι Διὸς πάρα μητιθεντος
ἐν κοτλῷ νάρθηκι λαθὼν Δία τερπικέραυνον. (Hes. *O. D.* 50-52)

9. devenit ad Iovis ignem; quo deminuto etc.
(*Hyg. poet. astr.* 2, 15)

10. ferula ignem de caelo subripuisse, etc. (Servius in *Verg. ecl.* 6, 42)

11. raptor per ferulam ignis divini. (Acron in *Hor. C.* 2, 13, 37)

12. post ignem aetheria domo
subductum. (Hor. *Od. I.* 3, 29-30)

13. ignem,
quem summa caeli raptum de parte Prometheus
donavit terris. (Juv. *Sat. xv.* 83-85)

Diodorus (5, 67) says that fire, according to some mythographers, was stolen by Prometheus 'from the gods.' Others say it was stolen from Lemnos, and in particular from Mount Mosychlos in Lemnos. Thus Cicero speaks of the furtum Lemnium (*Tusc. Disp.* 11, 10). Another version of the story represents the fire as having been secretly withdrawn from the sun.

14. Prometheus [Iapeti et Clymenes filius] post factos a se homines dicitur auxilio Minervae caelum ascensisse: et adhibita facula ad rotam Solis ignem furatus, quem hominibus indicavit. (Serv. in *Verg. ecl.* 6, 42)

A similar statement occurs more than once elsewhere (see A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, I, p. 324).

It has been thought that in the *Prometheus Soltus*, Aeschylus spoke of fire as stolen from Lemnos; but this remains a conjecture. He does not so speak in the *Vinctus*, where Kratos addressing Hephaistos says,

15. τὸ σὸν γὰρ ἄνθος, παντέχον πυρὸς σέλας,
θηγοῦσι κλέψας ὥπασεν.

(7-8)

Compare the passage (1) from the *Protagoras*, κλέπτει Ἡφαιστού . . . τὴν ἐντεχνον σοφίαν σὸν πυρὶ — κλέψας τὴν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην τὴν τοῦ Ἡφαιστού.

The similarity in the language of these passages suggests that the later writer is working on the same form of the myth as Aeschylus. Both writers at any rate agree that the fire was stolen from Hephaistos. But can we go any further? Is there plausibility in the suggestion that we are here dealing with the Athenian form of the myth connected with the joint worship of Prometheus and Hephaistos in the *Akademia*? It seems natural, and almost inevitable, that there should be an Athenian story connected with this cult, and, if we grant that, we may be led to suspect that Aeschylus made use of the local myth, especially if we believe that the *Purphoros* dealt with the institution of the torch-race. In the absence of evidence conjecture is idle. Only, the present writer confesses to a strong impression (1) that the story related by Protagoras is substantially the Athenian myth, allowing for the circumstance that in the *Protagoras* the scene of the theft is apparently Olympus, since man has not yet been created; and (2) that Aeschylus founded his trilogy on this myth. On this supposition it is interesting to note the Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ in Plato; these must be the Kratos and Bia of the *Prometheus Vinctus*. Protagoras says that the theft was made from the 'common house' of Hephaistos and Athena; the inference from this would be that Athena was definitely regarded as sharing the temple of Prometheus-Hephaistos. We may recall the words of the Sophoclean scholium, συντιμᾶται (δ Προμηθεῖς) τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ, καθάπερ δ Ἡφαιστος. καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῷ παλαιὸν ἴδρυμα καὶ βωμὸς ἐν τῷ τεμένει τῆς θεοῦ.

16. λαμπαδηροιμιαὶ δὲ γίνονται τρεῖς ἐν τῷ Κεραμεικῷ, Ἀθηνᾶς Ἡφαιστού Προμηθέως.

(Schol. Ar. Ran. 131)

17. τρεῖς ἀγουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι ἑορτὰς λαμπάδας, Παναθηναῖοι καὶ Ἡφαιστεῖοι καὶ Προμηθεῖοι.

(Harpocr., s.v. λαμπάς)

18. ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ ἐστὶ Προμηθέως βωμὸς καὶ θέουσιν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἔχοντες καιομένας λαμπάδας.

(Paus. 1, 30, 2)

It is usually inferred from this that the altar of Prometheus in the *Akademia* was the starting point of the torch-races in the Panathenaia, the Hephaistia, and the Prometheia.

19. γαμηλία· ή ἐς τοὺς φράγορας ἐγγραφή· ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν θυσίαν οὕτω φασὶ λέγεσθαι τὴν ὑπέρ τῶν μελλόντων γαμεῖν ἡμακέντην (γυνομένην ἵ) τοὺς ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ (sic)· καὶ οὐνοι ἥγοντο λαμπαδορομίαν τὴν ἑορτὴν τῷ τε Προμηθεῖ καὶ τῷ Ἡφαιστῷ καὶ τῷ Πανὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· οἱ ἔφηβοι ἀλειψάμενοι παρὰ τοῦ γυμνασιάρχον κατὰ διαδοχὴν τρέχοντες ἤπιοντο τὸν βωμόν· καὶ δὲ πρώτος ἄψας ἐνίκα καὶ η τούτου φυλή.

(Patmian *schol.* Dem. 57-43, *Bull. Corr. Hell.* I, p. 11)

Compare with this K (2). The *Gamelia* was part of the ceremonies performed in the *Apaturia* and was therefore part of the ritual of Athena. The details are too scanty and too obscure to permit us to make any certain inference; but we can say that here again we have the association Prometheus-Hephaistos-Athena, and this in a rite performed in behalf of those about to marry.

M. CONCLUSION

We are left at last in some uncertainty about the general bearing of the evidence and in the deepest uncertainty about many of the details. The character of the material for a judgement is such as to make every interpretation somewhat hypothetical. Yet it is possible to hope that something has been gained by the discussion. It has at least kept steadily in view the point with which the poet of the *Prometheia* is chiefly concerned, namely the relation between the King of the Gods and his possible successor — the Contest, as I have called it, between the Old King and the New. The terminology may be thought unsatisfactory, but what it is meant to describe is true. The idea of such a contest among the gods was perfectly familiar to the Greek mind. Clearly it was much in the mind of Aeschylus. It reveals itself in the *Agamemnon* (see E 1) and the *Eumenides* as well as in the *Prometheia*. The concluding part of the *Eumenides* is particularly interesting when we raise the question how the *Prometheia* ended. The circumstances are remarkably similar. The outcry of the Furies against the over-riding by the 'younger gods' of the ancient divine order exactly expresses the complaint of Prometheus. Both they and

Prometheus belong to that earlier *régime*; and there are certain other points of comparison. Moreover it seems to be now pretty generally conceded that the *Purphoros* dramatized the institution of the torch-race from the altar of Prometheus, who in fact is called ὁ πυρφόρος θεός by Sophocles. If we may assume that, the parallel with the *Eumenides* becomes at once more complete, since the close of the *Eumenides* represents the foundation of the *Panathenaia*. That was conclusively shown by W. G. Headlam; and his proof is perhaps an additional argument in favour of the current view regarding the *Purphoros*.

Now in the *Eumenides* the Furies undergo a sudden revulsion of feeling, withdraw their plea, and are reconciled to the younger gods against whom they have been so vehemently declaiming. We might infer from this that Prometheus also in the end admitted that he had erred and became reconciled to Zeus. Nearly all scholars have taken this view, because on any other assumption it is extremely hard to see how the trilogy could be brought to an end that would not outrage Aeschylean theology.

But the parallel with the *Eumenides* may be pushed too far. To the modern reader it seems (to put it plainly) that the Furies are in the wrong while Prometheus is in the right. And this makes all the difference in the world. We must of course, if we are to understand the *Prometheia* aright, occupy the ancient, not the modern point of view; and it is argued that to the ancient mind Prometheus was wrong in helping mankind against the will of Zeus, and was therefore justly punished. That argument appears to need investigating.

Let us consider first the *ἀμαρτία* with which Prometheus was charged and to which he himself pleads guilty (ἐκών ἐκών ήμαρτον, οὐκ ἀρνήσομαι 266). It is a case of theft (*κλοπή*. Cf. Protagoras in Plato *κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν* L 7). Technically Prometheus was guilty. Now his whole story belongs to a stage of thought which we are justified in calling primitive. We have to consider the attitude of the primitive mind to law and to a legal offence. The absolutely primitive mind (if such a thing could exist) is concerned purely with the fact, not at all with the motive. Now although the absolutely primitive mind is hypothetical, there is no doubt that the progress of law has been from a state of mind which takes less, to a state of mind which takes more,

account of motive in the commission of a legal offence. The history of the law of homicide provides an excellent illustration of this change. The notion of bloodguiltiness had originally nothing to do with the question of motive or indeed with morality at all. You might contract the guilt of bloodshed by accident. In the *Eumenides* the Furies argue that Orestes is guilty of murder because in fact he killed his mother, and that the plea of justification is irrelevant. That was the primitive view. Greek morality challenged and overthrew it, but we should remember that the process took time. It was an immense step in human progress. We can see that Aeschylus is intensely interested in it. It was perhaps more of a living issue to him than we quite realise. The idea of sin as a stain or infection which one may acquire or inherit like a disease is to be met everywhere in him, and we may suspect that it lingered — even if only as a *τριγέρων μῆθος* — in many minds about him. Even in much later times it is possible that the disturbing effect upon the popular mind of Hippolytus' words, ή γλώσσ' δμώμοχ', ή δὲ φρήν ἀνώμορος, was due to a lingering prejudice that, even if one were tricked into an oath, one was still somehow bound by it. That was the primitive view; it is still the 'romantic' view. It is not the view of Aeschylus. He raises the question of justification. He takes the extreme case of Orestes, who killed his mother, and states sympathetically the arguments for his acquittal. He is against the Furies with their thirst for vengeance, for everlasting torture of the prisoner. And there is no question whatever that he carried his audience with him.

In the *Vinctus* Prometheus admits the *δμάρτημα*, but pleads justification. We also know that in the end Zeus and Prometheus were somehow reconciled, as in the *Eumenides* the Furies and Athena are reconciled. The analogy, so far as it goes, rather suggests that the justification of Prometheus, so magnificently claimed in the *Vinctus*, was in fact established in the end — at least up to a point fairly satisfactory even to the modern sense of justice. And this view appears to be supported by the words of Hyginus in telling the story of Prometheus: Thetidi Nereidi fatum fuit, qui ex ea natus esset, fortiorum fore quam patrem. Hoc praeter Prometheus cum sciret nemo, et Iuppiter vellet cum ea concubere, Prometheus Iovi pollicetur, se eum praemonitetur si se vinculis liberasset. Itaque fide data monet

Iovem ne cum Thetide concumberet, ne, si fortior nasceretur, Iovem de regno deiceret, quemadmodum et ipse Saturno fecerat. Itaque datur Thetis in coniugium Peleo, Aeaci filio, et mittitur Hercules, ut aquilam interficiat, quae eius cor exedebat; eaque interfecta Prometheus post triginta annos de monte Caucaso est solutus (*Fab.* 54). Here there is mention of a pledge (*fides data*) given by Zeus to Prometheus. The knot is untied by a compromise honourable at least to Prometheus.

That at any rate would be the Greek view. If it seems a little disappointing to us, we had better consider if our disappointment be not due to a misapprehension. Certainly we do not want Prometheus to compromise with the Zeus of the *Vinctus*. But the Zeus of the *Solutus* is not the Zeus of the *Vinctus*. Neither is the Prometheus of the later play the Prometheus of the earlier. The interval of 30,000 years has profoundly altered the character of both. In the case of Zeus this change has found expression in the setting free of Kronos and the Titans. Pindar, the contemporary of Aeschylus, says: *λῦσε δὲ Ζεὺς ἀφθιτος Τίτανας· τὸν δὲ χρόνῳ μεταβολαι λήξαντος οὐρου* (*Pyth.* iv, 518). Zeus has learnt moderation in the punishments he inflicts and even compassion — qualities in which the god of the *Vinctus* is singularly deficient. That Aeschylus wished to emphasize this moral revolution appears certain from the introduction of a Chorus of released Titans in the *Solutus*. They were living evidence, which Prometheus could not reject, that Zeus was after all capable of a certain generosity.

But there are deeper issues involved, and in discussing them I think we touch the heart of the problem. We have studied with some minuteness the religious background of the trilogy. We have seen with what sort of matter — the feuds of the gods — Aeschylus had to deal. Behind the immediate question which divides Zeus and Prometheus, who is to be the next King of the Gods, rises the larger question of the respective values of the old and the new *régime*, the rule of the Titans and the rule of Zeus. Prometheus, although at first he had sided with Zeus against his brethren, in the *Vinctus* has definitely ranged himself on the side of the Titans. Now to the Greek mind, and perhaps more particularly to the Athenian mind, the Titans stood for something very definite. They were the forces of lawlessness, *ἀνάρχα*. The service of Zeus was to introduce law and order into the govern-

ment of the universe. It is easy for us to admit the truth of this in words; it is not easy to realize the intensity of Greek emotion about it. In the centuries between us and ancient Hellas the balance of material power has shifted. The advantage of force is now with Civilization and not with Barbarism; at least we have grown up in that belief. Accordingly we have acquired the habit of regarding the Barbarian with toleration and even a certain admiration, more or less sincere, for his picturesqueness and naturalness. That is because we no longer fear him. (Our confidence has been qualified of late). The ancient Greek was not insensible to the romantic attraction of Barbarism. But he was in constant and deadly peril from it, and therefore in acute fear of it. So he came to attach what seems to us an excessive value to the virtues in which the Barbarian is specially deficient — self-control and respect for the law. Hellenism is the correlative of Barbarism. It was in contact with the Barbarian, Thucydides tells us, that Hellenism first became conscious of itself. Liberty (*ἐλευθερία*), according to the Greek *maxim*, is the Reign of Law, and Hellenism is based on *Eleutheria*. In Greek religion the Titans represented, at least to reflective minds, the spirit of lawlessness; they were the Barbarians of the divine world. Zeus on the other hand represented the Reign of Law — θεὸς δὲ ὁ θεῶν Ζεὺς ἐν νόμοις βασιλείων (Plato, *Crit. ad fin.*). Not only Plato but Aeschylus speaks like this. Zeus may have been relentless enough at first, but he did at least check the anarchy of the Titans and establish a Law. Hence Greek sympathy is with Zeus, because Greek sympathy is with the Law. Democritus says,

'Ο νόμος βούλεται μὲν εὐεργετεῖν βίον ἀνθρώπων, δύναται δέ, δραν αἴτοις βούλωνται πάσχειν εὖ τοῖς γάρ πειθομένοις τὴν ιδίην ἀρετὴν ἐνδεκενται.
(*Gn. 139*)

This magnificent saying may be taken as the justification of Zeus. His design is to benefit man by teaching him the habit of obedience to the Law, since it is only through such obedience that he acquires ἀρετή. If the lesson is painful, why, we must remember that to suffer is to learn, that wisdom comes by suffering. All this is characteristic not merely of Aeschylus, but of Greek morality. We become good by doing good things, and that is not easy, at least at first. Thus

understood, the design of Zeus may honestly be regarded as something higher and in the long run more beneficial to man himself than the hasty generosity of Prometheus.

The expression used by Aeschylus for the design or system of Zeus is *Διὸς ἀρμονία*,

οὐπως
τὰν Διὸς ἀρμονίαν θνατῶν παρεξίσαι βουλαῖ. (550-551)

The word *ἀρμονία* is used of tuning a lyre or stringing a bow. It is the word employed by Herakleitos to describe the tension of opposites which is so important an idea in his conception of the universe. He describes this tension as *παλιντονός ἀρμονῆς δικαστέρ τόξου καὶ λύρης* (Frg. 46, 56 Burnet). The *Διὸς ἀρμονία* seems best understood along a similar line of thought. It is the 'attunement of Zeus,' who is like a musician keying up, each to its proper pitch, the various strings, which will then combine to produce the *μέλος*. The first thing that Zeus did on becoming King of the gods was to assign to each his own province,

εἰθὺς δαιμοσιν νέμει γέρα
ἄλλοισιν ἄλλα, καὶ διεστοιχίζετο
ἀρχήν. (P. V. 229-231)

Later in the play Prometheus, somewhat inconsistently, asserts that it was he himself who really did this,

καίτοι θεῖσι τοῖς νέοις τούτοις γέρα
τις ἄλλος ή γά ταντελώδιώρισεν; (439-440)

But the fact that Zeus may have acted under advice does not affect the significance of his action. The significance lies in this, that Zeus once for all put a stop to the *ἀναρχία* and *ἀνομία* of the Titans. He acted exactly like an ancient *νομοθέτης* — like Lycurgus or Solon — dealing with anarchical conditions. He defined for everyone his function and privileges in the community. In this way he created law as contrasted with mere custom.

In *Prometheus Vinctus* the harshness of the new law is emphasized, but this has a clear dramatic value. In the *Eumenides* it is ancient custom that seems hateful. Like Prometheus and the Oceanides, the Furies belong to the old order of things and denounce the injustice of

the 'younger gods.' It is evident that the two sides have different notions of what justice is. The Furies have their interpretation of the rule δράσαντι παθεῖν, and Zeus and Apollo and Athena have theirs. There is an interesting debate between Apollo and the Furies on a point which, as we have seen, has its bearing upon the *Prometheia*,

Χο. πατρὸς προτιμᾶ Ζεὺς μόρον τῷ σῷ λόγῳ
αὐτὸς δ' ἔδησε πατέρα πρεσβύτην Κρόνον.
πῶς ταῦτα τούτους οὐκ ἐναρτίως λέγεις;
ὑμᾶς δ' ἀκούειν ταῦτ' ἔγώ μαρτύρομαι.

Απ. ὡς παντομοσῆι κυρώδαλα, στίγμῃ θεῶν,
πέδαι μὲν διν λυθεῖεν, ἔστι τοῦδ' ἄκος,
καὶ κάρτα πολλὴ μηχάνη λυτήριος·
ἀνδρὸς δ' ἐπειδὰν αἷμα ἀνασπάσῃ κόνις
ἄπταξ θαυμντος, οὗτις ἔστιν ἀνάστασις.
τούτων ἐπιφάνεια οὐκ ἐποίησεν πατήρ
οὐμός, τὰ δ' ἀλλα πάντ' ἀνω τε καὶ κάτω
στρέφων τιθησιν οὐδὲν ἀσθμαίνων μένει. (640-651)

In the *Solitus*, as we saw, Zeus has already released his father. His judgements, however harsh they appear, are not capricious. Aeschylus, pondering on the mystery, evidently convinced himself that justice was in the long run always done. Even in the case of Io,

τίν' διν θεῶν ἐνδικωτέρουσιν
κεκλοίμαν εὐλόγως ἐπ' ἔργοις; (Suppl. 590-591)

The conflict between Zeus and Prometheus is the conflict between Justice and Pity embodied in two superhuman wills. The problem in the trilogy is to reconcile these virtues. If the compromise suggested in our vague notices of the *Solitus* appears unsatisfactory, it will chasten us to remember that it is exactly the problem that we are now with tears and blood trying to solve. We may respond, as Aeschylus manifestly did, to the appeal of both Law and Compassion. But in our hearts the voice of Pity will always, one expects, find the quicker response; and we can sympathise with Prometheus all the more because in the end he had, like any man, to give up a little of his desire.

"ΤΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ 'ΟΜΗΡΙΚΩΣ (Cicero, Att. 1, 16, 1)

By SAMUEL E. BASSETT

THE sixteenth epistle of the first book of Cicero's letters to Atticus is in reply to two questions about the unexpected outcome of the trial of Clodius: "Quaeris ex me quid acciderit de iudicio, quod tam praeter opinionem omnium factum sit, et simul vis scire quo modo ego minus quam soleam proeliatus sim; respondebo tibi ὑστερον πρότερον 'Ομηρικῶς." Cicero proceeds at once to answer the second question, i.e., why he was less energetic than usual at the trial, and continues: "Itaque si causam quaeris absolutionis, ut iam πρὸς τὸ πρότερον revertar, egestas iudicum fuit et turpitudo." Editors offer two interpretations of the phrase ὑστερον πρότερον 'Ομηρικῶς:¹ (1) Cicero has in mind the figure commonly known in modern times as *hysteron proteron*,² which was used by Homer in phrases like *γαμέοντί τε γιγνομένῳ τε* (δ 208); or (2) the phrase refers to the arrangement of the material in the *Odyssey* by which the situation in the tenth year after the fall of Troy is described first, and the adventures of Odysseus on his journey home are narrated afterwards.³ I wish to propose an entirely different interpretation, and at the same time to discuss a feature of Homer's style, unrecognized in modern times, which has a bearing upon the higher criticism of the Homeric poems, and which is of considerable importance for the understanding and appreciation of the art of the poet.

¹ One editor, Boot (1865), questions the genuineness of the adverb 'Ομηρικῶς.

² The ancient Greek grammarians called this figure πρωθύστερον or ὑστερολογία; the Roman commentators, Servius and Donatus, seem to be the only ones who use the term *hysteron proteron*.

³ Of the two passages cited by Tyrrell in his note, the first, Quint., 7, 10, 11, ubi ab initiis incipiendum, ubi *more Homericō* e mediis vel ultimis, doubtless does refer to this, but the second is not so clear: succurrit quod praeterieram . . . sed quamquam praepostere (= ὑστερον πρότερον) reddetur: *facit hoc Homerus* (Pliny, Ep. 3, 9, 28). Here it is to be noted that Pliny is replying to *questions* of his correspondent.

In the Phaeacian episode (η 238 ff.) Arete asks Odysseus three questions: 'Who are you? Who gave you those garments? Did you not say that you came hither wandering o'er the sea?' In his reply Odysseus ignores the first question, but answers the second and third, beginning, however, with the last, which concerns his wanderings. This failure of Odysseus to tell his name to Arete Kirchhof made the corner-stone of his *Nótos*-theory.¹ Scholars no longer follow Kirchhof in this, but they disagree in the way in which they explain how the poet makes it seem natural for Odysseus to withhold his identity at this point in the narrative. It occurred to me that it might be profitable to investigate the order in which a series of questions is answered in the Homeric poems.

In the dialogue, especially where several questions are asked consecutively, Homer is at a disadvantage, compared with the dramatic poet. The Homeric manner requires every speech to begin at the beginning of the verse,² and to be preceded by a formula, usually occupying a whole verse, to introduce the speech. Since it would be unbearable to repeat this formula for each of several short questions, it follows that the questions must be as it were fired in volleys, rather than asked singly, and the answers must likewise be given in a single speech. Now when more than two questions are put consecutively a threefold arrangement of the answers is possible: the order of the questions may be retained, or varied, or reversed.

The first disposition of the answers is of course the most natural, and is found in both poems. The best example is α 180 ff., where Mentes-Athena replies in almost the exact order of the six questions asked by Telemachus: 'Who are you?' 'Mentes.' 'Where is your city?' 'I rule the Taphians.' 'In what ship did you come?' 'My own.' 'How did you happen to be sailing near

¹ Fick accepted the conclusions of Kirchhof, and Rothe in 1882 argued that in an earlier version of the poem Odysseus told the queen who he was, and that consequently the verses now found at the beginning of the ninth book (ϵ 16-28) originally belonged after η 242 (see Ameis-Hentze, Anhang). Rothe later (*Widersprüche*, 1894, 22 ff.) justified the passage as it stands, comparing other passages where a question is left unanswered.

² For the two or three exceptions, see Elderkin, *Aspects of the Speech in the Later Greek Epic*, 7 ff.

Ithaca?' 'I am on a trading voyage to Temesa.' 'Who are your crew?' (This question has been answered.) 'Are you a guest-friend of my father?' 'I am.'

More frequently, however, the answers are arranged differently from the questions. This seems to have been due to several considerations. The first is that of *variety*, which is the more desirable because the Homeric manner permits, and both the poet and his hearers seem to have enjoyed, repetition of various kinds. An example of varied order in the answers is § 149 ff. (the first words exchanged between Odysseus and Nausicaa): Odysseus: (1) 'Are you a goddess? (2) Take pity on me, for I am a suppliant. (3) Show me your city. (4) Give me the wherewithal to cover my nakedness.' Nausicaa replies: 'You shall have raiment (4) [Notice that she answers the last request first]; you shall lack nothing that a suppliant should receive (2); I will point out the city to you (3); and I am the daughter of Alcinous (1).'

The consideration of variety is reenforced by two others: *poetic economy* and the *point of view of the second speaker*. The first of these is illustrated by the passage referred to above (η 238 ff.): the poet cannot allow Odysseus to tell his name until the following evening, and by changing the order in which he answers the queries of Arete the conversation passes naturally from the question of the stranger's identity to the conduct of Nausicaa. The *point of view of the second speaker* determines the order in which Noemon answers the four questions of Antinous (δ 642 ff.). Antinous asks: 'When did Telemachus leave Ithaca? Who formed his crew? Did he take his own serfs and hirelings? Did he use force in taking your ship, or did you lend it willingly?' Noemon replies first to the last question ('I lent it willingly. What else could I do?'), for he understands it to contain a threat in case it proves that he has sided with Telemachus in the rapidly growing quarrel between the Suitors and the young prince, and he wishes to remove as far as possible any ground for their hostility to him.

These three principles of variety, poetic economy and point of view of the second speaker are overshadowed in importance by a fourth, that of *continuity*. Homer had a *horror vacui* which in intensity, though not in kind, reminds one of the painter of geometric

vases.¹ He was averse to *lacunae* of all kinds. Hence, for example, he avoids intervals of time in which there is no action. As Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch remarks, "The poet evades or hurries over every flat interval." Zielinski has shown that in the arrangement of their action both Iliad and Odyssey are *continuous* narratives, and as we shall see presently, the principle of continuity governs also the succession of ideas. We may also note by way of corollary, the scrupulous care with which the poet articulates his material even in its minute details.² This attention to what, since the war, we may call *liaison* contributes much to the ease with which one follows the story, and must have lessened greatly the demands upon the attention of the listener. A good example of this liaison is seen in the account of the advance of the two armies in the first day's battle of the Iliad. In the Catalogue the forces of the Achaeans are described, then the forces of the Trojans; the Trojans advance first, then the Achaeans (Γ 2, 8). But in the second onset of the two hosts (Δ 427, 433) it is the Achaeans whom we first see moving forward, because our attention has been centered on them.³ Another illustration of careful ligaturing is the custom, rarely violated in the 1300 or more speeches of the two poems, of referring to the character who has just spoken, with the words, 'Thus spoke,' or 'To him replied,' or the like. We may add the frequent use of the transitional $\mu\acute{e}v$ in such verses as A 312 f., 318 f.⁴ The poet, except

¹ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Griech. Literatur*, 17, compares the Homeric episodes with the scenes on geometric vases in respect to their symmetry.

² See also below, pp. 54 ff.

³ Cf. also for liaison in a minute detail, A 15 ff.,

καὶ ἐλίσσετο πάντες Ἀχαιούς,
 Ἀτρεῖδα δὲ μάλιστα δύο, κοσμήτορε λαῶν.
 Ἀτρεῖδαι τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἐκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί.
 . . .
 οὐδέ τοιούτοις πάντες ἐπευφῆμησαν Ἀχαιοί.
 . . .
 δλλά' οὐκ Ἀτρεῖδη 'Αγαμέμνονι τιθανε θυμῷ.
 οἱ μὲν ἔπειτ' ἀναβάντες ἐπέτλεον ὑγρὰ κέλειθα,
 λαοὺς δ' Ἀτρεῖδης ἀπολυμαίνεσθαι ἤσχετο.
 ως οἱ μὲν τὰ πένοντα κατὰ στρατόν· οὐδέ 'Αγαμέμνων
 λῆγ' ἔριδος.

in a few instances, takes even temporary leave of his characters with courteous ease and thoughtfulness.

A similar attention to careful transitions is found in the ideas of consecutive speeches. This is seen best of all in the *Embassy to Achilles*. The ninth book of the Iliad contains more *oratio recta* than any other part of the Iliad,¹ and the speeches are of a more markedly rhetorical character. Yet if one compares them with the *φήσεις δικαιωκαὶ* of Attic drama, for example, one notices a striking difference: in the latter, the second speaker when rebutting his opponent's arguments usually follows the same order.² Likewise in the *Ὀπλῶν Κρίσις* of Quintus Smyrnaeus, who was strongly influenced by Euripides, the second speaker, Odysseus, follows the order of his rival Aias in answering the charges of the latter.³ But in the *Embassy* it is quite the reverse: six speeches are made in the hut of Achilles, and in each of the first five the speaker begins with a reference to an idea that is fresh in the minds of the listener.⁴ Odysseus opens the negotiations with a reference to the feast which they have enjoyed, and with it contrasts the perilous situation of the Achaeans (vss. 225–230).⁵ Achilles in his reply, after a brief introduction, takes up first an argument made by Odysseus near the close of his long speech (vss. 315 ff. = 300 ff.). Again, Achilles closes his first speech with a reference to Phoenix (vss. 427 ff.), and this makes it natural for the latter, who is not an official ambassador, to speak before Aias. Phoenix begins his long plea by referring to the return to Phthia, which Achilles had mentioned in the last two verses of his speech (vss. 428 f.). In the reply of Achilles to Phoenix the first words echo the last words of the old man (*τιμῆς, τετιμῆσθαι*, vs. 608 = *τίουσι, τιμῆς*, vss. 603, 605 — a pretty 'chiasmus'). Finally, Aias begins the last of the three pleas with *ἴομεν* (vs. 625), which is suggested by the words of Achilles, *οὐτοι δ' ἀγγελέουσι* (vs. 617), almost at the end of his reply to Phoenix.

¹ Elderkin, *op. cit.*, 6.

² E. g., *Medea*, 475 ff., cf. 525 ff.; Soph. *Electra*, 526, cf. 558; see also J. T. Lees, *Δικαιωκὸς Λόγος* in Euripides, *Univ. of Nebraska Studies*, 1892, 380, 385, 396, 399.

³ Cf. Elderkin, *op. cit.*, 45 ff.

⁴ See also below, p. 52.

⁵ So in the *Odyssey* the same speaker at the beginning of the *Apologue* contrasts the *εἰφροσύνη* of the Phaeacians with his own *κῆδεα* (6, 12).

This echoing of the last idea of a previous speech at or very near the beginning of the reply occurs repeatedly in both poems. Let us notice a few examples taken from the Iliad:—

(1) A 138 ff. Agamemnon threatens to take Achilles' prize of war, and closes his speech with the suggestion that Achilles go as commander of the ship in which the daughter of Chryses is to be sent home. Achilles replies first to the last point: 'How shall any Achaean readily heed thy commands to go on a journey?' (vs. 151). Then (vs. 161) he recurs to the threat to take his prize.

(2) A 159 ff. In the same speech Achilles says (vs. 159): 'We came to win honor for thee,' and concludes (vs. 169 ff.): 'Νῦν δὲ με Φθῆνε.' Agamemnon replies: 'Flee by all means! I have others by my side to do me honor.'

(3) A 363 f., 365, Thetis: 'Why do you weep? Speak, that we both may know.' Achilles: 'Thou knowest.' (*εἰδοὺς: οἶσθα*).

(4) Γ 54, 64, Hector: 'The gifts of Aphrodite will not avail thee.' Paris (after a preamble): 'Reproach me not with the gifts of Aphrodite.'

(5) E 177 ff., 181 ff., Aeneas: 'Unless it is some god.' Pandarus (at the beginning of a long speech): 'I think it is Diomede, but I do not know if it is a god.' (*εἰ μή θεός εἴστι: εἰ θεός εἴστι*).

(6) E 249, 252, Sthenelus: 'Let us retire from the fight.' Diomede: 'Speak not to me of flight.'

(7) K 551, 556, Nestor: 'Methinks some god gave them to you (i.e., the horses of Rhesus).' Odysseus: 'A god might give better horses than these.' (*δόμεναι θεός: θεός δωρήσατο*).

(8) Σ 74, 79, Thetis: 'That for which thou didst pray hath been brought to pass for thee by Zeus.' Achilles: 'Aye, the Olympian hath brought this to pass for me' (*τὰ μὲν δὴ τοι τετέλεσται ἐκ Διός: τὰ μὲν δέ μοι Ολύμπιος ἔξετέλεσσεν*).

(9) T 139 ff., 146 ff., Agamemnon: 'So rouse thee to battle, and I will render the gifts; or, if thou wilt, tarry, and the gifts shall be brought.' Achilles: 'As thou wilt about the gifts, but now let us bethink us of the battle.' (*δῶρα παρασχέμεν: δῶρα παρασχέμεν*).

This arrangement may be called chiastic, but it is not the figure commonly called chiasmus. The latter is defined by the ancient grammarians as a reversal of order in the second of two subordinate

and balancedcola of a period. Professor Gildersleeve calls it “the beautiful Greek method of giving a double stress to opposing pairs, a stress that we are prone to bring about by the mechanical expedient of hammering emphasis and dead pause.”¹ The arrangement which we are studying, on the contrary, is a matter neither of rhetoric nor of emphasis, but a constructive principle, based on the association of ideas, which assists the narrator to hold the attention of his listener with a minimum of effort on the part of the latter. It is the λέξις εἰρημένη in its widest sense, by which the *thread of the narrative*, to keep the figure, is never snapped, but the events and ideas follow each other in unbroken and continuous succession. If one reads the poems carefully with this point in mind, no matter in what portions he reads, he is ever finding new illustrations of this principle of continuity, and none are more striking than those which are found in the answers to two or more questions. Since our present inquiry began with the two-fold question of Atticus, let us note a few instances parallel to Cicero’s order of answering the questions. This time we take our examples from the Odyssey:

(1) η 186 ff., Alcinous says in effect: ‘(1) Come, let us send the stranger home, unless (2) he is some god’ (an implied query as to his identity). Odysseus replies: ‘I am no god (2); so send me home (1).’

(2) λ 160 ff., Anticleia: ‘(1) Do you come hither on your wanderings from Troy? (2) Have you not yet reached Ithaca?’ Odysseus: ‘I have not yet set foot on my native soil (2); I am still a wanderer (1).’

(3) λ 210 ff., Odysseus: ‘Mother, (1) why do you not tarry to embrace me? (2) Has Persephone sent an *eidolon* to deceive me?’ Anticleia: ‘Persephone is not deceiving you (2), but the dead have no flesh and bones for embracing (1).’

(4) λ 492 ff., Achilles: ‘Tell me of (1) my son, and (2) of my father, if you have heard aught.’ Odysseus: ‘Of Peleus have I heard naught (2), but I can tell you of your son (1).’

(5) ξ 115 ff., Odysseus: ‘(1) Who was your master? (2) Perhaps I can give you tidings of him, for I have wandered far.’

¹ Pindar, Introd, p. cxv; see below, pp. 54ff., for a discussion of the relation between chiasmus and the feature of poetic style which we are examining.

Eumaeus: 'No wanderer's tidings can have credence with my master's wife and son (2); my master was Odysseus (1).'

(6) o 347 ff., Odysseus asks Eumaeus about (1) his mother and (2) his father. The swineherd tells first of Laertes (2) and then of Anticleia (1).

(7) o 509 ff., Theoclymenus asks Telemachus whether he shall go for hospitality (1) to the home of some prince of Ithaca or (2) to Penelope's palace. Telemachus replies that it is impossible for his mother to see him, since she spends most of her time in the *hyperoon* (2), but that he might become the guest of Eurymachus (1).

(8) ω 106 ff. Agamemnon asks Amphimedon (1) how the Suitors came to die, and (2) whether he does not remember him. Amphimedon replies that he remembers him well (2). Then he tells of the slaughter of the suitors (1).

(9) ω 288 ff., Laertes asks the disguised Odysseus (1) how long ago it was that he saw his son, and later, (2) who he is. Odysseus replies to the second question first.

Sometimes the reversal of order is seen in the replies to three or more questions or the like. Naturally this is of less frequent occurrence. Let us notice one from either poem:—

Z 254 ff., Hecabe asks Hector (1) why he has come from the battlefield, suggesting that it is to pray to Zeus from the citadel. Then she bids him wait until she brings him wine (2) to pour a libation to Zeus, and (3) to refresh himself withal. Hector replies: 'Bring me no wine, lest I forget my prowess (3) [Compare *μένος μέγα οἶνος ἀλέξει*, 261, with *μένεος δ' ἀλεκῆς τε λάθωμαι*, 265]; I would not pour a libation to Zeus with unclean hands (2); Do thou pray to Athena (1).'

λ 170 ff., Odysseus asks the shade of his mother (1) of her own death, whether she died (2) of disease or (3) by the gentle darts of Artemis; (4) of Laertes; (5) of Telemachus; (6) whether another has taken possession of his estate and royal power; and (7) of Penelope. Anticleia replies in *exactly the opposite order* to the seven questions: 'Penelope remains in thy halls (7) [*μένει*, 178, *μένει*, 181]; no one has taken thy kingship (6); Telemachus is master of thine estate (5); thy father dwells in the fields (4); and I died, not by the gentle darts of Artemis (3), nor of disease (2), but of grief for thee (1).'

By the time I had noticed this remarkable case of reversed order in the answer to a series of questions, I was convinced that this was the kind of *hysteron proteron* which Cicero meant when he wrote to Atticus that he would answer his two questions *τὸτερον πρότερον Ὁμηρικῶς*. But the doubt at once arose in my mind whether a feature of Homeric style which had escaped the searchlight of modern scholarship, could have been known in Cicero's day. This doubt was set completely at rest when I found in van Leeuwen's note on the passage in *λ* a reference to *Pap. Ox.* 1086.¹ This is a fragment of a commentary on B of the Iliad, and is dated about the middle of the first century, B.C. It shows the critical signs which indicate the tradition of Aristarchus, and must be independent of Didymus and Aristonicus, who are at least half a century later. The scholium on B 763 (in which the poet himself puts two questions to the Muse, and answers the second first)² is as follows: *τὸ σημεῖον, δὲ πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπήντησεν*. Then follows a most interesting note on the passage in *λ*. The first parts of the lines are missing, but the meaning is fairly clear. It seems that a certain Praxiphanes had put forth an *aporia* on this passage, criticizing the poet for making Odysseus reserve until the last his questions about Telemachus and Penelope, since this is what he would most wish to know. Aristarchus defended Homer by reference to B 763. The scholiast continues: *σημειοῦται δὲ διὰ παντὸς [δὲ ποιητῆς οὐτως εἰς τὰ διπέρα πρότερος [sic] ἀπαντᾷ κατὰ λόγου συνήθειαν*. 'Notice that the poet always, as here, answers the later questions first.' This seems to prove conclusively that long before Cicero wrote, Aristarchus had recognized Homer's fondness for making his characters reply to a two-fold or plural question in the

¹ *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, VIII, 1911.

² B 760 ff.,

οὐτοι δέ τις ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν.
τις τ' δέ τῶν δέκα δριστος ἦτορ — σὺ μοι ἔντες, Μούσα —
εἴτε δέ τις τις, οἱ δέ τις Ἀτρέδογενες ἐπορτο;
τις τις μὲν μέγ' δρισταις ἦσαν Φηρηγιάδες,

ἀνδρῶν αὖ μέγ' δριστος ἦτορ Τελαμώνιος Αἴας.

* I. e., the *διπλᾶ*, which Aristarchus used, among other things, to mark a peculiarity of style.

reverse order. "*Τοτερον πρότερον Όμηρικῶς* would therefore have been understood by Atticus in this sense, and not in either of the ways suggested by the commentators. The latter may be excused for their ignorance of this Aristarchan variety of *hysteron proteron*; and yet the key to the explanation had been at hand for a century and more! For the scholium of the Venetus A on B 763 reads: [*τὸ σημεῖον*] ὅτι πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπήργηκεν.¹

The *πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπάντησις* has a wider application than merely to the interpretation of a passage in Cicero: it is of importance in the entire criticism of Homer, both that which is called 'higher,' which destroys in order to rebuild the Homeric poems in most un-Homeric fashion, and the other truer criticism, whose aim is a more complete understanding and a juster estimation and appreciation of the great poet's art. We may briefly indicate this two-fold importance.

One of the points of attack of the higher critics is the order in which events are narrated in our Iliad and Odyssey. In recent years a school of criticism has arisen in Germany, which attempts to 'improve' the poems by transfer of incidents from one place to another.² We have already noticed one instance of this kind in Rothe's first treatment of the supposed difficulty in 7238 ff. Kirchhof's arguments against this passage as it stands have been sufficiently answered from various points of view;³ our principle of *ὑστερον πρότερον Όμηρικῶς* makes the failure of Odysseus to reply to the queen's first question both natural and in perfect accordance with the Homeric manner.

Again, the order of carrying out the two-fold plan of Athena (*a* 84 ff.), by which the problems of the Return and the Vengeance are to be solved, and the consequent need of the Assembly of the Gods at the beginning of *ε*, have occupied the attention of the critics since the time of Bekker. We have no time here to enter into the various objections that have been offered to the arrange-

¹ Of course the meaning, 'answered,' is not to be pressed, although *ἀπαντᾶ* is used in this sense even in classical times; the signification as Aristarchus uses it (see below, p. 54 ff.) is rather 'recur': 'The poet recurs to the second point first.'

² See especially H. Schiller, *Beiträge zur Wiederherstellung der Odyssee*, I, II, III, 1907, 1908, 1911.

³ See Ameis-Hentze, Anhang, and Rothe, *l. c.*

ment which Homer makes; we can only indicate how the Homeric *hysteron proteron* may assist in removing them. But first we must notice another passage in which the order is likewise open to objection.

In a 93 Athena says that she will send Telemachus to Sparta and to sandy Pylus. This inversion of the order is said by Dūntzer to be due to the exigencies of the meter.¹ Others would justify it in the same way that the recognized ‘*hysteron proteron*’ is often explained: Sparta is logically the more important, and is therefore mentioned first. Both these explanations are insufficient, for two reasons, (1) *After Telemachus has made the journey* the other order is used:²

δ 702, έτες Πύλον ἡγαθένη τόδ' έτες Δακεδαιμονα δῖαν. (= ε 20)

(2) We find that in Homer the inverted order is not infrequently adopted in the carrying out of a two-fold plan or command, just as we have seen it to be true of the answers to two or more questions. A few examples from both poems will make this clear.

(1) ξ 209 f., Nausicaa bids her maids give Odysseus food and a bath in the river; Odysseus bathes before eating.

(2) η 163 ff., Echenaus urges Alcinous to command the heralds to mix wine for a libation, and the stewardess to place food before the stranger; the latter command is carried out first.

(3) θ 389 ff., Alcinous proposes that the Phaeacians give their guest a *ξενήπον*, and that Euryalus make atonement for his discourteous words; the apology of Euryalus is first described, then the preparation of the gifts.

(4) ν 404–ξ 1, Athena bids Odysseus go to the hut of the swineherd and remain there until she has summoned Telemachus from Sparta; the poet describes her going before that of Odysseus.

(5) ο 75 ff., Menelaus says that he will place his gifts to Telemachus in the chariot, and will tell the maids to prepare a feast; he tells the servants first.

¹ *Philologus*, N. F., III (1890), 214.

² How little the demands of the meter determine the order of words was shown by Porson, who gave twenty transpositions of the words of a single verse of Sophocles, and all without destroying the meter (Roberts, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus on Literary Composition*, 14, note 2).

(6) O 55 ff., Zeus bids Hera summon Iris and Apollo; she calls Apollo, then Iris. They go to Zeus, who dispatches first Iris (vs. 158), then Apollo (vs. 221). He gives the latter a two-fold command (vss. 229-233), to take the aegis and with it to put the Achaeans to flight, and to go to the assistance of Hector and rouse his strength. Apollo goes first to Hector's aid, and it is not until vs. 308 that we hear again of the aegis with which, at vs. 322, he makes the Achaeans forget their prowess.

It would not be difficult to multiply examples. But are not these sufficient to show that in a 93 Sparta is mentioned first in the plan of Athena because the journey to Pylus, mentioned second, is to be carried out first? And does not the Homeric *hysteron proteron* which these examples illustrate likewise make entirely natural a similar reversal of order in a 84 ff.: 'Let us send Hermes to Calypso, but I will go to Ithaca?' The Homeric convention, *ἡ πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον ἀπάντησις*, justifies the postponement of the first part of the plan until after the second has been carried out. Certainly it would have been very simple to put the two-fold plan in the other order: 'I will go to Ithaca, etc., *οὐδὲ δ' αἴτῳ μελέτῳ, Κρονίδῃ, πολυμῆτρις Οδυσσεὺς*.' This would have put squarely upon the shoulders of Zeus the responsibility for sending Hermes to Calypso, and so would have given to the critics a better justification for their objections to the Assembly in e. But they might well have objected to the suggested verse as being — what it really is — a weak imitation of O 231! *And it would not have been Homeric*. For the inverted order is so widely distributed throughout the poems, and is used for such a variety of purposes, that we are justified in regarding it as the natural order for the poet to adopt at his discretion. Doubtless a closer examination of the poems than I have been able to give will reveal many other passages where the objections of the critics disappear upon the application of the principle of *ὑπερον πρότερον Ομηρικῶς*. Certainly the Chorizontes and the other Dismemberers of Homer should be asked to explain why, if their theory of divers authors is correct, a feature of style so marked as this is found not only in both Iliad and Odyssey, but in parts which they regard as of widely differing dates, the Second Necyia and the Telemachy, as well as the Apologue and the

Vengeance, and the Doloneia, the Diomedea, and the Embassy to Achilles, as well as the Menis.

We have by no means exhausted all the ways in which the inverted order is employed by Homer. We note, for example, the following neat use of the Homeric *hysteron proteron* in description: 1117 ff., Odysseus first *describes* Wild Goat Island: (1) 'It was neither very far from, nor very near, the land of the Cyclopes; (2) there were wild goats upon it; (3) there was a fine harbor.' Then he *narrates*: 'We entered the harbor (3); we hunted the goats (2), and we looked off to the land of the Cyclopes (1).' Other varieties of the figure are noted by Aristarchus. Lehrs (*Aristarchus*², 11), to indicate the significance of the *dipλē* and the Aristarchan source of certain kinds of scholia, collected more than a score of passages to which the grammarian prefixed the sign, δτι πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπαντᾶ, or the like. These we shall discuss later. None of them illustrates any of the particular kinds of inverted order that have been considered thus far. Doubtless the collection of Lehrs is far from complete, and many more scholia bearing upon the Aristarchan deuterion proteron are to be found. Certainly Lehrs failed to include at least the scholium on B 763, the only one which refers to the inverted order in answers to questions, and which was available in his lifetime. This omission brings us to the second way in which Τοτερον πρότερον Ὁμηρικῶς bears upon the criticism of the Homeric poems, that is, its importance in helping us to understand the secret of the poet's art.

It must be admitted that, in making my collections, I had failed, as Lehrs did, to notice B 763 and its scholium. Consequently I had not read the comment of Eustathius upon this verse. I was not a little gratified, therefore, to find that my own theory of the chief reason for the inverted order in the answer to two or more questions, i.e., continuity, was also that of the erudite archbishop of Thessalonica, for he explains the inversion in B 763 as being διὰ τὸ συνεχές τοῦ λόγου. Encouraged by the feeling that my researches thus far had the sanction of the church I delved deeper into the amplitudinous commentaries of the learned prelate, and found to my further satisfaction that he too had marked as a peculiarity of Homeric style the careful liaison between the speeches

in the Embassy to Achilles (761, 10, cf. 765, 5, and 769, 47): *καὶ δὲ Φοῖνιξ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος καθὰ ποιεῖν Ὁμήρῳ σύνηθες, καὶ ἀπὸ αὐτῶν τῶν, δὲ φασι, παρὰ τόδες λαμβάνει τὸ πρεσβευτικὸν προσώπιμον, ὡς περ Ὁδυσσεὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ*, that is, it is habitual with Homer to proceed from the thought of the moment, and from the ideas which are, one says, ‘uppermost in the mind.’ This comment is most illuminating. It throws a clear light upon the principle underlying the use of the Homeric *hysteron proteron*, and links it with many other features peculiar to Homer, which scholars, both ancient and modern, have pointed out. One of these is the *λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου* of Aristarchus himself.¹ Another is Zielinski’s law of the continuous narrative,² for the reason why the poet cannot go backward in his narrative is that this would not show a sufficient regard for what was ‘uppermost in the mind.’ Still another illustration of the principle is Bougot’s law of affinity,³ which he applies to the arrangement of episodes, the choice of scenes, their details and the characters who take part in them, and the succession of ideas in each speech.⁴ Finally, the late Professor Seymour’s penetrating observation of the use of an adjective or a participle at the beginning of the verse or of the second half-verse as a transition to the idea which follows,⁵ reveals only another illustration of the poet’s habit of proceeding *ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος*.

In this principle seems to lie the very essence of the great poet’s matchless art. This was partially indicated by Classen, nearly three-quarters of a century ago.⁶ In explaining many rhetorical figures and grammatical constructions of the Greek language which appear strange to us, Classen emphasized the peculiarly subjective character of the Greek spirit, and added: “The form of the expression is fixed and controlled more by the vividness of the

¹ Cf. Hans Dachs, *Die λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου*, Erlangen, 1913, reviewed by Professor Scott, *Class. Phil.*, IX, 329.

² *Die Behandlung gleichzeitigen Ereignisse im antiken Epos*, *Philologus*, Supplementband VIII (1899–1901), 405–449.

³ *Étude sur l’Iliade d’Homère*, 1888, 493 ff., 536 ff.

⁴ “Dans Homère une idée appelle une autre” (*op. cit.*, 536).

⁵ *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, III (1892), 98 ff.

⁶ *Über eine hervorsteckende Eigentümlichkeit des griechischen Sprachgebrauchs*, 1850.

author's personal, that is, by the subjective, conception, and by the vigor with which the particular moment influences his mind, than by considerations of objective truth (*op. cit.*, 196)." In other words — to apply his explanation of the commonly recognized *hysteron proteron* to the phenomenon which we are studying — oftentimes that which is *τοτερον τῇ φύσει* becomes *πρότερον πρὸς ημᾶς*. This subjective attitude of mind Classen finds in all Greek authors, but most prominently developed in the greatest masters, Homer first of all.

Classen's explanation is excellent as far as it goes; it fails, however, to consider the relation of the poet to his listeners and to the characters of his tale. We must combine the observation of Classen with that of Eustathius, and explain *τοτερον πρότερον Ὄμηρικῶς* in the widest sense of the term as being due to the overwhelming influence of what at the moment is 'uppermost in the mind' of the characters of the story, the listeners, and the poet himself.

APPENDIX

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ARISTARCHAN DEUTERON PROTERON AND CHIASMUS

THE preceding exposition is open to the natural objection that the inverted order which has been noted is after all nothing but chiasmus in an extended meaning of the term. This is true, but it does not help us to understand why the poet adopted this arrangement, for we know too little about the origin and use of this figure. Chiasmus deserves to be studied historically and with reference to the different literary genres. At present all that we can do is to state the problem and suggest a possible solution. It must be understood that any conclusions which may be reached are given with considerable diffidence, and only in the hope that they may lead to a careful study of the phenomenon, based upon a complete collection of material.

We must first notice the varieties of the Aristarchan deuteron proteron which are revealed by the scholia mentioned by Lehrs (*Aristarchus*,² 11), and a few others. They may be described thus:

I. The inversion of the order concerns the answers to two or more questions: B 763 ff., λ 170–203. These have been discussed already (above, p. 45 ff.).

II. Two or more persons are named, and in the sequel the first reference is to the last mentioned.

(a) The last mentioned name is repeated:

Z 197 f., Ἰσανδρὸν τε καὶ Ἰππόλοχον καὶ Δαοδάμειαν.
Δαοδάμειη μὲν παρελέξατο μητρέα Ζεύς.

N 1, Hector, the first to enter within the wall, is mentioned second (Schol. T). Also B 642, I 531, Δ 221, Ο 8, Τ 67.

(b) Two names are mentioned, and the narrative proceeds with δ μέν, or the like, referring to the second name, e.g., H 1–11, Hector, Alexander (δ μέν . . . Ἐκτωρ δέ). Also H 275, 306, Δ 834, Ζ 391, Ο 330, Σ 595, Ω 605.

(c) Similarly, two names are mentioned, and a relative clause follows, referring to the second: B 629, ‘Meges, who was the son of Phyleus, who in days of yore sought a new home in Dulichium’ (the second relative referring to Phyleus rather than to Meges). Also N 793, Τ 233, Ψ 679.

III. A single case closely resembles chiasmus in the ordinary sense in which the term is used:

Δ 450 f., ἐνθα δ' ἀμ' οἰμωγή τε καὶ εὐχωλή πέλεν ἀνδρῶν
διλλόντων καὶ διλυμένων.

Here the participles refer to the nouns in reversed order. This passage, together with another (Γ 103 ff.) will be discussed later.

IV. Finally, there are passages where the scholiast notes exceptions to the rule, that is, where the poet recurs to the first-mentioned thought or person: Ζ 219, Δ 109, Ο 6, 7. (Schol. T. refers also to Β 493 f., 620 f., Δ 20 ff.) Ο 56, ΙΙ 251, Σ 406, Χ 158.

It is probable that a complete collation of all the scholia will throw more light upon the Aristarchan doctrine, but even those which have been given show clearly the importance which the great Alexandrian scholar laid upon the inversion of the natural order. That he regarded it as the rule in Homer is plain, not only from the expressions, *συνθήθως* (Schol. A on Σ 595); διὰ ταῦτας, κατὰ ίδιαν συνθήθειαν (Ox. Pap. 1086, on Β 763, see above, p. 47); ως ἐπίπαν (Schol. A on Ο 56), and παρὰ τὸ εἰθισμένον πρὸς τὸ πρότερον ἀπῆγοντες (Schol. A on Β 621), but also from the pains which he takes to explain and justify violations of the rule:

Α 109. The poet has mentioned Isus and Antiphus, sons of Priam, and has told of their capture and subsequent release by Achilles; he now describes how Agamemnon slew them: τὸν μὲν (= Isus) . . . "Ἀντίφον αὖ. Schol. A comments, "He repeats the name because two have been mentioned, and his purpose in not inverting the order is to explain in what part of the body each of the two is wounded." The meaning of the latter part of this scholium is hard to guess, but we can see that Aristarchus is endeavoring to account for the failure of the poet to observe deuteron proteron.

Ο 6 ff.

τόε δὲ Τρῶας καὶ Ἀχαιούς,
τοὺς μὲν ὄριομένους, τοὺς δὲ κλονέοντας ὅπισθεν
Ἄργειούς, μερὰ δὲ σφὶ Ποσειδάνων ἄνακτα.

In vs. 7 *τοὺς μὲν* refers to the Trojans and there is consequently no deuteron proteron (so Schol. T.) On *'Αργείος* Schol. A remarks, "The name is repeated for the sake of clearness," that is to say, the reader, expecting deuteron proteron in vs. 7, would be likely to misunderstand the reference of the pronouns, and has to be assisted by the addition of *'Αργείος*.

The majority of the scholia on the passages which have been cited merely indicate that the *diplop* is prefixed to the verse to call attention to the deuteron proteron. Evidently Aristarchus was attempting by numerous examples to establish the principle as a law of Homeric poetry, in spite of the fact that, as even the casual reader may see, and as I have not thought it necessary to point out, the evidence has been forced repeatedly. But at any rate, having proved to his own satisfaction that deuteron proteron is the rule in Homer, Aristarchus proceeds to use it in both the interpretation and the criticism of the text:

Schol. T on Ψ 679 calls attention to the deuteron proteron, and Schol. A adds, "The relative clause, 'who came to Thebes of yore,' must be understood as referring to Macisteus, and not to Euryalus, as Crates (the Pergamene rival of Aristarchus) takes it." i.e., the failure to recognize the principle of deuteron proteron has led Crates astray in his interpretation.

O 56-77. This is a famous case of Aristarchan *athetesis*. Among the many reasons given for the rejection of these twenty-two verses we are surprised to find the following (Schol. A): "And because, although the poet generally ($\omega\varsigma \epsilon\tau\iota\pi\alpha\nu$) recurs to the second idea first, here he has recurred to the first."

The great grammarian was not free from the weakness which has marred the work of many other great Homeric scholars, modern as well as ancient: not content with calling attention to some newly-discovered feature of the poems, they deduce from this a so-called 'law,' with which they wish to fetter the poet's genius. They fail to remember that all true poets are above petty rules — and the great poet most of all. Sometimes, however, the scholar's prestige carries with it conviction in spite of evidence to the contrary. This was happily not true of Aristarchus and his deuteron proteron. There were so many exceptions to his rule that they could not long remain unnoticed. His position was soon challenged. Our evidence for this, although slight, seems unimpeachable. It is found in the Townley scholia and in Eustathius, who is apparently following the same tradition.

Schol. T on O 6, 7 (cited above, p. 55) $\delta\tau\iota \delta\epsilon\iota \pi\rho\delta\varsigma \tau\delta \pi\rho\hat{\omega}\tau o\varsigma \hat{\nu}\pi\alpha\eta\tau\hat{\omega} \delta$ *ποιητής*, $\omega\varsigma \kappa\alpha l$ (three examples are given, B 493, 620, Δ 20) . . . $\kappa\alpha l \delta\lambda\lambda\alpha$ *πολλά < παρα> τίθησιν δ' Ἐγαφρόδιτος*. The adverb $\delta\epsilon\iota$ points clearly to polemic against Aristarchus. Therefore we cannot agree with Lehrs (*i. c.*) that all the scholia which refer to reversed order in repetitions are derived from the Alexandrian. Schol. T, in at least four other places (on O 56, 2, O 330, Σ 406, X 158), calls attention to the failure to observe deuteron proteron, and always without comment or attempt to explain or justify the failure. The scholiast of the Venetus A, on the other hand, never observes the passages where deuteron proteron is violated, except to explain them away.¹ Furthermore, the Townley scholiast invariably uses *πρῶτον* and some form of *ἀπαντῶ*, while the Venetus A regularly prefers *πρότερον* and *ἀπαντῶ*. Was the source of the Townley scholia on these passages Epaphroditus (latter part of the first century after Christ), or do they go back to the tradition of Crates? We should like to think that the latter is the ultimate source, because of the rivalry existing between him and Aristarchus. Our evidence, however, is rather tenuous. Schol. T on X 158 comments: $\delta\tau\iota \pi\rho\delta\varsigma \tau\delta \pi\rho\hat{\omega}\tau o\varsigma \hat{\nu}\pi\eta\eta\tau\hat{\omega} \kappa\alpha l \tau\hat{\omega} \hat{\alpha}\pi\tau\theta\epsilon\tau\hat{\omega} \sigma\chi\mu\alpha\tau i\chi\eta\tau\alpha\iota$, and on Ω 605 (a case of deuteron proteron), *βη\tauο\tauικῶς \alpha\ne\sigma\tauρε\iota\epsilon \tau\eta\iota \delta\iota\eta\gamma\eta\varsigma\iota*. These are both *rhetorical* comments, and we know that the Stoics of Pergamum under the leadership of Crates paid more attention to rhetoric than did the Alexandrians under Aristarchus.

We have no wish to push the case for Crates as author of the polemic against the Aristarchan deuteron proteron; further study of the scholia may prove the value or the worthlessness of our suggestion, which is hardly more than a guess. What is of importance in the evidence just presented,

¹ Schol. A on Z 219 is an exception, but here we find *σημεούνται τινες*, i.e. the source of the scholium is not Aristarchus.

however, is that at least two of the scholia treat the Aristarchan deuteron proteron, or the failure to observe it, as a matter of rhetoric. Here we have the link which connects the phenomenon which we have been studying with chiasmus.

We must now leave the scholia and turn to the commentaries of Eustathius. The latter, as Lehnert has shown by innumerable examples,¹ was steeped in the rhetoric of Hermogenes, and derived his own rhetorical comments on Homer rather from the treatises of 'The Rhetorician' than from the scholia. Eustathius refers twice to the Aristarchan deuteron proteron, in both cases to refute the doctrine (but cf. also p. 682, 38, where he calls attention to the *καινότροτον σχῆμα* of H 306).

The first passage is p. 1005, 53, on O 56-77, the famous *athetesis* of Aristarchus, mentioned above. Eustathius first gives the arguments of the Obelisers, and uses almost the words of Schol. A (see above p. 56). Then he cites the counter-arguments of the Exegetes, in the course of which we read (1006, 7), "Moreover the recurrence to the first point (ἢ πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀπάντησις) is not unusual, as we have shown above," i.e., p. 1002, 2, on O 8. When we turn to this passage we find this comment: "They err who say that the poet always recurs to the second point first." Then Eustathius cites examples of the failure to observe deuteron proteron — both those which Schol. T referred to Epaphroditus, and several others. On the basis of these he argues, very sanely, that the poet uses now the normal, now the inverted, order, and he remarks that the former is the clearer and more natural, the latter not very clear, "yet ornate and befitting the elevated style of poetry" (*ἐμπερίβολον δὲ καὶ πρέπον μεγάθει ποιήσεως*). He concludes with a reference to his comment on Γ 103, where the question is discussed at greater length. Before discussing the latter passage we must notice his comment on Δ 450 f., *ἔνθα δ' ἄμ' οἰμωγή τε καὶ εὐχωλὴ πέλεν ἀνδρῶν*

ὅλλιντων καὶ δλλιμένων (p. 496, 14).


"The natural arrangement of words would be *οἰμωγή δλλιμένων*, followed by *εὐχωλὴ δλλιντων*. But Homer at times adopts a rather novel order, placing the nouns by themselves and the participles by themselves, the second noun being followed by its own participle, and this in turn by the participle which belongs to the first noun. Many other examples of this arrangement are found, as has been indicated more fully in the commentary on Book III. Another example is 'Bitter and sweet of honey and wormwood': the juxtaposition of 'sweet' and 'honey' contributes to the continuity of thought" (*συνεχῆ πώς τὸν λόγου ποιεῖ*, cf. διὰ τὸ συνεχές τοῦ λόγου, 339, 24, cited above, p. 51).

The passage to which Eustathius twice refers for a fuller discussion of Homer's 'novel order' of words (390, 2, on Γ 103) is in brief as follows:


*οἰστερε δ' ἄρν', ξεπον λευκόν, ἐπέρην δὲ μέλαιναν,
Γῇ τε καὶ Ἡελίῳ.*

¹ *De scholiis ad Homerum rhetoricos*, Leipzig, 1896.

"The order of words results in a lack of clearness, and in a distorted and artificial form of sentence like that which is called 'periodic' and 'chiastic' and 'composed of four cola.' The natural order — and the clearest — would be, 'Bring two lambs, one white, for Helius, and one black, for the Earth,' the adjectives being placed each close to its appropriate noun — an arrangement which we might call 'linear.' Next to this in clearness and natural order, would be, 'Bring two lambs, white and black, for Sun and Earth.' This arrangement, in which the second pair of words follows the order of the first pair, may be illustrated by a square figure as follows:




But the poet has made the meaning still more indistinct by arranging the four words like an X, as in the following diagram, the relation of the adjectives to their nouns being indicated by the diagonals of the square:



This is artificial and contorted: the poet has imitated a man whose mind is confused, and one who is not at home in arranging words naturally. A

similar striving for effect is found in the arrangement, not of single words (as in Γ' 103, Δ 450 f.), but of larger units of thought, for example: 'Achilles was chosen polemarch, and the princes tarried by the ships; they were to keep the Trojans within their walls, while he ravaged the country round about.' This figure is 'ornate' because of the transposition of the thoughts. Yet it possesses a certain degree of clearness and naturalness resulting from the balance between the two mean terms and the two extremes. The following diagram will make clear what I mean:



The difference between the Eustathian and the Aristarchan treatment of Homer's inversion of the natural order of words and thoughts is fundamental: the one is based on rhetoric, for it has reference only to the form of the sentence, the style appropriate to poetry, ethopoeia; the other considers the phenomenon only as an aid to interpretation and criticism. These two views must be harmonized if we are to give a proper value to this feature of Greek and Roman literature. The problem has not received the attention that it deserves. In modern editions we often find the remark, "Note the chiastic order," but rarely any reason for doing this. Yet if chiasmus is merely a rhetorical trick of style, discovered and named by the ancient grammarians, it may be queried whether the student is sufficiently repaid for assuming this added burden of scholastic baggage. The only reason for 'noting the chiasmus' is that it is important for an appreciation of the spirit of the language, the connection or the coloring of the thought, the emotion of the speaker, the style of the author, or his peculiar way of arranging both the smaller elements and the larger masses of his material. If chiasmus is to be more than a scholastic legacy of doubtful value, its function and significance should be explained.

The problem may be stated more fully if we adopt for the present the following premise: Rhetoric had its origin to a considerable extent in the attempt to give to prose the same qualities of beauty which its elder sister, poetry, already possessed, that is, form and ornament. We may therefore look to poetry for the origin of chiasmus, and may ask how far the chiastic order was determined by each of the following elements: euphony, rhythm, avoidance of monotony; arrangement of ideas, that is, emphasis, poetic economy and possibly the element of surprise which sharpens the attention of the listener; and finally, as we have suggested above, the psychological factor, the advantage of using one idea to suggest another, and thus to make the thought continuous.

To illustrate, let us take an author who apparently uses the inverted order more than any other prose writer, Plato. Norden (*Kunstprosa*, I, 111) has given good reasons for believing that Plato is free from the sophistic tricks of style except in certain half-playful passages or else in downright parody. In general we may therefore assume that chiasmus in the Platonic dialogues was not due to the influence of formal rhetoric. Plato's word-order is exceedingly free, yet no ancient writer ever gave more thought to this feature of his style: Dionysius Hal., *De Comp. Verb.*, XXV (Roberts' translation), "Plato did not cease, when eighty years old, to comb and curl his dialogues and reshape them in every way. Surely every scholar is acquainted with the stories of Plato's passion for taking pains, especially that of the tablet which they say was found after his death, with the beginning of the *Republic* ('I went down yesterday to the Piraeus together with Glaucon the son of Ariston') arranged in elaborately varying orders." Two facts may help to account for this unusual care in the arrangement of words: Plato was a poet, by nature and by early training, and his style was based on the tone of conversation, if not on the actual Socratic manner of speech. If therefore we take an early dialogue like the *Apology*, written in all probability when the influence of Socrates was still fresh, and when the wooing of the Muse had not been largely forgotten because of the seductions of philosophy, we may gain some light upon our problem.

In the *Apology* I have noticed nearly a score of passages where in the arrangement of modifiers, or in the repetition of words or ideas, the order is inverted. I append these, together with a brief indication of what seems to me to be the chief reason for the inversion. The study of a very large number of similar cases would probably show how far the reasons which I have assigned are correct.

- 17 B. κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, δῆμασι τε καὶ δύμασι : οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους) (εἰσὶ λεγόμενα : τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν δύμασιν (cf. T. D. Seymour, *Class. Rev.*, XVI, 27 f.) (Emotional)
- 19 C, D. οὐτε μέγα : οὐτε συμκρόν) (ἢ συμκρόν : ή μέγα. (Variety)
- 20 C, D. αἱ διαβολαὶ : φημι τε καὶ λόγος) (τὸ τε δυομα : καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. (Emotional, as the intervening words indicate.)
- 24 C. Socrates reverses the order of the two counts in the indictment (cf. 18 C. and Xen. *Mem.* I, 1, 1.) (Economy)
- 25 B. οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιῶντες : πάντες ἀνθρώποι) (εἰς δὲ τις : δὲ διαφθείρων. (Emphasis)
- 25 C. ἡ πολίτεια χρηστοῖς : ή πονηροῖς) (οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ : οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ. (Continuity: a genuine case of Aristarchan deuterion proteron.)
- 25 D. σὺ : ἄμοι) (τηλικόντον δύτος : τηλικόσθε ἄντε. (Emphasis; this, too, may be paralleled in Homer: Δ 450 f.)
- 27 A. χαριετιόμενον : καὶ ἔναρτια λέγοντος) (φαίνεται τὰ ἔναρτια λέγοντα : καὶ τοι τοῦτο ἔστι ταῖς ὄτας. (Emotional)
- 28 A. διαβολή τε : καὶ φθόνος) (18 D, φθόνῳ : καὶ διαβολῇ. (Variety))

29 A, B. οἵδε οὐδεὶς εἰ τυγχάνει μεγίστου διὰ τὸν ἀγαθὸν : διὰ κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ οἴδα) (πρὸ οὗ τὸν κακόν, ὃν οἵδε διὰ κακοῦ ἔστι, διὰ οὐδὲ εἰ ἀγαθὸν διὰ τυγχάνει. (Emotional)

29 D. χρημάτων μὲν . . . δύτως σοι θέται ὡς πλεῖστα : καὶ δόξῃς καὶ τιμῆς) (φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας : καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, δύτως ὡς βελτίστη θέται. (Emotional; there is a secondary inversion here: θέται ὡς πλεῖστα) (ὡς βελτίστη θέται)

30 A. καὶ ξένῳ : καὶ δούρῳ) (23 B, καὶ τὸν δοτῶν : καὶ τὸν ξένων. (The natural order is the second: the first seems to be used for the sake of variety, but it also suggests the thought which follows).

31 E. διακαλῶν τολλὰ ἄδικα : καὶ παράνομα) (παρανόμως (32 B, of the trial of the generals) : ἄδικον (32 D, of the command of the Thirty to arrest Leon of Salamis.) (Continuity)

31 C. ἕτερᾳ μὲν . . . : δημοσίᾳ δὲ) (33 A, δημοσίᾳ τε : καὶ ἕτερᾳ. (Continuity and Economy; cf. *Class. Jour.*, XIII, 282 f.)

34 C, D. παιδία τε : καὶ ἀλλούς τὸν οἰκεῖον) (καὶ οἰκεῖον μοι εἰσι : καὶ νεώτερος . . . δέοντες παιδία. (Emotional)

39 D. οὐτε διωρατῇ : οὐτε καλῇ) (καὶ καλλιότητι : καὶ βάστη. (Variety)

40 D. σίκετας τε : καὶ ἡμέρας) (ἡμέρας : καὶ σίκετας. (Variety)

These instances are too few to justify any sound generalization from them. Yet one cannot refrain from querying whether Plato was not influenced by Homer more than is generally admitted. Certainly the Platonic dialogues have many features in common with the Homeric poems. In both the author keeps himself in the background, putting his thoughts entirely or largely into the mouth of his characters; both show throughout a gentle humor, and at times even comedy,¹ and both arrange their material in episodes, which are nevertheless linked together by the choice of a central figure on whom the attention is focused. These and other similarities may have no causal connection. And yet in ancient times the strong influence of Homer on Plato was recognized. Ammonius, successor to Aristarchus, wrote a treatise on Plato's borrowings from Homer (Schol. A on I 540; see Roberts, *Longinus On The Sublime*, 9, Note 1). The author of the essay *On The Sublime* (XIII, 3 f.) calls Plato "above all others Ὄμηρικώτατος, who from the great Homeric source drew innumerable tributary streams." And he even goes so far as to suggest that "there would not have been so fine a bloom of perfection on Plato's philosophical doctrines, and that he would not in many cases have found his way to poetical subject-matter and modes of expression, unless he had with all his heart and mind struggled with Homer for the primacy, entering the lists like a young champion matched against the man whom all admire, and showing perhaps too much love of contention, and breaking a lance with him as it were, but deriving some profit from the

¹ Cf. the paper by Dr. William Chase Greene in the present volume, pp. 63-123.

contest none the less." (Roberts, *op. cit.*, 81). Either Plato derived from Homer his fondness for the inverted order,¹ or else deuterion proteron is only a natural feature of all poetry and poetic prose.² Certainly it differs from the chiasmus of formal rhetoric. The extent and quality of this difference, and the true explanation of its use must await further study. If our fragmentary discussion shall lead to a thorough investigation of the phenomenon, perhaps the imperfection of its method may be excused.

¹ Note also these three instances of Homeric *hysteron proteron* in the answer to a two-fold question:

Lysis 203 A, *καὶ με προσιέντα δὲ Ἰπποθάλης ιδών,*³ Ω Σάκρατες, ἔφη, τοῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν;

Ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, πορεύομαι εἰδί Δικείου.

Prot. 309 B, ΕΤ. ἡ παρ' ἑκείνου φαίνει; καὶ πῶς πρὸς σὲ δὲ νεανίας διάκειται;

ΣΩ. Εὖ, ἔμοιγε οὐδέξει, . . . καὶ ἀρτὶ ἀπ' ἑκείνου ἔρχομαι.

Phaedrus 227 A,

ΣΩ. Ω φίλε Φαιδρε, τοῖ καὶ πόθεν;

ΦΑΙ. Παρὰ Δυστον, ω Σάκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλου, πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἔξω τείχους.

² It is also possible that the popularity of the Gorgian antithesis may have led Plato to prefer the reversed order by way of protest.

THE SPIRIT OF COMEDY IN PLATO

BY WILLIAM CHASE GREENE

I

PHILOSOPHY is at best a solemn business, concerned with weighty matters, and inclined to fall into a technical jargon in which the words sometimes conceal, rather than reveal, the thought. Even when the world was young, the philosopher had the reputation of being an unpractical star-gazer who had little in common with his fellow-men. Search the indices of Plato, and you will find no imputation of wit, humor, or satire. The uninitiated will suppose that Plato was as solemn as the rest of the tribe. Yet several clues might save us at the start from so capital an error. We may recall the fondness of Plato's master for a quizzical sort of irony, that mystified, irritated, and at times enlightened his associates; it would be surprising if Plato had not learned something of this method. What is more, we know that Plato was supposed to have been fond of the mimes of Sophron; add to this the significant fact that Aristotle, in discussing literary types, is at a loss for a common term to include the "Socratic discourses" and the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, but feels that they should be included in a single class.¹ To be sure, Aristotle argues merely that both forms are examples of imitation in prose; and since the mime might be either *σπουδαῖος* or *γελῶντος*, it would not be fair to conclude from Aristotle's words that he regarded the dialogues of Plato as necessarily comic in vein. On the other hand, the mime was habitually comic, and though realistic in treatment, tended to introduce in a lifelike way idealized types, ordinarily comic, already familiar in the theatre and the public assemblies. Therefore whatever weight is to be given to Aristotle's remark must go to suggest that he thought the dialogues of Plato dealt with ideal types in a realistic manner, probably with a touch of comedy; certainly we should not conclude

¹ Arist. *Poet.* 1447b; cf. *Frag.* 61, Berlin ed., 1486a.

that he thought their purpose was to chronicle historical facts or episodes.¹ Even before opening the pages of Plato himself, then, we have the right to expect to find in them something of the comic spirit. Furthermore the expectation has the sanction of Plato, who professes to have no high regard for the written word; it is perforce inferior to the living word of conversation. But the philosopher, he thinks, may at times write in a playful mood.² Just how far this spirit of play is the key to Plato's meaning is the matter to be investigated in this study.

One need turn over no great number of pages in the dialogues to find passages interlarded with amusing phrases, homely proverbs, and racy metaphors, which give a lively conviction that we are listening to the talk of men of flesh and blood, not sticks and stones. There is the description by Socrates of himself as a gadfly³ and the recurrent simile of the midwife.⁴ We learn to expect the half-earnest, half-impatient exclamation that is always on his lips, 'By the dog of Egypt.' Philosophical argument falls easily into such a mould: the soul, we read, is imprisoned in the body 'like an oyster in its shell';⁵ according to the followers of Heraclitus, the world is 'like a leaky vessel or a man who has a running at the nose'.⁶ Meno, when asked for a definition of virtue, responds with a 'swarm of virtues,'⁷ or 'makes many out of one, as is often said in jest of those who pound or beat anything to pieces'.⁸ Courage is a thing not 'such as every pig would know'; and this laughing remark leads to the real point (and is not said merely *παλιγών*), that there is such a quality as 'thoughtful courage'.⁹ There is no need of multiplying instances, scattered through even some of the later dialogues, of humorous language.

The characters in the dialogues, too, are drawn with the comic writer's care for realistic detail and the exaggeration of significant traits. A gallery of minor characters are hit off, each with an adjective or a phrase. The 'eager' Chaerephon¹⁰ is 'a kind of madman';¹¹ Menexenus is always 'very pugnacious',¹² not unlike the 'pertinacious'

¹ As A. E. Taylor concludes: *Varia Socratica*, pp. 54-57.

² *Phaedrus* 276d: *τελεῖς χάρις*. ⁸ *Ibid.*, 77a.

³ *Apology* 30e.

⁹ *Laches* 196de.

⁴ *Theaetetus* 149a; *et passim*.

¹⁰ *Apology* 21a.

⁵ *Phaedrus*, 250c.

¹¹ *Charmides* 153b.

⁶ *Cratylus* 440c.

¹² *Lysis* 211b.

⁷ *Meno* 72a.

Cebes;¹ while Apollodorus 'the madman, always rages against himself and everybody but Socrates.'² Who can forget Aristodemus, 'a little fellow, who never wore any shoes,' or the love-sick Hippothales, who writes bad verse and talks in his sleep?⁴ Some of the characters are drawn on a larger scale, and supplement each other: blunt Laches is the foil of the more intellectual Nicias; Euthydemus and his brother are a team, truculent, playing to the *claque*, and absolutely without conscience. The pompous Ion, most gullible when most deceived, is a picture by himself; but we find his peer in the fatuous Euthyphro, the exemplar of misunderstood greatness. Thrasymachus is painted in broad strokes; nothing characterizes him so well as the words with which he hurls himself 'like a wild beast' into the conversation: 'What folly, Socrates, has taken possession of you all?'⁵ and the manner in which he tries to withdraw, 'having, like a bath-man, deluged our ears with his words.'⁶ More subtle is the way in which, progressively, a similar attitude is upheld by characters in the *Gorgias*; the famous rhetorician is courteous, self-satisfied, rather simple, and has nothing to say when confuted; Polus is the vehement, cock-sure young man; Callias is more frank, and becomes surly when the argument goes against him. The crowning audacity in characterization comes when immediately after the most profound moment of the *Symposium* Plato puts in the mouth of Alcibiades, the drunken reveller, the humorous but wholly revealing remarks about the nature of Socrates, whom it will be sufficient here to remember as that satyr, or Silenus, or Marsyas, who is half a wild thing of nature and half divine.⁷ This double creature we shall encounter more than once.

The comedy of incident is everywhere abundant, especially in the opening scenes of the dialogues. Such an episode as the beginning of the *Charmides*, where the audience struggle for seats,⁸ is not over-drawn; I have seen it reenacted in Paris, with abandon, at a lecture by Bergson. Who but Plato, however, would have introduced the argument of the dialogue as a cure for a head-ache, or have sent Aristophanes off into a fit of hiccoughs, in the *Symposium*, so as to

¹ *Phaedo* 62ef; 77a.

⁵ *Rep.* 336b.

² *Symposium* 173d.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 344d.

³ *Ibid.*, 173b.

⁷ *Symposium* 215 ff.

⁴ *Lysis* 204b ff.

⁸ *Charmides* 155c.

postpone his farcical myth to its effective place in the dialogue?¹ It is of a piece with the absent-mindedness of Socrates that had kept him from appearing at the house of his host till supper was half over. Both incidents are in character; both mildly ridicule their heroes; neither was strictly necessary to the plot. Such, too, is the banter and by-play that mark the beginning of the *Phaedrus*, and the riotous close of the *Lysis*, where the tutors of Menexenus and Lysis interrupt and pack them home, shouting angrily in their barbarous dialect, somewhat drunk.² And nothing, surely, could be better than the delicacy of the spirited narrative at the beginning of the *Protagoras*: the spirit of early morning adventure; the surly porter, annoyed at the swarm of sophists; the great Protagoras promenading, attended by his admirers, who follow him, wheeling with military precision as he turns at the end of his course; the mock liturgical quotations of Homer introducing Hippias and Prodicus, the latter in bed, much bundled up, and talking to so large an audience that Socrates can come near enough only to hear the indistinct booming of his barytone voice.³

To multiply examples of comic phraseology, amusing characters and ludicrous episodes to be found in the dialogues would be easy; but even an exhaustive collection, if it were worth making, would prove nothing more than that Plato was either a clever reporter or, what is more likely, a shrewd artist who reported or invented what he most needed to give a sense of reality to his philosophical mimes. It requires perhaps a greater degree of boldness to see in these comic gestures presumptive evidence that the spirit of comedy may lie deeper than the surface. We are at least bound to inquire how far the presumption is fortified by facts.

On almost every page of Plato is inscribed a ridicule, sometimes courteous, sometimes veiled, often outspoken, of Plato's adversaries.

¹ Cf. Jowett, tr. Plato, I, p. 530. The use of this device to call attention to the position of the speech is similar to the method used in the *Republic* to emphasize the importance of solid geometry and to call attention to its comparative neglect (*Rep.* 528ab). Socrates pretends to skip the subject, and then recurs to it with apologies. Solid geometry was in the time of Socrates embryonic, but not non-existent; the question, therefore, is one of emphasis, not of a clumsily evaded anachronism.

² *Lysis* 233ab.

³ *Protagoras* 311-316.

At first the objects of his shafts are real persons, the contemporaries of his master Socrates, whose prestige he defends against all comers. Even in the early dialogues, however, there are cases where Socrates does not quite come off a manifest victor in the battle of wit, and that, too, not for the reason that the dialogue is merely sceptical or aporetic; a conclusion is suggested, directly or indirectly, which clearly belongs to the writer of the dialogue. By degrees the hero of the dialogues appears no longer as Socrates, but as an impersonal spirit of philosophy speaking through various mouths, and in one notable instance speaking directly against the character named Socrates.¹ The objects of ridicule are now no longer historical personages, or at least are attacked less as individuals than as types of the forces that were opposed by the idealized Socrates, or by the spirit of true philosophy. The antithesis being clear in Plato's mind, — Socrates *contra mundum*, or the true philosopher ranged against the sham pretender, — the course of comedy is plain; for comedy means, as Plato tells us, the exposure of all pretensions.²

Even a partial list of the persons and the schools of training held up to ridicule by Plato is impressive; for it includes the greater part of the orthodox teachers and masters of Greece. Beginning with Homer, whom he quotes sometimes seriously, but more often with a twinkle in his eye, there are not many of the great poets whom he does not pillory; and the whole art of poetry, after being subjected to a searching criticism, is given only a qualified approval.³ If the poet is an irresponsible being, it follows that the rhapsode, for all his fine clothes and his beautiful poses, is even more absurd;⁴ and Euhemerizing interpreters of mythology and arbitrary etymologists are as bad.⁵ Those who are forever explaining matters by appeals to a *deus ex machina* or to the *βάρβαροι* or to antiquity are dismissed with contempt.⁶ The sophists are for Plato the supreme deceivers; and though

¹ Cf. pp. 76 f.

² *Philebus* 48–50.

³ That Plato did not condemn poetry outright, but based his criticism of it, for better as well as for worse, strictly on the principles of his philosophy, is the conclusion maintained in my study, *Plato's View of Poetry* (H. S. C. P., XXIX, 1918), which in several respects supplements the present study.

⁴ *Ion*, *passim*.

⁵ *Phaedrus*, 229b ff.; *Cratylus*, *passim*.

⁶ *Cratylus*, 425d–426b.

most of Grote's defence of them may be sustained from the point of view of the practical needs of Greece, Plato treats them with no exaggerated harshness when he contrasts their superficiality and their chance methods with the rigid requirements of his own creed.¹ For individual sophists there may be a good-natured tolerance or a mild satire: here we deal with the actual contemporaries of Socrates, who addresses them generally with mock respect. He is unfortunately prevented by poverty from attending the more expensive course of Prodicus on philology;² as a matter of fact, however fanciful Prodicus is, he shows more good sense than the other sophists.³ The irony is more patent when Socrates professes his desire to become the pupil of the 'pancratiasts' Euthydemus and Dionysodorus,⁴ or complimenting the sophists on their knowledge and their business ability.⁵ Plato goes out of his way to be fair to Protagoras, giving him some of the best arguments in the dialogue that bears his name,⁶ and restating his doctrines or the conclusions that should be drawn from them;⁷ but the prevailing tone, when Protagoras is on the stage, is one of deeply ironical appreciation. So, for example, Socrates, when about to prick the bubble of his argument, is most appreciative of his speech, and has 'only one very small difficulty which he is sure Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much.'⁸ As Plato gradually drops the fiction of the reporter, and speaks *in propria persona*, the courtesy that has been extended to the individual sophist is dropped, and the sophist, as a type, becomes the victim of a merciless attack. During Plato's maturity and old age, to be sure, sophists in the strict sense no longer existed; but their attitude of mind persisted in various forms, and was so obviously the arch-enemy of true philosophy that we find Plato devoting a dialogue to the analysis and reprobation of the sophist, even naming it for the villain of the piece.

Rhetoric is for Socrates, as for Plato, another false idol. Socrates treats Gorgias with signs of respect;⁹ but is capable of giving in the style of Gorgias an answer that is 'theatrical and pompous' but not

¹ The responsibility is not really shifted to the public in *Rep.* 492; for it is the sophists who feed the 'Great Beast.'

² *Cratylus*, 384b; cf. 391b.

⁶ Cf. pp. 76 f.

³ *Phaedrus*, 267b.

⁷ *Theaetetus*, 162 ff.

⁴ *Euthydemus*, 272b.

⁸ *Protagoras*, 328e.

⁵ *Apology*, 19, 20.

⁹ *Meno* 70bc.

good;¹ Lysias comes in for a good deal of satire, whether the speech attributed to him in the *Phaedrus* is genuine or a parody, and is advised to study philosophy rather than rhetoric;² and the whole aim and method of the art of rhetoric, as generally practised, is set down as deception.³ There, again, the increasing intensity of the onslaught keeps pace with the transition from the individual to the type. A similar progress may be traced in the treatment of the politicians, from ironical appreciation of the individual⁴ to condemnation of the type;⁵ the politician is only a sort of rhetorician.⁶ One contemporary of Plato is singled out for an especially pointed rebuke; Isocrates might have become a real educator, had he forsaken rhetoric for philosophy.⁷

Of philosophers, few, even of the teachers of Socrates and Plato, escape comic criticism. Heracleitus and his followers, 'father' Parmenides, even the Pythagoreans have to take their turn.⁸ Socrates is not infallible, even as a sceptic; and it is possible to detect glancing refutations of Plato's own contemporaries,—Antisthenes, heretical hedonists, and ardent but misguided 'friends of the ideas.'⁹

It is not enough, however, to regard Plato as a merely satirical writer following with an increasingly embittered mood the destructive critical method of his master. Socrates himself, to be sure, might insist that he was no torpedo-fish, unless that animal be conceived as itself experiencing the numbness that it induces in others.¹⁰ But Plato does not betray an equal candor; he knows how to use stalking-horses. The essence of the dialogues is a spirit, apparently disinterested, but in fact carefully directed by the author, which we might call "the argument personified" as the real hero of the dialogues; and "Socrates" in the dialogues often refers to it in almost these terms. He knows that he is a cat's paw. His wisdom in

¹ *Meno*, 76e.

⁴ Cf. *Euthyphro*, 2b ff.

² *Phaedrus*, 278bc; 279b.

⁵ *Rep.* 564; *Politicus*, 291; 303.

³ *Phaedrus*, *passim*.

⁶ *Phaedrus*, 257, 258.

⁷ *Phaedrus*, 278ef. The sting is the sharper if, as seems entirely probable, the *Phaedrus* was written comparatively late. Prophecy attributed to the past and known to have been unfulfilled points tragically to what 'might have been.'

⁸ For the Pythagoreans, cf. *Rep.* 531bc.

⁹ *Rep.* 475 f.; *Philebus*, 11b; *Sophist*, 248a ff.

¹⁰ *Meno*, 8oc.

the *Apology* is that of one divinely inspired, because about to die.¹ Again, poor Euthyphro cries: 'I really do not know how to tell you what I think. Whatever we set up seems somehow to move away; it refuses to stay where we put it.' 'Why,' retorts Socrates, 'that sounds as though your theories were the work of my master Daedalus.' 'Their shifting and changing is none of my doing,' replies Euthyphro; 'it is yours; you are our Daedalus.' That is our cue; but Socrates is not his own master any more than is Euthyphro; he, too, goes through his paces, and that, too, unwillingly. He makes his own works and those of others move against his will; he would rather fix his argument on a firm base. Still he is not so much a Daedalus as Euthyphro, who makes the argument move in a circle.² Of course the arch-manipulator here is the Socrates-Plato who is playing with the consequences of one-sided definitions. So, again, in the *Crito* the personified laws address Socrates, giving us a dialogue within the dialogue, that includes a comic picture of the imagined escape of Socrates from prison;³ they are the antithesis of the threatening arguments, like hobgoblins or bogies, that are used to frighten children.⁴ It is indeed δίκαιος λόγος confronting ἀδίκος λόγος. Or we may turn to the *Charmides*, the argument of which "says 'no'" and mocks us;⁵ or to the *Protagoras*, where we learn that 'if the argument had a human voice, it would be heard laughing at us,' and pointing at the paradoxical relation of the speakers.⁶ Laches finds that the quality he is trying to define 'slips away from him, and he can not get hold of her'; Socrates is of the opinion that the good sportsman should follow the track, and not be lazy.⁷ The metaphor is repeated, with variants, in several other dialogues, notably in the *Phaedo*, where the argument is conceived as game to be hunted.⁸ The *Phaedo*, moreover, contains a notable plea for disinterestedness and courage in argument, a plea that is doubly emphatic by reason of its position: both the hearers of Socrates and Echecrates, the hearer of the repeated discussion, express their bewilderment at the argument, and are counselled against distrusting the reason and against betraying

¹ *Apology*, 39c ff.

⁵ *Charmides*, 175b; 175d.

² *Euthyphro*, 11; 15.

⁶ *Protagoras*, 361a.

³ *Crito*, 50 ff.

⁷ *Laches*, 194b.

⁴ *Crito*, 46c.

⁸ *Phaedo*, 63a; 66a; 66b; 66c; 76e; 88d; 115b.

the truth to partisan reasoning.¹ In the *Phaedrus*, Lady Rhetoric, having spoken in self-defense, is answered by the arguments of Socrates, which he addresses as his 'noble children.'² Socrates in the *Republic* professes to have no preconceived doctrine; 'Whither the argument blows, we follow.'³ This may be quoted as evidence of the open-minded attitude of the historical Socrates; but we shall not be far wrong if we see in it also the acquiescence of the mouth-piece of that Plato who knows well enough where the wind of argument is to take his characters. He (or Theodorus, speaking for him) is not afraid of any judge or spectator who may recall him to the point⁴; for he is himself the judge in the rules of the game. It seems as if we might almost add a minor supplementary canon to that used by Bonitz and Adam for the determination of Plato's real teaching (that the unrefuted residue, after propositions have been discussed, holds): it appears that Plato is fond of setting off or projecting his views by making them as impersonal as possible; it is something told to Socrates, or dreamed, or argued to him by the spirit of logic, that he firmly holds; the characters in his writings are merely carried by the current. It is at any rate worth while to test this fiction of the comic spirit in the several dialogues.

II

The *Apology*, though dealing with a very serious situation, strikes constantly the note of comedy.⁵ Confronted by vaguely worded

¹ *Phaedo*, 88c-91a.

³ *Rep.* 394d.

² *Phaedrus*, 260d-261a.

⁴ *Theaetetus*, 173c.

⁵ For convenience, I discuss the dialogues in the order adopted by Lutoslawski (*The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*), placing the *Lysis* and the *Ion*, which he omits, in the early group of 'Socratic' dialogues. One can not avoid the question of the 'historicity' of the various dialogues. I have already (in *Plato's View of Poetry*, pp. 4-6) indicated my belief that it never occurred to Plato to present an historical picture of Socrates, and that he always felt at liberty to treat Socrates, like the other historical personages, with great freedom. One may admit degrees in his use of this freedom; in this case it seems clear to me that the *Apology* is the dialogue in which we should expect the most scrupulous adherence to fact and to the *ipsissima verba* of Socrates, though even here it is not to be expected that we have anything like what a modern newspaper man would call a strictly accurate report. The whole conception of literary standards and ethics in Plato's time favored a greater degree of freedom than seems natural or even justifiable today. Indeed,

charges that he could perhaps disprove, did he care to do so, Socrates sees that his real antagonist is a mere prejudice, which time has created and which only time could remove. He does not seriously deal with the charges, but throws up a mocking defense;¹ and then, turning his back on his judges, he talks to the few who can understand him and to posterity. The *Apology* is a comic justification of the life lived in the spirit of comedy, — the exposure of pretension, — at the behest of a god: surely this is piety! The unpopularity of Socrates arises from the fact that the public has no sense of humor, and from the irresponsible use of the spirit of comedy by the young bloods of Athens,² at which the public is angry, and therefore invents false charges. ‘The truth, I imagine, they would not care to say, namely, that they have been convicted of claiming knowledge when they know nothing.’³ The falseness of the charges is easily shown; Meletus is rapidly lured into making wild and unconsidered accusations, admissions, and contradictions, in which emphasis takes the place of discretion, and which show how little care he has given to the case.⁴ Socrates gives Meletus a lesson in logic,⁵ and dismisses him as insignificant; it is the old prejul dice, if anything, that will overwhelm him. So he turns to his re-defense, the interpretation of his past life.⁶ The life of inquiry, the life of philosophy, is his divine mission, which must not be betrayed.⁷ It is not his fault, then, if the latter part of his defense seems almost wilfully to rub the jury the wrong way; and in fixing his counter-penalty Socrates is not insolent, but merely carrying out consistently

Schanz has denied all historical value to the *Apology*, and C. W. E. Miller argues that the question of Chaerephon and the reply of the Delphic oracle is a fiction and the literary device of Plato (Johns Hopkins University *Circular*, 1910; No. 6, pp. 13–16). But it is fair to ask whether a speech purporting to give a defence made at a formal trial, at which the public, including Plato, was present, is not from the nature of the case more likely to exclude intentional fiction than, for example, an account of an informal conversation with friends like that recorded in the *Phaedo*, at which the author expressly says he was not present. The question will recur in an acute form in the discussion of the *Phaedo*: cf. pp. 90 ff.

¹ Pater (*Plato and Platonism*, p. 79) finds sophistry or casuistry in the *Apology*; of course it is there, and that is part of the comedy! Read as sober logic, the argument in this part of the dialogue loses its point.

² *Apology*, 23c.

³ *Ibid.*, 23d.

⁴ *Apology*, 24–26.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 27b ff.

⁶ Cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* 4. 8, 4 ff.

⁷ *Apology*, 28e; 30a; 37e; 38a.

his idea of the value of the philosopher's life.¹ As a matter of fact, no other penalty or even compromise would be consistent; Socrates is not bargaining, but conducting his defense on a wholly different level from that of the law-court; he rests it on that of pure reason. He sees it is not easy to remove a great prejudice in a little time; and he does not try to do so.² He rather dramatizes in comedy the contrast between this earthly miscarriage of justice and the ideal justice of the other world, where departed worthies win their deserts and can enjoy the life of philosophic inquiry.³ And he closes his speech with an appeal to the just judges to reprove and trouble his sons if they care for money or anything else more than for righteousness, or 'seem to be something when they are really nothing';⁴ this will mean that *real justice* will have been received.⁵ So Socrates, heaping coals of fire on the heads of his accusers, steps from the *bema*: not he, but the philosopher is the hero of the dialogue; not the verdict in his case, but the real justice that he invokes, is the motive of his discourse. He has only followed the life of philosophy enjoined on him by a god (that is his technical defense, so far as there is one, against the charge of impiety); he will not show fear in the face of death, or abandon the life of the philosopher, or use unworthy means to work on the feelings of the jury; that would be inconsistent with the life of philosophy.⁶ He prefers to let 'truth pass the sentence of unrighteousness and injustice' on his accusers.⁷ *Truth*, or *real justice*, is the invisible victor: some think Socrates wise when he refutes other men; 'the truth probably is that God is wise, and by the oracle means only that human wisdom is of little or no account.'⁸ Socrates changes from the rôle of hero to that of an agent of reason. To the posterity for whom the speech is mainly intended, the change is not a fall; to the comic spirit, it appears a positive gain.

Much the same point is made in the *Euthyphro*, but the comic contrast between orthodoxy and the philosophic temper is more broadly

¹ *Apology*, 36-37.

² *Apology*, 37b.

³ *Ibid.*, 40-41. It is in this spirit, as we shall see, that the ideal of philosophy and the disappointing practise of poetry are placed in comic conflict in the last book of the *Republic*.

⁴ *Apology*, 41e.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 34-35.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 42a.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 39b.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 23a.

drawn, and the vein is one of deep irony, sustained to the very end. Euthyphro is orthodoxy personified; his piety is so impossibly consistent that he is proceeding to prosecute his father for the death of a murderous slave, for which his father is indirectly responsible. But Euthyphro's notions, when put to the test of simple Socratic logic, prove to be a tissue of contradictions and confusions. In the background stands the tragic fact that Socrates is soon to go to his death for preferring reason to orthodoxy. The satire is the more terrible for the enthusiasm that marks the pretended acquiescence of Socrates in the positions of Euthyphro. 'Quite admirable, Euthyphro,' he cries, just before demolishing a definition;¹ and he is sure that if he could only become Euthyphro's pupil in the art of holiness he could meet the charges of his accusers. To be sure he could,— by forswearing his gift of reason; and Euthyphro could of course prove his point,— but has not the time. So Euthyphro departs, sublimely wise in his own conceit, and thoroughly approved by society; Socrates has shown only a negative sort of wisdom. But the comic contrast has left us tragically wiser.

The same ironic manner lends character to the *Ion*. Burning with the desire to define the nature of knowledge and its sources, Socrates turns to the rhapsode Ion, who, as the recognized interpreter of Homer, poses as one of the official educators of Greece. Ion affirms and retracts; he 'has as many forms as Proteus,'² while Socrates is not wise, like Ion, but is 'only a common man who speaks the truth.'³ Plato is neither seriously upholding the traditional view of poetic inspiration nor wholly discarding it. Ion is used as a foil to throw the problem into relief; and enough is done when it is shown that he simply has no conception of the meaning of knowledge. That Ion is completely ignorant, in the face of Socratic analysis, goes without saying; that he is allowed to take refuge at last in the claim to inspiration, is to be expected. The result, for all the irony, is not wholly negative; whatever value is to be allowed to poetry and inspiration must depend on the friendly mediation of the reason.⁴

¹ *Euthyphro*, 7a.

² *Ion*, 541e.

³ *Ibid.*, 532d.

⁴ Cf., further, *Plato's View of Poetry*, pp. 15-18.

In the *Crito*, we return to the fortunes of Socrates, again viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*. The dialogue has been analyzed by L. Dyer, following the suggestion of Cron, in the manner of the plot of a Greek tragedy.¹ The formal structure bears out the analysis to a striking degree; but I cannot help feeling that the current of the thought suggests even more the spirit of a comedy, or at least of those Euripidean tragedies that end happily. Certainly, τύλοκή and λύσις lead to a conclusion that is of fair omen, at least from the point of view of eternity. If it is a human tragedy, it is a divine comedy; and that is the point on which Socrates insists in the *Apology*, the *Crito*, the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*, and other dialogues. If it is better to suffer than to do wrong, in the eyes of the gods the conclusion of the *Crito* must be nothing if not happy; and in fact, as Dyer points out, Socrates appeals to δόθεος in his last sentence, as he does in the last sentences of the two main parts of the *Apology*, quite in the manner of Dante's closing references to *le stelle*. But this *Commedia* ends with a hint, not of a *Paradiso*, but of an *Inferno* and all the suggestions of the popular belief.² As we have learned to expect, however, the transition is accomplished from the interest in the fortunes of a personal hero to the emergence of an abstract but personified principle; and the conclusion of the dialogue is fairly stated by the argument of the personified laws, who bid Socrates think of justice first, of life and family afterwards.

The clue to the meaning of the next three dialogues is simple: with a great show of perplexity, "Socrates" is testing imperfect, because one-sided, definitions of various moral qualities. More than ever we feel that behind the feigned inconclusiveness a true standard of knowledge and conduct is being formulated. So, in the *Charmides*, the creation of definitions, only to be discarded, proves as infectious as a yawn;³ yet we have a dream of such a thing as universal knowledge, "a dream, whether from the horn or the ivory gate,"⁴ and young Charmides, with rare good sense, refuses to be taken in by the apparent failure of the arguments of Socrates.⁵ So Socrates, in the *Laches*, plays the ring-master; Laches and Nicias together give the truth, and say what Socrates does not explicitly lay down; and

¹ L. Dyer, ed. *Apology and Crito*, Introd., pp. 47 f.

² *Crito*, 54bc.

³ *Charmides*, 169c.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 173a.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 176.

the comedy lies in the division of the argument between the two and their impatience with each other. So the dialogue professes to end in ignorance; courage is an unknown quantity, and we must all go to school.¹ But the conclusion is not really so inconclusive; the shrewd man in the audience sees that several points have been established,—the need of universal definitions, and the place of the reason and of character in courage. In the *Lysis*, again, the bewilderment of the cross-examined *Lysis*, plied with leading questions and fallacious logic, gives scope for rich fun; even the head of Socrates is dizzy with the argument.² But the line between the real *impasse* and the literary device is not sharply drawn. Instead of being given a didactic refutation of false notions of the duties of friends, *Lysis* is trifled with, to the discomfiture of Hippothales. A series of verbal plays appears to prove that friends can not discover what is a friend, ‘as the by-standers would say, as they went away.’³ We, as the ‘by-standers,’ the audience of the mime, see that it is irony of the dramatic type. We play the rôle of common-sense, and perceive with the author, what the actors do not know, the relation of friendship to human needs and to ideals.

To a literal-minded reader, the *Protagoras* must seem a baffling dialogue, with its shifting points of view, and the mixture of respect and ridicule meted out to the great sophist; read as what it is, high comedy from first to last, the dialogue is simple. The problem on which the conflict turns is that which came to the fore in the set of dialogues just discussed: Is virtue one, and can it be taught? But the solution of the problem is not stated by any one speaker, nor, in fact, is it at all stated in so many words. But it lies near the surface. The character of Protagoras is drawn in no unfriendly spirit;⁴ he is, moreover, no man of straw. He holds all the respectable doctrines, and is the mouth-piece of common-sense. So far as positive beliefs are concerned, there

¹ *Laches*, 200, 201: a little psychological analysis of the point is all that is really needed. Cf. Aristotle on *καρπεια*.

² *Lysis*, 216c.

³ *Ibid.*, 223.

⁴ There is, to be sure, incidental satire on sophistic and over-ingenuous interpretation of poetry, and on the prolixity of the sophists: Protagoras ‘goes forth on the gale with every sail set, out of sight of land into an ocean of words’ (*Protagoras*, 338a).

would be little to criticize in him; but when it comes to a rational foundation for his beliefs, he is nowhere. Socrates simply floors him by superior dialectic; what Protagoras holds and Socrates denies,—that virtue can be taught,—is shown to be not common-sense, but the consequence of the doctrine that Protagoras has denied,—that virtue is knowledge and is one. The tables are completely turned. Now it is perfectly plain, in spite of the irony and satire, what the author of the dialogue really holds. He speaks equally through the mouth of Socrates and of Protagoras. He does not repudiate the fundamental moral notions of the sophist; and he approves for practical purposes a sort of utilitarianism, that does not rest on transcendental grounds. But he insists on that systematic coördination and unification of moral qualities which the criticism of Socrates was able to supply. In other words, Protagoras supplies the content, Socrates the method. But the actual argument of the dialogue contains not a little of fallacious eristic, such as Plato can hardly have intended seriously; the antinomies, indeed, are so closely paralleled by the *δισσοι λόγοι*, probably written before Plato's earliest writings, that Taylor supposes a common source.¹ It is clear that the substance of the Protagoras was a matter of frequent discussion in the days of Socrates; but it does not follow that Plato suggests that either of the opposing theses may be held with equal correctness. On the contrary, the arguments given to Socrates, though in detail sometimes fallacious, establish a clear advance over the initial position of Protagoras. The two wrestlers have not merely changed places; Protagoras has the satisfaction of seeing his belief accepted by Socrates, but not on his own terms, while Socrates finds that his reasoning supports what he recently denied. Either competitor in the contest would from his own point of view call it a draw; but the argument with its human voice may well ‘laugh;’² for “the argument” is the hero of the dialogue, and from the content of Protagoras and the method of Socrates it is already launched on the construction of the revised ethics that we shall find in the later dialogues. Such a revision, of course, can not be attempted at the end of this dialogue; and the polite refusal of Protagoras to coöperate with Socrates in a new discussion of the subject

¹ A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, pp. 114 ff.

² *Protagoras*, 361a.

till 'some future time'¹ is the obvious device of the author to indicate this limitation.

When Socrates does return to the problem, in the *Meno*, it is not in company with Protagoras, though he makes half-serious compliments to Gorgias and Prodicus. Socrates is the solitary protagonist, professing ignorance of the essence of virtue; he is not wise, like Gorgias and his pupils. Meno, called upon to supply the missing knowledge, fails. Can virtue really be taught? This is all part of the current disputation common to the *Protagoras* and the διστολ λόγων; we even find the common fallacy, that one cannot seek either for that which one knows or for that which one does not know.² And Socrates, who has just been accused of numbing his interlocutor like the torpedofish, and who has replied that his ignorance is no affectation, gives his answer to the fallacy in the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. That merely establishes the possibility of knowledge in general. It turns out that virtue does not seem to fall under the category of knowledge, or it would have been taught by sophists or by good men,— but this has not been done.³ It really appears that virtue can not be taught. Here comes a caution against superficial reasoning: 'We have been so foolish as not to consider that it is not under the conduct of science that the affairs of men are administered rightly or well';⁴ for practical af-

¹ *Protagoras*, 36e.

² *Meno*, 8od.

³ The appeal to Anytus for an opinion on this matter is an admirable episode. Anytus, the model citizen, is shocked at the idea that the sophists are educators, and would not think of talking with them; Socrates thinks Anytus must have the gift of divination, if he knows what they are without any experience of them (*Meno*, 91, 92). Here we trifle on the edge of a volcano. This is the literal-minded person who is one day to accuse Socrates of impiety; and Socrates is defending the sophists before him! Anytus takes him in sober earnest: no wonder Aristophanes found it worth his while wilfully to confuse Socrates with other types of learned men, if he could reckon on such an audience. But there is worse to come. Socrates apologizes; he has said nothing to the purpose; Anytus gravely agrees, not seeing through the irony of Socrates, and goes on to say that any random Athenian is a better teacher of virtue than the sophists, earnestly suggesting that virtue comes from the example of great men. He is angry when examples rise up to confront him, and warns Socrates against speaking ill of others; as if he were among the illustrious men whom he erroneously supposes Socrates to abuse (*Ibid.*, 92–95). He retires in a bad temper; it is doubtful whether Meno, who is asked at the end of the discussion to go and soothe him, will succeed in his mission.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 96e.

fairs, right opinion, though certainly different from knowledge, is enough, and this is a sort of inspiration.¹ Mystical utilitarianism, then, is the strange outcome of our search! The gesture reminds one of the ironical close of the *Ion*, in which the rhapsode is given the privilege of claiming inspiration in default of knowledge. We are saved from complete bewilderment by the prompt putting of the "previous question"; what is the *essence* of virtue? That is a question, not for right opinion, but for knowledge: and the whole problem must eventually be solved on the basis of the really knowable.

Here is a dilemma indeed: the inconsistency and irresponsibility of the popular teachers force Socrates to stake conduct on reasoned knowledge of the essence of things. Reason, however, is just what has so far failed. Can it be trusted, or is intuition the supreme guide in conduct, as in other grave matters? That is the question put forward in the *Euthydemus*. The comedy in the dialogue can not be missed by any reader: it is "of all the dialogues of Plato that in which he approaches most nearly to the comic poet,"² and the irony is sustained to the very end. The casual reader is in much greater danger of failing to perceive the exquisite art with which the comedy strikes home a point of tremendous seriousness. The dialogue, in a word, should be read as a biting satire on verbal eristic and logical quibbles; it launches us again into the atmosphere of the διστολ λόγων;³ but the fallacies which Aristotle will duly expose by logical analysis, Plato holds up to ridicule by merely slightly caricaturing them, and inviting our approval. In the art of eristic, the elderly brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are *enfants terribles*; what fun to be like them! They can argue both sides of anything; so Socrates, when the bark of his argument is on the point of ship-wreck, calls on them, his Dioscuri, to save him from the billow,⁴ and wishes to become their pupils.⁵ No modern reader could conceivably be taken in for a moment by the irony; but the fallacies that the brothers so glibly toss off were real stumbling-blocks to the young men of Plato's time as well as to those of the earlier generation.⁶ To the contemporaries of both

¹ *Ibid.*, 99bc.

⁴ *Euthydemus*, 292ef.

² Jowett, tr. *Plato*, I, p. 194.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 295d.

³ Cf. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, pp. 107 f.

⁶ Of course Taylor minimizes the difficulty that they caused in the times of

Socrates and Plato the flood of new ideas and the poverty of logical distinctions meant a real difficulty; they were the more impressed by the mental acrobats who could make havoc of common sense. For their credulity the best antidote was satire. So in the *Euthydemus* Plato flings about all sorts of fallacies of a type that are obvious to us and of a type that in less grimly logical moods Plato's Socrates himself has admitted.¹ Again, as so many times before, the reader sees the point and is not deceived by the assumed bewilderment of Socrates and his eulogy of the sophists. And what is the outcome? Jowett, who realizes that the work belongs to the "early" group of dialogues, holds that it represents Socrates as willing to learn, but unable to teach; it has not yet reached, he thinks, the position of the *Meno*, — that there are no teachers.² The bearing of the *Euthydemus*, however, becomes decidedly different when we regard it, with Lutoslawski, as following the *Meno*, and realize that the *Meno* itself is by no means wholly sceptical. The sequence of thought therefore is: Right conduct should depend on reason; conduct has not yet been based on reason, for the teachers have not been fully rational (so far the *Meno*); the cause of their failure is the embryonic condition of logic; therefore right conduct will depend on the development of a true logic. That this last proposition is the real conclusion of the *Euthydemus*, rather than any confession of helplessness, is quite apparent. Though young students of philosophy, 'like children after larks, always think they are on the point of catching the art, which has always just escaped them,'³ the Socrates of the dialogue is sufficiently definite in urging that the study be continued, and in a fatherly spirit assists the young Cleinias to see that all the word-play of the sophists is only the first stage of a more serious initiation into an understanding of the place of knowledge in conduct.⁴ Cleinias considers superfluous the proof that wisdom can be taught;⁵ and, as Crito, to whom Socrates narrates the discussion, observes, he shows a logical

Plato and of Aristotle (*Varia Socratica*, pp. 91 ff.). But the fallacies and the eristic of Antisthenes and of the Megarian school could hardly have persisted in a world that had put away these childish things.

¹ Cf. p. 77.

² Jowett, tr. Plato, I, p. 203.

³ *Euthydemus*, 291b.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 277-283; cf. 288.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 282.

bent, making telling points¹ about the requirements of a true notion of knowledge. Crito must not be discouraged; philosophy is not discredited by the sophists: 'do not mind whether the teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy herself.'² This appeal to impersonality, more and more insistent in the dialogues, comes in the epilogue, and may fairly be considered Plato's own plea, spoken as directly as the dramatic form permits. The sophists have won a nominal victory,³ and have been complimented; now that the game is over, and a sober judgment is in order, we look at the thing impersonally; philosophy herself, rid of the sophists and their eristic, remains as our hope. Philosophy has yet to find a content;⁴ logic is only in the making, and some of the fallacies just ridiculed are not permanently downed; but the path is clear, and scepticism is not to recur.

The Socrates of the *Gorgias* does not always avoid the eristic that he has just satirized in the *Euthydemus*. We need not on that account hold him, nor his sponsor Plato, guilty of wilful deception; logic is in slow process of being reformed. The skilful artist, too, whether serious or light-hearted, will not use too delicate an instrument for the matter in hand; and some minds are capable of appreciating a verbal argument where they can not be trained to the understanding of more

¹ *Ibid.*, 288b-291a. It is worth noting that Socrates is not sure that young Cleinias was the speaker; it may have been some one else; it surely was not Euthydemus or Dionysodorus, but perhaps 'some superior person.' 'Yes, indeed,' says Crito, 'some one a good deal superior, I should think.' It is by hints like this that Plato constantly goes out of his way to mark the progress of the argument; the tone is still dramatic, but 'the argument itself' is having its laugh. Cleinias, by the way, is the grandson of Alcibiades, who died in 404 B.C., at the age of forty-six. Alcibiades is referred to as *τελαύς*; moreover his grandson, even by the greatest compression of generations that is probable, could hardly have taken part in such a discussion much before a time somewhat after the death of Socrates. It looks as if we have an intentional anachronism; and the attention of the reader is called to it by Plato in the passage just quoted.

² *Ibid.*, 307b.

³ Yet the nihilism of this sort of victory has been pointed out by Socrates with sufficient explicitness: the denial of the existence of error denies itself (*ibid.*, 279e; cf. 297a). Socrates and Ctesippus show, by taking it up, that the game can be played with disastrous results to its champions; no age or want of capacity is an impediment (*ibid.*, 304c).

⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, 292e.

sound reasoning. Here Plato is the opportunist, justifying a faith which he firmly holds by a means that he would not wholly defend before those who could follow a more developed logic. Rhetoric is combated with verbal fencing; one extreme is met by another. The *Gorgias*, then, represents the triumph of right instinct (the right opinion of the *Meno*) over specious wrong-doing, established by a verbal reasoning that is impatient of detail. The purpose is ethical, and logic is for the moment subsidiary; the most effective weapon is paradox. Yet the paradoxes of the *Gorgias* are no idle invention; they represent the appeal from earthly well-being to the judgment of eternity and the world to come, quite in the spirit of the *Apology*, the *Crito*, and the *Phaedo*. Socrates keeps the pose of the inquirer, who wishes to analyze the ideas of others, and who is not sure how he is coming out;¹ but the pose is transparent. Socrates states his paradoxes first, and then argues in defense of them. At least, this is for him not new ground but the rehearsal of old convictions. At the same time, the *Gorgias* bears the marks of being a preliminary study, which the author will take up on subsequent occasions to be amplified or confirmed by closer reasoning. This Plato does on the rhetorical side in the *Phaedrus*, from the standpoint of ethics in the *Republic*, and of psychology in the *Republic* and the *Philebus*. The main positions of the *Gorgias*, to which instinct has led Plato, as it did Protagoras in the earlier dialogue, are not to be deserted; their logical foundation will be made more secure. From the logical point of view the *Gorgias*, when read after the *Meno* and the *Euthydemus*, comes with something of a shock; when the comedy of the dialogue is recognized, however, with the leading interlocutors put forward as stalking-horses for popular notions and answered each in the manner that he deserves, it gains in power. It would be quite out of the question in a single encounter to educate the elderly Gorgias and the hostile Polus and Callicles into a new life, as Socrates may hope to do in the case of his young friends and constant companions Glaucon and Phaedrus; but by flooring them on their own ground he can refute popular doctrines.

The dramatic interplay of argument with character deserves to be followed in its general course. Gorgias and Socrates in turn define the art of rhetoric. Gorgias takes a personal view of it, and is inclined to

¹ *Gorgias*, 455ab; cf. 505ef.

point to concrete experience. Socrates, after a special plea to the great rhetorician to consider the matter disinterestedly,¹ shows that rhetoric by the nature of its relation to the other arts is either superfluous or deceptive. Gorgias, who has already had to be coaxed to continue the discussion, now drops out silently, quite puzzled, remaining only as chairman of the debate that follows. Polus becomes impatient as well as mystified² at the distinction made by Socrates between $\delta\delta\kappa\epsilon\iota$. . . $\beta\epsilon\lambda\tau\sigma\alpha$ and $\delta\beta\omega\lambda\sigma\tau\alpha$. He no sooner recovers from this concession than he is compelled to assent to a damaging distinction between means and end; he becomes cynical with regard to the advantages of tyranny, but is frankly incredulous when Socrates propounds the paradox that it is better to suffer than to commit injustice. By an extreme example, Socrates shocks Polus into admitting a limitation set by justice; but Polus suspects that he is being tricked. He points to 'the facts,' and appeals to the opinion of the public, in the manner of the rhetorician, as Socrates observes. To Polus the paradox seems quite absurd, that one who is unjust is less wretched if he be punished.³ But his contrast of tormented with triumphant injustice is a mere bugaboo, not an argument, thinks Socrates;⁴ as a matter of fact it is really another appeal to 'the facts,' which intensifies the dramatic opposition of this world to the world to come. At Socrates's reaffirmed conviction that injustice punished is less wretched than injustice unpunished, Polus can only laugh⁵ and appeal to popular feeling. The counter-appeal of Socrates is to only *one* witness, $a\bar{t}r\bar{t}\bar{o}\bar{v}\pi\rho\bar{s}\delta\bar{v}\delta\bar{v}\mu\bar{o}\bar{i}\delta\lambda\bar{y}\bar{o}\bar{s}\bar{\eta}$.⁶ He then sustains his former paradox by a verbal quibble, good enough for the occasion, and makes his bow to Polus, the one witness needed. Without letting him interrupt, he rapidly shows, by somewhat better reasoning, that to do injustice and go scot-free is worse than to do it and face the music; " $\phi\bar{a}\bar{l}\bar{v}\bar{e}\bar{r}\bar{a}\bar{u}\bar{s}$," is the reluctant admission of Polus. If all this be admitted, rhetoric is useless. Polus admits the steps of the argument; but the result still seems to him absurd.⁷ He should have made his objection earlier; he should have maintained that justice is not a *desideratum*; but he had not the courage of his convictions.⁸

¹ *Gorgias*, 457c-458b.

² *Ibid.*, 467b.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 4732.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 473cd.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 473e.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 4742.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 480e.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 482e.

Callias has no scruples, and steps in where Polus missed his chance. But first he raises the question whether Socrates is not jesting;¹ Chaerephon reassures him. Socrates bases on the one point that Callias and he have in common,—their infatuation for their respective favorites, and for their idols, the *δῆμος* and *φιλοσοφία*,—his declaration that Callias ought to understand how Socrates must perforce follow the dictates of Lady Philosophy and of consistency, even at the cost of disagreement with popular judgments. The appeal invites sympathy, if not argument; there is no logical ground why Callias should make concessions, for his community with Socrates, if it really exists, is one of temperament, not of common reasoning. Callias, the frank champion of naturalism, opposes the justice of convention. As for philosophy, it is a pretty thing, and a necessary part of the liberal education of the young; but it is foolishness for grown men.² It would do Socrates no good, were he to be unjustly imprisoned and put on trial. Socrates is not in the least offended; at last he has an enlightened opponent. Gorgias and Polus were too modest, and contradicted themselves and public opinion;³ Callias is a foeman worthy of his steel. Socrates shows that by admitting that *βελτίων* is equivalent to *κρέττων*, which, in turn, is tantamount to *ἰσχυρότερος*, Callias has wiped out the distinction between *φύσις* and *νόμος*. Callias is indignant: this is mere verbal nonsense!⁴ He professes to define *βελτίων* as *φρονιμώτερος*; but Socrates, who disclaims the imputation of verbal quibbling,⁵ arouses his anger by testing the new definition by its application in the various trades. Callias rejects it, and decides that what he really means, after all, is that *βελτίων* is the equivalent of *ἀνδρεῖος*,—in fact, real *εὐδαιμονία* is simply self-gratification. No false modesty here, as Socrates exclaims.⁶ He can not move Callias by showing that happiness of such a sort is like a leaky vessel; but he does wring from him the admission that pleasures vary in quality, and that there is something unstable in a pleasure that is founded on such evils as hunger or thirst. The argument here, though not fallacious, is verbal, and lacks the necessary psychological basis: it is reflected in the surliness of Callias, who tries to wriggle out of the conclusion;⁷ but the distinction be-

¹ *Gorgias*, 481b. ² *Ibid.*, 487ab. ³ *Ibid.*, 490a. ⁴ *Ibid.*, 497ab; 499b.

² *Ibid.*, 485a. ⁴ *Ibid.*, 489bc. ⁵ *Ibid.*, 492d.

tween *άγαθος* and *κακός* remains, and the life of philosophy is now weighed in comparison with the claims of rhetoric.

Now rhetoric, like drama, is flattery, and even its best practitioners have no standard, and do not really try to improve their audience. (At this point Callias sullenly refuses to argue; Socrates goes on with an imaginary conversation, emphasizing the points with which Callias can not agree. But Callias is soon drawn into the discussion again.) It appears that to avoid suffering injustice involves accommodation to the powers that be; but this is not unqualifiedly worth while. At all events, statecraft requires skill and experience; and actual statesmen do not seem to have improved their citizens, for they have been overthrown or disciplined. This last deduction seems somewhat unsound; Socrates should be the last person to hold that the failure to convert one's contemporaries implies a radical error in one's creed, or that worldly failure is a sign of lack of merit. But the passage is merely another instance of the adaptation of argument to interlocutor that we have already noted; nothing impresses Callias more strongly than an appeal to 'the facts.' Nevertheless Socrates expressly guards against the imputation to a teacher of the lapses of his renegade pupils:¹ the language is such as to call to one's mind the careers of Alcibiades and Critias,—another anachronism, perhaps, for our list.² Unlike the statesman, Socrates now argues, he, the philosopher, has devoted his life to the real service of the city, nor do threats of persecution terrify him.³ He is a good physician; and though unable to help himself (*άδιναρος οὐ εἰντῷ βοηθεῖν*), his resource is justice, so that he stands acquitted in the life to come. The Myth which he recounts in support of this contention is solemnly introduced as fact, not fiction, on Homeric authority. The earlier part of it is slightly comic in its jaunty style and in the spirit in which the prescriptions of a modern

¹ *Gorgias*, 519e ff.

² That the coming events do cast their shadows before should be obvious to any reader; and the *Gorgias* presumably deals with a time falling within the first years of the Peloponnesian War. But cf. *Gorgias* 518e–519e; 521e; 522b, *et passim*.

³ The diction is a forecast of the charge in the *Apology*: cf. *Gorgias*, 521e: *τοὺς πειράτους . . . διαφθείρει*. *Ibid.*, 522b: *ἡλύτης μὲν . . . πειράτους φῆ διαφθείρειν*. And the grimness with which he announces that in case he is tried he will avail himself of no rhetorical flattery (*Ibid.*, 522d.) points to the last part of the *Apology*.

judicial system are interpolated in the primitive story. After 524b, where the consequences of the myth are drawn and Socrates makes his contribution, the tone becomes serious. The ideal judgement is contrasted with the possible miscarriage of justice in the event of Socrates being brought to trial; he will not be able to help himself, nor will Callias and the others be able to save themselves in the after-life. 'The argument' now steps forward and announces the conclusion;¹ the myth may be an old wives' tale,² but it is the best account of the truth available, and though the other arguments have been disproved, this alone stands fast — the value of the life of justice. The conclusion is one that Gorgias, Polus, and Callias could by no means be expected to admit; it is a forecast by something like religious faith of things not seen and as yet hardly to be argued; the real argument comes later.

What the *Euthydemus* has done for the beginnings of logic, the *Cratylus* does for the beginnings of philology. It is equally comic and equally satirical, but truth lurks behind the ridiculous even more tantalizingly. The pretense of ignorance and of inconclusiveness is therefore not equally kept up. The question is propounded: Is language natural or conventional? The reader feels that Socrates, giving a fair chance to the extreme views of both Cratylus and Hermogenes, and himself taking the middle ground, is on the whole the mouth-piece of Plato, for all his ironical self-depreciation and his absurd illustrations of true principles. It is not hard to distinguish between the extravagant parody and the mock-modesty in which Socrates is surprised to discover accidentally the truth, or in which he pretends to reach it by borrowing ideas and by dreaming or guessing. He seems inspired; yes, he caught his inspiration from Euthyphro, who gave him a long lecture;³ he has a new and ingenious thought; if he is not careful, he may be wiser than he ought to be before tomorrow's dawn.⁴ There is good reason, however, beyond that of the literary artist, for this pose; philology is a still weaker science than logic, and the responsibility for concrete statements is avoided by the double expedient of delegated authority and of comedy. There

¹ *Apology*, 527b4: δλόγος; 527c6: δλόγος σημαίνει; 527e2: ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρησάμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, δε ηὖν σημαίνει δὲ κτλ.

² *Ibid.*, 527a.

³ *Cratylus*, 396d.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 399a.

is no satire in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes to surpass the derivation, proposed by Socrates, of *οἰνός* from *δρῦσα τὸ ἄνω*¹ and Plato goes out of his way in the *Republic* to ridicule the notion that underlies it.² The truth is that the fanciful derivations of the *Cratylus* are no more supposed seriously to be true in detail than are the myths or the other approximations that are specially ear-marked as such. Plato is fond of sketching sciences and provinces of knowledge that the future must fill in, like solid geometry, in the *Republic*, and physical science, in the *Timaeus*. Unlike the sober writers of our day, he does not leave blanks where his knowledge ceases, but lets comedy fill the gap. Plato believes in the importance of etymologies; but not willing to commit himself to authentic examples, he tosses in specimens of current derivations together with inventions of his own. You can not convict him of error, for he can always plead the jester's privilege. Yet amid all the foolery, Socrates pauses to dispose of the foolish denial of the existence of falsehood that is based on a logical quibble: he can play the fool on occasion, but the quibble is becoming, in his opinion, too dangerous to be consciously tolerated,³ and common sense comes to the rescue. The end of the dialogue, too, becomes serious in tone. Socrates, though on the whole basing his theory of language on a compromise that favors the position of Cratylus a little more than that of Hermogenes, will not admit that any "man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names;"⁴ especially since there is an uncomfortable sense of insecurity in that they partake to a certain degree in the Heracleitean flux. Socrates, speaking as an older man, gently chaffs the young Cratylus about the perils of the flux; Cratylus is unconvinced, and, being allowed the last word in the dialogue, expresses his hope that Socrates will also continue to reflect on these matters. When we remember that Cratylus and Socrates were in turn the masters of Plato, this finale becomes highly amusing. The Heracleitean philosophy dies hard.

III

From the point of view of form, the *Symposium* is the most perfect comedy among the dialogues of Plato. Setting, characters, comic

¹ *Cratylus*, 396c.

² *Rep.*, 528ef.

³ *Cratylus*, 429c ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 440c.

relief, and plot are manipulated with consummate art. From the point of view of philosophic progress, the richness of form makes possible an interplay of personalities and ideas that gives a result not merely cumulative but architectural. Or, to change the figure, the light, at first prismatic, is later gathered into a white radiance by the mind of Socrates. For though all the first five encomia on love contribute points of lasting importance, they do not rise gradually to a climax, but serve as the materials from which Socrates builds his own discourse. Incidentally the speech of Phaedrus contains not a little sophistic rhetoric; and that of Pausanias, which is ridiculed for its prose rhythm,¹ has poor logic and a 'weak ending,' as Eryximachus remarks.² Eryximachus himself inclines to bring the whole discussion down to a matter of physics; so that the contrast with the farcical mythology of Aristophanes, who follows him, is the stronger. The hiccup of Aristophanes, which has postponed his speech, brings the comic poet's discourse also immediately before that of Agathon, the tragic poet, which is 'partly playful, yet partly serious.'³ Aristophanes emphasizes in his fantastic vein the incompleteness of the lover; Agathon, holding that love is of beauty, and thus limiting its scope, delivers an extravagant and rhetorical panegyric on love. And now it is the turn of Socrates; indeed, he has with difficulty been prevented from thrusting an argument between two of the earlier speeches, and now that he has the floor he begins with a bit of dialectic. In the course of the speech that follows, he skilfully weaves in parts of the thought of all the previous speeches. But it is especially the speech of Agathon, his immediate predecessor, that gives him his cue. Love is of beauty, or of the good; but no man can love, or desire, that which he has. Jowett calls this distinction an obvious fallacy, and says that Socrates "almost acknowledges" it to be one.⁴ Socrates does admit, and even emphasize, the difference between loving what one has and desiring more of it, thus recognizing that love may be either of what one has or of what one has not; but for him at this moment the whole value of love is in its devotion to that which it has not, — to those abstract ideas of goodness and beauty that are not mere quantitative increases of good and beautiful things but qualitatively different

¹ *Symposium*, 185c.

² *Ibid.*, 185e.

³ *Ibid.*, 197e.

⁴ Jowett, tr. Plato, I, 532.

existences. He is accepting the point made by Aristophanes, without naming him explicitly;¹ and he is thus enabled to transfer from love, which now becomes a neutral quality, to its object all the eulogy which Agathon, who has not made such a distinction, lavished on love itself. The distinction, far from being a fallacy, is an extension of the meaning of love, and of the conception of philosophy with which it is implicated. For philosophy, like love, mediates between mortal and immortal, between concrete and abstract, 'spanning the chasm.'² Love and philosophy thus stand in a mean between ignorance and wisdom, and we have pushed aside the old stumbling-block that we met in the *Meno* and the *Euthydemus*, — the question how one can seek what one does not know.³ And the way is prepared for the idealized contact with beauty and knowledge. Socrates has already disclaimed, with accustomed irony, his responsibility for this argument by saying that he received it from the wise Diotima; and it is from her that he professes to have received the conception of this new education in love and philosophy. Such a literary device enables Socrates to express the views of Plato without seeming discourteous to his host.⁴ The emotional pitch of the revelation is high; comic relief comes in the last act of the dialogue, with the boisterous entry of Alcibiades and his revellers, his strange panegyric on Socrates, and the picture of Socrates drinking the night long with Agathon and Aristophanes, the two banqueters who have given him the most help in his discourse. But, like the hiccup of Aristophanes and the other comic interludes, this satyric drama⁵ contributes more than comic relief. It gives Alcibiades a chance to descant on the character of Socrates, which in a way is itself a speech on love philosophized, exhibiting the results of the 'down' course of ideal love in the fleshly sphere. Socrates can not say, "Behold, I am not disobedient to the heavenly vision." It is therefore

¹ But cf. *Symposium*, 205e.

² *Ibid.*, 202e: συμπληρῶ. I am indebted to Jowett for this felicitous translation of the word.

³ *Meno*, 80de; *Euthydemus*, 275d-277c.

⁴ Cf. *Plato's View of Poetry*, pp. 19-21, where the argument is analyzed. Note especially the device that marks the introduction of new and positive doctrine, — the metaphor of a transition from the preliminary to the complete initiation into the mysteries.

⁵ *Symposium*, 222d.

given to Alcibiades, absurdly enough, to drive home the point made by Socrates, and it all comes about by an apparent coincidence; for Alcibiades is fairly launched on his appreciation of Socrates before he is told of the subject of the previous speeches, and even when invited to speak on the same subject he insists on continuing his eulogy of Socrates. Despite the grossness of his discourse, the point is that Socrates is the union of passion and chastity, the living embodiment of the experience recounted by Socrates himself. Coming from the lips of Alcibiades, the testimony is doubly impressive, as well as tremendously grotesque. And Plato proves, what Socrates here holds, that the same writer can combine tragedy and comedy;¹ for this philosophic mime, like the rest, is both *στούδιος* and *γέλωνος*.

The *Phaedo* purports to give the conversation of Socrates on the last day of his life. If the dialogue is in general like the rest of the dialogues, we may expect to find in it on the whole a life-like picture of his personality; but we need not on that account expect an accurate report of his conversation, nor need we take every statement at its face value. That, at least, is the orthodox view of the dialogue, such as would conform with the statement of Taylor in his admirable little book on Plato.² It seems as if Plato himself is giving us a special warning against any other view, since this is one of the very few passages in which he mentions himself; and here it is only to tell us that he was not present at the scene that he narrates. What, then, are we to make of the recent suggestion of Taylor and Burnet,³ that the *Phaedo* is intended as a true account of the conversation, with the implication that any statements as to the earlier life of Socrates and his views are to be taken as historical evidence? If the suggestion be accepted, we must believe that Socrates himself held on his dying day the 'doctrine of ideas' in a fairly well developed form, though he has hardly mentioned it before, and that his earlier interests were much more scientific than they have generally been supposed to be. Now it is unnecessary to labor the point, fully established by Burnet,⁴ that

¹ *Symposium*, 223d.

² A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, London, 1911, pp. 29-33.

³ A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, Oxford, 1911; J. Burnet, ed. *Phaedo*, Oxford 1911, and *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato*, London, 1914. I have already indicated some of my reasons for disagreeing with the main contentions of these very learned but, I think, misleading works in *Plato's View of Poetry*, pp. 4-6.

⁴ J. Burnet, ed. *Phaedo*, intro. pp. xii-xxx.

Plato was in a better position than Xenophon to give an accurate portrait of Socrates and his history, if that was his purpose. The whole question is about the purpose. In all the other dialogues, with the possible exception of the *Apology*, it appeared that Plato's main purpose was not the presentation of facts or of the history of philosophy, but the free dramatic expression of the spirit of philosophy. Burnet rightly holds¹ that Plato succeeds better than Xenophon or than Aristophanes in depicting the Socratic *θόος*; but we must not therefore take it for granted that he intends to give also the Socratic *βίος* and *λόγος*; for we know that where philosophical truth is involved Plato shows himself the heir of his master's *εἰπωνεῖα*. So, for example, Socrates may have been acquainted with the physical theories enumerated by Burnet;² the point is, was he formerly a believer in them, or does Plato concentrate into quasi-biographical form the philosophical progress of any one dealing with his problems? The observer of Plato's manipulation of comedy, who has noticed the feigned agreement of Socrates with most of his opponents at some stage in the other dialogues, will incline to feel that there is nothing surprising if Plato does not seriously mean us to believe that Socrates was in his youth a devotee of physical science. At the most, we need suppose only that he took a layman's interest in what gossip about the subject came to him, weighing it from that ethical point of view that appears so clearly in the present account;³ even the philosophy of Anaxagoras he examined only in a book.⁴ Yet it need not startle us greatly if the whole episode was invented by Plato out of whole cloth. In favor of its verisimilitude we have, to be sure, the striking resemblance, established by Taylor and Burnet, between the picture in the *Phaedo* and the caricature in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes.⁵ But, to offset this resemblance, we have in the *Apology*, a dialogue which we found cause to

¹ J. Burnet, ed. *Phaedo*, intro. pp. lv f.

² *Ibid.*, pp. xxviii–xliii.

³ Cf. *Phaedo*, 97c: δην δι βέλτιστα τοι.

⁴ It is perfectly conceivable that Plato might have made Socrates talk with Anaxagoras, instead of merely hearing his book read, if Plato had had an issue for them to discuss in detail. Plato did a similar thing, at the cost of a philosophical (not an historical) anachronism, in the *Parmenides*. Taylor, of course, does not admit such an explanation. (Cf. *Varia Socratica*, p. 164, n. 2.)

⁵ Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 129 ff.

regard as the most nearly historical of Plato's writings,¹ the statement that Aristophanes is a false witness,² that Socrates was not interested in science,³ and that he had no private doctrines or pupils.⁴ Aristotle supports the statement with regard to the lack of interest in science (and must have got his information mainly from Plato); and Xenophon's evidence, for what it is worth, goes to show that Socrates during his later years, though not an ignoramus in scientific matters, valued science wholly for its practical applications. The picture drawn by Aristophanes, moreover, striking though it be, need not be solemnly invoked as historical. It is recognized that the intimate relation of Socrates to the inferior brand of sophists, suggested by the play, is not historical; if Aristophanes succumbed to the temptation to paint such a picture, is he to be trusted for a moment when he rakes up the notions of twenty years ago and attributes them to Socrates? Well, men did believe in such theories in the youth of Socrates; and it would be a ready way of raising a laugh to father them on the mature Socrates. The public would not discriminate: or if some of the audience of the *Clouds* knew better than to confuse Socrates with physical speculators, the joke was for them all the better. May we be as ready to treat comedy as comedy! If we want serious testimony about the youthful interests of Socrates, we may more profitably turn to the *Protagoras* of Plato. There it appears that Socrates had already attracted the notice of the veteran sophist and humanist by 445 B.C.⁵ In view of the interests of Protagoras himself and of the subjects discussed in the dialogue that bears his name, is it likely that it was scientific interests that had won for Socrates such a reputation as to meet with the generous approval of the arch-humanist? Not to deny absolutely any such interest to the youthful Socrates, it seems more reasonable to hold that his chief preoccupation at all times was ethical and logical.

It is by this time sufficiently clear, I trust, that some, at least, of the difficulties of the *Phaedo* depend not so much on matters of chronology as on an understanding of Plato's method and point of view. As soon

¹ Cf. p. 71, n. 5.

² *Ibid.*, 18, 19, *et passim*.

³ *Apology*, 18d, 19c.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 33af.

⁵ "Some years before he [Socrates] had reached the age of thirty." Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, p. 143.

as it is recognized that the *Phaedo*, like the other dialogues, is a philosophical mime, many of these difficulties disappear. Socrates no longer stands as an historical figure, but becomes the personification of the philosopher; the dialogue is no longer a personal record, but an interpretation of the life and death of Socrates, together with all that they imply and have come to mean to Plato. The relation between Xenophon and Plato, as witnesses of Socrates, and that between the Synoptic evangelists and St. John, in their accounts of Jesus, present a familiar parallel; it is worth while to remember the direction in which recent study of the fourth gospel has tended. I will quote from Père Calmes, a Roman Catholic who writes, with the approbation of the papal censor, of this gospel: "It seems to us impossible not to admit that we have here dogmatic developments explicable rather by the evangelist's habits of mind than by the actual words of Jesus. . . . History is seen through the intervening dogmatic development." The Abbé Loisy regards the evangelist as "a theologian far removed from every historical preoccupation." These writers, to be sure, do not attribute the gospel to John the son of Zebedee. F. von Hügel, in his article on the Gospel according to John, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (from which I quote the *dicta* given above), writes: "By insisting upon having history in the same degree and way in John as in the Synoptists, we cease to get it sufficiently anywhere at all." He finds in John "traditional, largely historical, materials everywhere handled with a sovereign freedom," and the "mystic's deep love for double, even treble meanings." The threefold interpretation that Dante applied to his *Commedia* might be cited as a further parallel; but it had better be said quite definitely that Plato's good sense kept him from obscurantism. The fourth gospel would in several ways be inexplicable without Philo Judaeus and Paul: the literary descent from Plato to John is thus not altogether negligible. Now from these circumstances it would be dangerous to argue that Plato's procedure was the same as that of the later writers, who differed from him in race, to mention only one fundamental particular. But the parallel does justify us in holding that Plato need by no means have considered himself a chronicler when he dealt with the most solemn moments of his master's life. If we find that he represents him as entertaining views on that occasion which the real Socrates seems to have held

lightly, if at all, we need not accuse him of "heartless mystification;"¹ we should remember that literary standards have changed.²

The discussion of immortality in the *Phaedo* shows a distinct advance over the equivocal references to the subject in the *Apology* and the appeal to orthodox views in the *Crito* and the *Gorgias*. It is, of course, possible that Socrates spoke on the subject on the last day of his life, and, if so, he doubtless spoke with greater earnestness and profundity than ever before. But the fusion of various arguments in support of immortality seems hardly Socratic. The paradox that philosophy is a *meditatio mortis* can be paralleled in Pythagorean or Orphic dogma; and the doctrine of ideas has roots in the every-day, as well as in the scientific, language of the fifth century.³ But the full development of the doctrine and the use of it to establish the paradox has no parallel and is purely Platonic.⁴ The omnipresent Pythagorean coloring of the *Phaedo* may easily be Plato's own introduction, the result of his contact with Pythagorean influences in Hellas and in Magna Graecia; and his dramatic sense finds a good chance to use it by making the semi-Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, the chief interlocutors of Socrates; for they would be a highly sympathetic audience for the sentiments that Plato wishes to set forth. It should be noticed, on the other hand, that the more important contributions to the argument come, not from these young men, who after all are only partially Pythagoreans, but from their senior, Socrates. Cebes and Simmias have to be instructed about the doctrine of their reputed master, Philolaus; and Socrates knows of it only by hearsay.⁵ Lest it be replied that this is only Plato's device for avoiding a monotonous piece of exposition, it is enough to remark that nowhere else does Plato employ such a roundabout device. It seems clear, therefore, that the characteristic doctrines of the *Phaedo* are Platonic, and that the setting in which they are found is due to his sense of dramatic fitness: a discussion on immortality could not be given to Socrates on any other occasion so appropriately as on his last day. He could attribute it to

¹ Burnet, ed. *Phaedo*, p. xii. ² For example, plagiarism was once respectable.

³ The evidence has been conveniently stated by Taylor in *Varia Socratica*.

⁴ That the ideas are implicit in the method of Socrates may be granted, but not such an hypostatization of them as marks the *Phaedo*.

⁵ *Phaedo*, 61d.

Socrates without violence to the truly Socratic doctrines, but only by virtue of a good deal of "interpretation" and adjustment.¹ Simmias and Cebes supply the sympathetic audience; and some of the doctrine is represented as familiar to them, and as often discussed with them. That obviously does not mean that Socrates as a matter of history learned certain Pythagorean doctrines from his younger associates;² at the most it would merely hint at dialogues, never written or never transmitted to us, in which the present speakers set forth the doctrines here accepted as true. Burnet asks: "Did any philosopher ever propound a new theory of his own by representing it as already familiar to a number of distinguished contemporaries?"³ Plato, at least, did not hesitate to do so; the cardinal virtues, for example, though introduced in the *Republic* as familiar and accepted, are clearly part of Plato's regular teaching, but are nowhere demonstrated.⁴ The nature of the general problem, which is a literary one, rather than an historical puzzle, was sufficiently recognized by Burnet many years ago: "When Plato deliberately attributes some of his own most important discoveries to the Pythagoreans, he [is] acknowledging in a characteristic way the debt he [owes] them."⁵ "He [Plato] is apt to develop Pythagoreanism on lines of his own; . . . he is not careful, however, to claim the authorship of his own improvements in the system. . . . He is . . . quite willing to credit Timaios the Lokrian, or 'ancient sages' generally with theories which certainly had their birth in the Academy."⁶ This literary device even led to charges of plagiarism.⁷

The *Phaedo* marks, if I understand it correctly, a conscious step from Socratic to Platonic doctrine. A number of the earlier dialogues have almost imperceptibly substituted interpretation and high comedy for record, and have shown an impersonal *λόγος* as the real protagon-

¹ For a Johannine parallel, one may cite the fourteenth to the seventeenth chapters, in which subjects ignored by the synoptic evangelists are treated.

² As Burnet and Taylor seem to argue.

³ Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*⁸, p. 355.

⁴ Cf. Adam, on *Republic*, 427e. Some allowance, too, must be made for Plato's oral teaching: his lecture on the Good was notable, but he slighted the subject in his writings.

⁵ Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*⁹, p. 124.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 323.

nist; here, as the master Socrates passes from the stage, his mantle descends to that pupil Plato who is not even present. Socrates will appear again, but it will be even less than ever the "real" Socrates of history. Socratic irony, of course, persists; but it is more and more a mask for dogmatic affirmation. The difficulty which Socrates encounters with regard to the nature of the unit in the *Phaedo*¹ will recur in the *Parmenides*² and the *Philebus*³; but Plato assumes the point as clear in the *Republic*.⁴ That the difficulties attributed to the Socrates of the *Phaedo* are ironical we might guess from such phrases as *αἴρεις εἰκῆ φύση*⁵ and *δέντρος τλοῦς*⁶ applied to the new method of the speaker, and *κομψεῖα*, 'subtlety,'⁷ used of the ordinary way of speaking of such things. The whole performance is certainly *οἰδὲν καιρὸν*, as Socrates says, but it is not 'mystification.' The myth of the *Phaedo*, too, in its philosophical bearing a forecast of the Cave of the *Republic*, is quite in keeping with the Socratic *θόος*, with its grotesque *dramatis personae* of fish and frogs. On the formal side, however, the *Phaedo* shows a relation to the other dialogues rather too subtle to be the result of the artless conversation even of a Socrates. Its language simulates at times that of a defense in court;⁸ but it is the converse of the *Apology*. In the earlier instance, Socrates pleaded formally, at least, for life, against those who wished to put him to death; here he defends his readiness to die against those who deplore his death. Crito has now to be persuaded of the opposite of that which he forced the judges to believe; then it was the fact that Socrates would remain, now it is that he will not remain.⁹ A somewhat similar contrast divides the *Phaedo* from the *Symposium*: the disciple of Diotima found in the ideal world a preoccupation for life; here it is the justification of death. All this is the work of that paradox of philosophy as a *meditatio mortis* that Plato seems to have appropriated from the mysteries. The result is too grave a matter, perhaps, for comedy; but it throws the light of hope over tragedy.

¹ *Phaedo*, 96de.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 99c.

² *Parmenides*, 137c.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 101c.

³ *Philebus*, 56d.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 63br-2; 63e8-64a3; 69de.

⁴ *Republic*, 525d ff.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 115c ff.

⁵ *Phaedo*, 97b.

IV

The *Republic*, in spite of the earnestness of its burden, lacks the note of personal tragedy which necessarily is sounded in the *Phaedo*; it is of the very essence of impersonality. And one element, more than anything else, gives scope for exquisite comedy,—the contrast between an ideal world, often conceived as being to a certain degree realized, and this world of change and decay. The charting of the ideal world is of primary importance, and the contrast only incidental; but the contrast recurs again and again. For one thing, no weapon is so strong as satire when the claims of pretenders are to be opposed; so the sophists, the poets, the tyrants, and all the powers of this life in turn suffer from the shafts of ridicule. And Plato knows, too, that he is describing a kingdom not on earth, but in heaven; his powers of description will certainly fail him at times, and his failures can most conveniently be concealed in Parthian volleys of comedy. The comedy is perhaps most keen when Plato is most impatient of the impediments that keep him, and that, as he knows, must always keep him, from demonstrating the Heavenly City as something more than an ideal. His Socrates asks permission ‘to keep holiday, like lazy-minded men, who feast themselves on their own thoughts when travelling alone. They do not wait to discover the means of attaining the object of their desires; they let that question alone to save themselves the weariness of deliberating about what is practicable and what is not. They suppose they have what they desire ($\thetaέντες \omegaς$ $\deltaιπάρχον εἶναι δι βούλοντα$), and then proceed to arrange the remainder of the business, and amuse themselves by enumerating all they will do when their desire is realized, so making their already lazy minds even lazier.’¹ So Socrates defers questions of practicability; but he is not the less critical of all that usurps the position that he claims for his ideals. Though his *Republic* is at times a mere ideal of the imagination,² and is often explicitly marked as such,³ it is at times regarded

¹ *Rep.*, 458a.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, 471c ff.; 534c; 592ab.

³ Notably in 592ab: $\gammaῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἴμαι αἰτήν εἶναι$. A striking parallel is Virgil, *Aen.* VI, 893–899. Aeneas comes up from the lower world, after his vision of the future, through the ivory gate through which false visions issue. Virgil thus stamps the vision as a splendid but illusory dream; and this is only the last and most pointed of a series of indications of unsubstantiality.

as not impossible, however difficult, of realization on earth.¹ The possibility rests on a famous proviso: the Republic can exist only when kings are philosophers and philosophers are kings.² *Si le roi savait, si le philosophe pouvait!* But how much virtue in that "if"! Even an approximation to the Utopian ideal may be of value,³ and even the Heavenly city itself needs the services of a living legislator;⁴ but changes must be radical, and Plato has little faith in the value of half-way measures, the efforts of 'charming' tinkers and patchers.⁵ Notice the transition; a man may be pardoned for believing that he is six feet tall, *if he has no standard*.⁶ The Socrates of the *Republic* does not lack a standard; his difficulty is in persuading others to adopt it. As usual, the tone is one of irony and extravagant apology. Socrates has recourse to a 'magnificent lie';⁷ his hearers do not wonder that he is 'ashamed to propound such fiction' as the myth of Cadmus, which, to be sure, is incredible in this generation, though it may be credible in the next.⁸ Socrates pretends more than once that he is unwilling to continue the argument;⁹ he expects, and receives, the waves of ridicule that are ready to overwhelm him;¹⁰ he hesitates long to speak his paradoxical suggestion.¹¹ 'All that can be said of the extravagance of Plato's proposals is anticipated by himself.'¹² The pretended evasion of certain topics merely marks the difficulty of speaking on them in such a way as to carry conviction.¹³ Not lack of will, but lack of ability may hinder Socrates from showing how a city can entertain philosophy without being destroyed by it.¹⁴ The Good has 'often' been mentioned, but 'we have no proper knowledge of it,'¹⁵ yet it is the most important of all subjects. The views of others are refuted; but Socrates shirks further discussion of it.¹⁶ Here is frankness at last: Plato gives nowhere any more satisfactory account of the Good, for it is an

¹ *Rep.*, 389d; 416d; 450cd; 466d, 499d; 502c.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 425-427. .

² Cf. *ibid.*, 592b.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 426.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 497c.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 414b; cf. 459c, on the dose of falsehood needed for the regulation of marriages.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 414e; 415d.

¹² Jowett, tr. Plato, III, lxxviii.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 368b: 449-451; 457e.

¹³ Cf. *Rep.* 502d.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 472a.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 497e.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 472, 473.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 505a.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 506b-d.

ideal of the imagination incapable of detailed exposition.¹ The evasion is an example of Plato's common device for avoiding the exposition of a difficult subject, which he reserves for oral discussion.²

It is hardly worth while to rehearse the many occasions of Plato's satirical treatment of false pretenders in the *Republic*. Some of his attacks are important enough, however, to deserve special note. The shrewd comments on human nature that appear in the accounts of the transformations of governments³ are something more than satire on existing governments, flavored with metaphors from animal life, and possibly with allusions to real men. All is viewed from the vantage ground of the philosopher *sub specie aeternitatis*, and thus becomes a subject for pity, if not for contempt. *Suave mari magno*. . . . But Plato is no quietist; the worthlessness of the world is for him a challenge, not the warrant for indifference. The sophists are in general treated with contempt. The poets, as individual writers, fare ill; Homer is often quoted with ironical approval, but the satire is directed quite as much against the interpreters of Homer as against the poet himself. Yet the art of poetry gains in dignity, so far as it shares in the universals of philosophy.⁴ The treatment of poetry in the last book of the *Republic* presents a special difficulty; for it is inconsistent with the argument of the earlier books. The difficulty vanishes, as I have shown elsewhere, when it is recognized that the contrast in the tenth book is between poetry as it exists and an unattainable ideal of philosophy; it should be read as comedy. The vantage ground from which the attack is made appears again in the sequel; the rest of the book continues the contrast between the ideal world and the injustice of this life.⁵ It is in a certain sense a compliment to poetry to single it out, as the most formidable rival of philosophy, for the renewed discussion of the tenth book. Yet there may be a more immediate mo-

¹ Cf. *Plato's View of Poetry*, pp. 45-50.

² For another example, there is the reply to Glaucon: he can not follow Socrates in the study of dialectic (*Rep.*, 533a.) Cf. also *Symposium*, 209ef.

³ *Rep.* VIII.

⁴ This and the following point are discussed in detail in *Plato's View of Poetry*, pp. 34-38; 50-56.

⁵ The myth of Er, for all its grandeur, contains shrewd bits of comedy; the fates of Ardiacus the tyrant, of Orpheus, Ajax, Thersites, and Odysseus, project severally their earthly *θόρ*os against the background of eternity.

tive: it is possible that Plato feels a measure of resentment toward Aristophanes for the ridicule of Socrates in the *Clouds*.¹ Aristophanes and Socrates, as guests of Agathon, appear in the *Symposium* on good terms; but it is not inconceivable that Plato, who always reserves his most vehement attacks for types rather than for individuals, and who becomes increasingly intolerant of rivals to the claims of philosophy, sees an opportunity in the *Republic* to retaliate against the whole tribe of poets; comedy is vanquished by comedy. But the point lies outside the possibility of demonstration. Much more simple is the defense of philosophy against the charge of uselessness.² Socrates admits that as matters stand the philosophers are rogues, if bad, and fools, if good. The answer, as we should expect, consists of the comic contrast between true and false standards. After narrating the parable of the ship, with its noble but deaf master, and its crew who have no notion of the principles of navigation, Socrates proceeds to throw the blame for the disrepute of philosophers on the public, who corrupt them and do not give them an untrammelled opportunity for practising their art. So philosophy is dishonored by inferior men, mere mechanics: it is like the little, bald tinker 'who marries his master's daughter.' Yet the public are not wholly to blame, nor are they wholly bad: they are in turn corrupted by 'outsiders who have burst in like drunken revelers where they have no right, who abuse and wrangle with one another, and spend their whole time in personalities and in behavior that is entirely unbecoming to philosophy.'³ The real philosopher, of course, has no time for such conduct.

Plato has already commended to us the 'noble lie.'⁴ The fundamental principles of lying are boldness, consistency, and detail. If you wish a lie to be believed, you must make it circumstantial. Plato's appreciation of this principle, in the exploitation of the ideal commonwealth, accounts for much that seems obscure. On the purely literary side, one may note the wealth of detail that secures plausibility for the

¹ Cf. *Apology*, 18d; 10c; *Rep.*, 606c; *Laws*, 658 ff.; *Ibid.*, 817. Adam thinks it probable that in *Rep.* V Plato is answering the *Ecclesiazousae*, which had ridiculed either the earlier argument of Plato in his oral discussion and in *Rep.* II, or at least the current views of communism which Plato partly approved. Cf. Adam, App. I on *Rep.* V.

² *Rep.*, 499–500.

³ *Rep.*, 500b.

⁴ *Rep.*, 414b.

Myth of Er.¹ It is not different in the case of the main argument. The great difficulty in the commonwealth, he says, is in its institution;² accordingly, to make the notion plausible, he actually suggests the first step in launching the new state: all the inhabitants of the state above the age of ten are to be banished, in order to give the philosopher-guardians full opportunity, without contaminating influences, to initiate the rising generation. The proposal is not altogether arbitrary, unpractical though it may be; but it is significant chiefly of Plato's regular method of filling the *lacunae* that are bound to exist in his mediation between actual and ideal conditions,—the injection of detail, in serio-comic vein. Such is the method of his philosophy of history in the eighth book. The sequence of states that he sketches is not an historical one; nor can history be derived by any such *a priori* method. Plato probably realized this as well as we; and symptoms of his embarrassment are the sudden institution of the ideal state, and the arbitrarily conceived descent of the timocratic man from the retired statesman, a patent *non sequitur*. The atmosphere of comedy, indeed, pervades this whole discussion. What is the principle of change in the state? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us 'how discord first arose? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery, to play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty tragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?'³ The reply of the Muses proceeds to rest the whole matter on the principle of growth and decay in organisms,—a sensible enough answer, provided that it be applied sensibly,—and on the manipulation of the 'perfect number,' which governs birth,—a reply which means everything and nothing. No doubt Plato had a certain faith in Pythagorean formulae and modes of attacking problems; no doubt, too, analysis has shown the basis in symbolism on which the 'perfect number' is constructed. But only a very credulous reader will ascribe to Plato any confidence in the value of the particular number that he has constructed. He holds that there is an element of quantity or proportion in all things; but his attempt to apply the general notion of quantity to the case in hand is mathematical comedy, of which the appeal to the Muses gave us timely warning, if warning were

¹ Cf. Jowett, tr. Plato, III, p. clxix.

² *Rep.*, 499b ff.

³ *Ibid.*, 545d f.

needed. This view is substantially in accord with that of Adam, who has been far from neglecting all the solid argument that is to be detected in the text. "The episode," he says, "like many other passages in Plato, is half-serious, and half-playful."¹ The comic vein is sustained in the following argument, with its reference to the metals previously introduced under the aegis of the 'noble lie';² and for the whole theory the Muses are again solemnly made responsible, and the Muses "must needs speak truly."³ It is in such a tone that Plato lets comedy fill the cracks in the fair structure of his city. And not inconceivably his chief reason for feeling that they should be somehow filled is his unwillingness to admit that any ordinary cause could bring to pass the downfall of his state, if it has been once established. The 'perfect number' is not the only example of Plato's arbitrary use of mathematics to substantiate a preconceived position. The same semi-serious, semi-jocose spirit plays about the tremendous difference between the life of the king and that of the tyrant, and evolves the 'tyrant's number.'⁴ Again the manipulation of the mathematical reckoning includes arbitrary steps in order to attain the number, 729, which Plato evidently intends to reach.⁵ The whole passage is the fanciful statement of serious truth; strictly speaking, you can not get a good (or a positive sum) by multiplying a bad (or a negative sum), for the difference is qualitative; but you can by such a calculation suggest to the imagination the infinite⁶ difference in happiness between the just and the unjust life.⁷

¹ Adam, ed. *Rep.*, II, note on 545c ff. The first Appendix to Book VIII, a monument of learning and acute interpretation, shows the number to be intelligible: but Adam is duly cautious in ascribing to Plato any serious regard for these speculations. Cf. p. 294, end; and p. 306.

² *Rep.*, 546e ff.; cf. 414b.

³ *Ibid.*, 547a.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 587b.

⁵ Cf. Adam, on 587b; 587d; and 588a.

⁶ *Rep.*, 587e.

⁷ Pythagorean influence again doubtless is responsible for the nature of the statement: but the comic possibilities of the calculation perhaps appealed to Plato more than we generally realize. Cf. the humorous word that Socrates coins: ἐνεκάκησκοντακοσιοπλαστάκις (587e). Modern slang also speaks of "getting one's number." The elaborate method by which the chasm between the king and the tyrant is magnified reminds one of the somewhat similar manipulation of the notions of original and copy that Plato introduces in the tenth book into the discussion of

The subjects discussed in the *Republic* are compared by Socrates to actors who go on and off the stage.¹ An actor does not make his exits and his entrances without the connivance of the dramatist; and the dramatist in this instance is Plato. The movement of the plot of the *Republic* is extraordinarily interesting. Socrates is what the playwright would call a developing character; in his hands the argument changes from inquiry and scepticism to dogmatic and spiritual affirmation. The progress is worth defining. In the first book, Socrates is the investigator who explodes false notions without offering any solution of his own, and who in the end confesses ignorance.² This book, together with the earlier pages of the second book,³ are not unlike the early dialogues: for superficial views of justice are thrown into the form of comedy, and the upshot is mainly negative. So popular morality finds its champion in Cephalus, shallow argument in Polemarchus, and sophistic contentiousness in Thrasymachus. Socrates easily disposes of these false views. Glaucon and Adeimantus, as *diabolici advocati*, now present the position of justice in the eyes of this world,⁴ and of the gods.⁵ Their arguments, which run counter to their own convictions, represent superficially, like the previous views, 'the facts,' which remain, for what they are worth, despite all the high discourse and the ideal commonwealth that is to come. Plato means to leave no unguarded positions in the rear; and the objections of Glaucon and Adeimantus, made early in the second book, are sound, as far as they go. From the worldly point of view, justice does not always pay; but, as Plato goes on to prove, that does not mean that the claims of justice should be pursued wholly on grounds of policy.⁶ In the rest of the poetry, likewise in the interests of a special interest (cf. *Plato's View of Poetry*, pp. 50ff.). To the sober-minded reader who needs explicit warning from Plato himself against taking too seriously the fantastic conception of the 'tyrant's number,' we may commend the remark that the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher are separated by an interval which no mathematical ratio can express (*Politicus*, 257b).

¹ *Rep.*, 451c.

² *Ibid.*, 327 to 368.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 363a ff.

³ *Ibid.*, 354bc.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 358e ff.

⁶ Strictly, the Socrates of the *Republic* side-steps, and never really answers the objections of Glaucon and Adeimantus. He does not say, "Be good, and you will be happy," but, 'Be good, and you will not care whether you are happy or not.' Blessedness takes the place of happiness. Then faith takes up the work of reason, and the rewards of righteousness are reckoned in. A careful reading of *Rep.*, 612a ff.

second book, and in the third and fourth books, Socrates leads the conversation, but his scepticism is already giving place to dogmatism: for example, he lays down, as already accepted, the cardinal virtues. Glaucon and Adeimantus, whose better nature has already forestalled the Socratic position with regard to the need of investigating justice itself apart from its consequences, now lag in the argument. Glaucon, to be sure, does enliven the discussion from time to time with his humor, and his brother brings to bear a graver mind on the more serious questions;¹ but they contribute comparatively little that is constructive. In the next three books, they become mere puppets, and Socrates dogmatizes freely. Dramatic instinct would prefer that the brothers should bring forward the views of the idea of the Good that are to be weighed and discarded; but Socrates brings them forward himself. Every sign tells us that the discussion is no longer one of the inquiries of the midwife Socrates, but a lecture from the Academy. The dialogue form, however, arrests the dogmatic tendency, or, at least, corrects it at times. Adeimantus distrusts the results of the reasoning of Socrates: driven from position to position and silenced, like an unskilful player at draughts, he holds that a number of small false moves have accumulated to cause his defect.² Socrates half admits the force of the accusation, but justifies his point in the present instance (on the value of philosophy). The objection of Adeimantus would have no place here if Plato did not mean us to perceive that he realizes the danger of dogmatism without a genuine opposition. It is not the dangers of the Socratic mode of reasoning, as Jowett holds,³

is instructive. The spirit of the last part of the *Republic* is not unlike that of the last part of the Book of Job, and is similarly inconsistent with the earlier argument.

¹ The difference in character between the brothers is well described by Jowett, tr. Plato, III, pp. xii ff. Part of Glaucon's by-play appears to be on his part unintentionally humorous: in the sketch of the philosopher's education he interposes the practical application of each branch, whether mischievously, or, as Plato seems to intend, through lack of comprehension (*Rep.*, 522 ff.). But Socrates has no use for the shop-keeping view of mathematics or the sentimental view of astronomy: existing science is insecure (*ibid.*, 533). Again, Glaucon's amusing misunderstanding of the meaning of Socrates with regard to the study of music is, after a fashion, a play within a play, satire within satire, and serves, like the other *béries* just noted, to emphasize the purely theoretical nature of the education that Socrates proposes. For this sort of emphasis, cf. also *Symposium*, 206 f., and *Rep.*, 528ab.

² *Rep.*, 487b ff.

³ Jowett, tr. Plato, III, p. xc.

that Plato means; for the best guarantee against a gradual variation in the meaning of terms in the course of an argument is the challenge of a competent critic, and that is what the dogmatist lacks. Adeimantus is too far beyond his depth to serve the purpose very effectively; the Socratic method must be either revived or discarded. But the Socrates of this dialogue proceeds practically unchallenged hereafter. Glaucon has spoken for both his brother and himself: 'If you treat me as a follower who is able only to see what is shown to him, you will treat me fairly enough,'¹ In other words the Socratic method is used now only from force of habit, and Plato is his own critic.² He does, indeed, treat in the last three books such matters as the real Socrates might have discussed; but the treatment is wholly Platonic. And Socrates, who at first was the man of flesh and blood, has been transformed almost imperceptibly into the type of the philosopher, the mouth-piece of Plato himself. Needless to say, the illusion of the historical Socrates is barely sustained; something like an allusion to his fate occurs more than once, naturally in generalized terms.³

One must not press unduly what may after all be only a personal impression: but to me, at least, it seems as if the greater richness of Plato's language in the *Republic*, especially in his comic sallies, accompanies the transformation of the original Socrates into the Platonic philosopher. Socrates was himself, we know well enough, a wag with a taste for odd twists of speech; yet in none of the earlier sketches of Socrates does he speak in so racy a vein, nor are his figures so vivid. In the *Republic*, the Socratic illustration becomes the Platonic parable or allegory, often subtly comic, — the Cave, the Captain of the Ship,

¹ *Rep.*, 432c. Cf. 533a. Socrates takes Glaucon at his word, and proclaims the result of an argument in the name of Glaucon (*ibid.*, 580).

² I am aware that this is not the usual interpretation of this passage; but it seems to me the natural one. Notice the difference between the accusation against Socrates in *Meno*, 80, — that he bewilders those who talk with him (Socrates is there represented as mainly, though not wholly, the investigator not committed to a conclusion), — and the present accusation (*Rep.*, 487b ff.). The point is emphasized in the *Phaedrus* (275d ff.); a written speech, unchallenged, 'dead,' is irresponsible, uncontrollable, incapable of adapting itself to an audience, and hence leads to misunderstanding.

³ Cf. *Rep.*, 360c ff.; 492a; 517a. References to the fate of Alcibiades seem not improbable (494b; cf. 560). For further anachronisms, cf. 336a, and *Symposium*, 193a.

the philosopher as a watch-dog, the marriage of the portionless maiden Philosophy to an upstart little tinker, the drones and the wasps, the Great Beast, and the soul under the simile of a composite beast. Sometimes a metaphor is familiar,—a philosophical inquiry conceived under the guise of a hunt;¹ but the more humorous figures crop up, as it were, on the spur of the moment: music, ‘pouring like water through the funnel of a man’s ears, wears away the edge of his soul’;² the contrast between the soldiers of the ideal state and those of neighboring states under the image of lean dogs and fatted sheep, or of trained boxers and corpulent opponents;³ evil stories about the gods are to be told only after the sacrifice of some all but un procurable animal;⁴ the soul in this life is like the sea-god Glaucus, encrusted with barnacles.⁵ Such drolleries are doubtless to be found in the earlier dialogues, and the graver dialogues of Plato’s later years disclose them but seldom; but it would not be profitable to dispute who is the greater humorist, Socrates or Plato. It is enough to notice the wealth of humor that enlivens the *Republic*, and to remember how far it is taking us from the simple, though baffling, interrogations of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus.

Though the doctrine of the *Phaedrus* is sufficiently Platonic, and the Socrates is patently the mouth-piece of Plato’s dogmatism, the setting of the dialogue is such as to preserve much of the personality of Socrates. He is, moreover, the same quizzical fellow whom we have often met before. He toys with Phaedrus, and makes him produce the manuscript of the speech of Lysias that Phaedrus admires so much. He affects great admiration for it, and is barely persuaded to deliver a speech of his own; but he delivers it with rare skill, inspired, he thinks, by the place in which he speaks, a place dedicated to the nymphs.⁶ Of course its attack on love is ironical; yet it is not wholly ironical, for it contains much that is true, and though seeming to oppose love it really only makes a distinction between kinds of love, somewhat in the spirit of the *Symposium*. Nevertheless, there is something shocking about this negative attitude; and Socrates is urged by his familiar sign to sing a palinode to atone for his blasphemy against Eros. The

¹ *Rep.*, 432b; cf. *Phaedo*, 63a; 115b.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 378a.

² *Rep.*, 411a.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 611cd.

³ *Ibid.*, 422b ff.

⁶ *Phaedrus*, 238cd; 262d.

atonement is complete: so far from finding fault with the madness of love, as before, Socrates now discovers that this madness is of a noble sort, and launches himself upon the myth that illustrates at once the possibilities of love, the theory of ideas, and the principles of a philosophic rhetoric.¹ He continues his discourse from a sense of duty; the grasshoppers will report it to the Muses. Now that the ground has been cleared of false notions of love and false standards of rhetoric by this comic but wholly easy and natural bit of drama, Socrates proceeds to discuss the point that his palinode has already illustrated: the principles of a true or philosophic rhetoric, based on knowledge of the truth, that is, of ideas. Well, his second speech was playful, yet partly true in its adherence to the principles of generalization and division;² and the rest of his discourse consists largely of the development of these points.³ At last 'the game is played out,'⁴ and the conclusion is soberly stated: writers and talkers of all kinds are justified only when their work is based on knowledge of truth.

We shall never know with just how much seriousness Plato wrote the pages of the *Phaedrus* that deprecate the value of the written word, and give high praise to conversation because it is living and therefore philosophical. It might be argued that they are wholly flippant, for the dialogue itself is a written work. On the other hand, we know that it was Plato's own practice to reserve for oral discussion many difficult matters; in his time philosophy dealt in words that were barely defined and were easily capable of misinterpretation. That is the reason why unchallenged dogmatism was so dangerous, as Plato himself realized;⁵ and that is the reason for the peculiar value of the Socratic method, when sincerely practised. Socrates in the *Phaedrus* admits that the Egyptian 'tale' was invented to introduce his point: but the real point is the truth conveyed by the story, as he

¹ I have already called attention to a comic touch in the myth that should not be overlooked, — the relative rank of the various professions (cf. *Plato's View of Poetry*, p. 62.)

² *Phaedrus*, 265c.

³ Socrates, in the interest of fairness, himself undertakes the 'wolf's cause,' and argues against his own cause; but he then refutes the dissenting argument (*ibid.*, 272cd).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 278b: οὐκοῦν δὴ τεκατσθε μερόως ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων.

⁵ Cf. *Rep.*, 487b ff., discussed on pp. 104 f.

explains.¹ Probably we shall not appreciate Plato's full meaning if we take him wholly in earnest or wholly in jest: 'in a written discourse, whatever the subject, there must of necessity be much that is sportive. The best of them are nothing else than reminders of what we know.' That may be the principle on which we may best understand the *Phaedrus* as a whole.

V

In view of the abstract nature of the subjects treated in the 'dialectical' dialogues, their comic phases strike one as many and surprising. Though the *Theaetetus* beyond doubt belongs to this group, its dramatic traits have often led readers to place it much earlier. But the character of Socrates is more Socratic than the argument. The discussion is described as a game: whoever misses shall sit down, as at a game of ball, and shall be 'donkey,' as the boys say; he who outlasts his competitors without missing shall be 'king.'² The friends of Socrates, adopting the language of the palaestra, in which they are speaking, twit him with wishing to 'try a fall with all comers.'³ Yet there is no taint of professionalism in his attitude; unlike the sophists, who are fond of making a sparring-match over arithmetical contradictions, he and Theaetetus wish only to establish the relation of principles;⁴ but he must guard against being satisfied with a merely verbal victory, and must not crow too soon.⁵ Quite in keeping with the earlier pictures of Socrates are the mock respect for Homer⁶ and the biting satire on Euripides.⁷ The figures of speech seem to me more akin to those of the *Republic* than to those of the earlier dialogues; knowledge, for example, conceived as impressions on wax, or as an aviary, or as the Trojan horse.⁸

Apart from the remark that the conversation is a game, the point of view is suggested by the digression and the recurrent references to the obstetric art of Socrates, who offers only other people's wisdom, not his own.⁹ How far this attitude is ironical depends, naturally, on

¹ *Phaedrus*, 275bc.

² *Theaetetus*, 146a.

³ *Ibid.*, 169b.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 154de. Cf. the wholly sound remarks given to Protagoras by Socrates, about the dangers of mere contentiousness, 166a-168c.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 164c.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 152e.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 157c, *et passim*.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 154d.

the extent to which Socrates guides the discussion to any definite conclusion. We notice in the first place that all the attempts to define knowledge appear to fail, whether they are in terms of Heracleitus and Protagoras, or of impressions on a *tabula rasa*, or of true opinion defined and explained. The Heracleitean hypothesis is apparently accepted,¹ only to be rejected. The imaginary speech of Protagoras is dignified, and though it may represent Plato's notion of what Protagoras logically ought to have said to fill out his case, rather than the actual utterances of Protagoras, it is as notably fair-minded in its treatment of the arch-sophist as the dialogue that bears his name. But Socrates has launched a barbed arrow against the fundamental position of Protagoras: and it is irresistible. One is as little likely to forget or to deny the criticism of Socrates, phrased humorously in terms of pigs and dog-headed beasts² as to lose the point of the onslaught of Xenophanes on anthropomorphism with its analogy in terms of oxen. If truth is relative, there is no possibility of comparison or of certainty. And the other proposed solutions of the problem of knowledge prove equally unsatisfactory; they are only 'wind-eggs.' Yet the result is not wholly inconclusive. Socrates realizes that inability to frame a definition must not deter him from reasoning.³ On the negative side we have learned that knowledge is neither sensation nor the irresponsible work of the mind; on the positive side, we find the rudiments of a "critical philosophy" (in the Kantian sense), with a list of categories.⁴ These truths are the joint discovery of Socrates and his interlocutors; but the guiding is wholly in the hands of Socrates, who assumes responsibility for the sensible words that he attributes to Protagoras, and who even gives impartial criticism to his own argument.⁵ That he does not more definitely state the conclusions of the dialogue, and leaves the whole matter in so non-committal a fashion, is altogether in the spirit of Plato, as well as of his master; it is the return to a non-dogmatic style that is highly appropriate in dealing with a question that could not in Plato's day be more than thrown into relief by the refutation of false notions and the statement of certain requirements for a correct solution. There was no rough

¹ *Theaetetus*, 152 ff.² *Ibid.*, 161c.³ *Ibid.*, 196d-197a.⁴ Cf. J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, Oxford, 1909, pp. 65 ff.⁵ *Theaetetus*, 164c ff.

and ready answer; the question is far from settled to-day: the best method of attacking it was, and still is, not frontal, but enveloping. The point is illuminated by one of the long digressions of Socrates, which, as Theodorus remarks, is easier to follow than the argument itself.¹ It deals with the difference between the lawyer, who is a slave to the necessities of his profession, and the philosopher, whose liberal profession excuses him from the instancy of practical affairs; all time is at his command: 'the argument is our servant and must wait our leisure.'² Plato must not be pressed for too dogmatic a deliverance on the matter in hand.³ The whole method of Plato, in this as well as in other dialogues, especially when taken in the light of the digression on the philosopher, suggests that the Socrates of the *Theaetetus* is ironical in his inconclusiveness. The audience, at least, is not a little wiser than before.

The *Parmenides* has always been a stumbling-block for its readers. Plato attacking the doctrine of ideas? The notion seems absurd. But there is no evading the fact; the only question is, what form of the doctrine is it that is so easily demolished? And who is the young Socrates, its unsuccessful champion? That the doctrine is not what Plato himself had previously held, is apparent: it is clearly such a

¹ *Theaetetus*, 177c.

² *Ibid.*, 173bc.

³ The contrast rests on the same reasoning as the defense of the philosopher against the charge of uselessness in *Rep.*, 487 ff. and in *Rep.*, 516e ff.; and is based on the distinction between the ideal and the physical world. Humor plays about the whole digression, but the philosopher has much the best of it. One phase in the caricature of the philosopher should be noted. The philosopher does not care to join in the ordinary occupations of men; he is 'measuring earth and heaven and the things which are under and on the earth and above heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety, but not condescending to anything which is at hand' (*Theaetetus*, 173e.). And the jest about the blindness of the star-gazer Thales is applicable to all philosophers; for the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next-door neighbor, but is occupied in searching into the essence of man (*ibid.*, 174ab). It is clear that Plato intends the phrase about the astronomical activities of the philosopher to be taken chiefly in a metaphorical sense (cf. *Rep.*, 529a: Socrates ridicules Glaucon for sentimentalizing about the elevating influence of astronomy); for when he generalizes about 'all philosophers' he mentions specifically investigations of human problems, rather than cosmology. Aristophanes wilfully treats metaphor as fact, since dramatic effect is to be gained (*Theaetetus*, 173e; cf. *Apology*, 18b. It is even easier to raise a laugh by an appeal to the eyes than by an appeal to the reason).

perversion of his theory as would not be found in an early stage of its development (in the mind of the real Socrates or of Plato), but in a later stage when Plato's makeshift language had been carelessly used by others. In fact, the young Socrates gives the version of the doctrine that Aristotle undertakes to criticize in the *Metaphysics*; "and if we could suppose that Plato had his young pupil Aristotle in mind when he invented the part of the 'young Socrates' in the *Parmenides*, we should find ourselves assisting at a very entertaining comedy. We should have Aristotle defending unsuccessfully his own erroneous view of the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas!"¹ There are difficulties, as the author of the sentences just quoted admits, to prevent us from believing that Plato had the young Aristotle especially in mind; but it is obvious that he is criticizing such a perversion of his own theory as was likely to crop up in the Academy. He finds Parmenides a convenient mouth-piece for his own answers to the perverted statement of his doctrine; and since Socrates has been habitually used to voice his own statement of the theory, the natural way to bring the two views together is to make Socrates talk with Parmenides; and there is no chronological difficulty in imagining a meeting. But in order to bring it to pass, Plato has to make his master Socrates young again, and to send him to school again to learn from Plato himself. This is indeed "a very entertaining comedy"! Of course the use of Parmenides to present his own criticisms saves Plato from such open courtesy as would have attended an attack delivered in his own person.² Since the perverted theory could easily be developed from the notions of the real Socrates, it was logically defensible to put it in the mouth of the young Socrates.³ Thus "the *mise en scène* and cast of the dialogue

¹ J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 72.

² The device reminds one of the irony of Socrates in the *Symposium*, where he criticized the views of his host and his fellow guests by recounting the discourse of Diotima.

³ Burnet naturally is shocked by such a suggestion: "That Plato should have meant his own earlier self will only be credible to those who can believe that in the *Phaedo* he made use of Socrates as a mask for his own personality; while the view that by Socrates here he meant some callow Academician who held his own theory in a crude form should be credible to no one. We might be reluctantly convinced that Plato used Socrates as a disguise for himself; but it would surely have been impious to represent his own immature disciples under the revered name of his

give Plato the opportunity at once of setting forth his own debt and relation to the Eleatics and of 'scoring off' his own pupils;¹ and Aristotle's criticism becomes a piece of stupid plagiarism! But we are not yet done with the comedy. Parmenides does not represent the whole truth till he has been submitted to criticism. The second part of the dialogue, therefore, with its bewildering dialectic, is aimed at the Eleatics as much as at the Academicians, even though it is Parmenides who is Plato's spokesman.² The One of the Eleatic philosophy has no content, and can explain experience only as it resolves itself into a Many. The argument is exceedingly abstract, and is not altogether guiltless of fallacies;³ of these some are probably unintentional, but others may be intended as incidental satire on the Megaric dialectic. The hero of the dialogue is Plato, who does not speak a word in his own person, but who pulls the strings with consummate cleverness. He does not repudiate the doctrine of ideas: he rejects the more gross perversions of it. He by no means gives up his dependence on the reason; he shows that the reason is valid only when it has a content.⁴

master." *Thales to Plato*, p. 256. Yet a few pages later we read: "Parmenides proves that, if we take the intelligible world by itself, it is quite as unsatisfactory as the sensible, and by taking the One as his example, he really refutes the Megaric doctrine, and that with the weapon of the Megarics themselves. It adds to the humour of the situation that this refutation is ruthlessly carried out by the revered Parmenides." *Ibid.*, p. 262. If the "revered Parmenides" may be represented in such an occupation, why is Socrates too respectable to assist in the comedy?

¹ Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 72 f.

² This appears to be in the main the view of Jowett, Taylor, Natorp, and Stewart. Cf. Stewart, pp. 79 ff.

³ Noted by Jowett, tr. Plato, IV, pp. 33 f.

⁴ P. E. More, whose analysis of the *Parmenides* is in many ways illuminating, seems to me to miss the point here, because of his dualistic bias. He holds that the second part of the *Parmenides* "exhibits the inadequacy of the metaphysical use of reason to prove or disprove what we possess by the higher intuition" (*Platonism*, p. 304): and since he perceives that Parmenides is correct in his attack on the ideas, which are nevertheless not given up, he argues that they must rest on a non-rational basis, and "do not come to us by a process of metaphysical logic, but by means of some direct experience independent of such logic." Is not More reversing the order in which Plato conceived the matter, and does not faith and contemplation end the work that reason leaves undone? Stewart's guidance in this fundamental matter seems to me more safe. As an alternative to More's dualistic interpretation of Plato, I suggest some such account of Plato's metaphysical career as the following:

The *Sophist* has less of dramatic interest than any of the preceding dialogues; instead of the iridescent lights that usually play about Plato's theme, we find the white light of reason. Socrates is only in the background; he launches the discussion at the beginning, but is quite eclipsed by the Eleatic Stranger, who obviously speaks for Plato. The pretense of a dramatic method is so awkwardly sustained that the Eleatic Stranger professes to be familiar with the difference between a sophist and a philosopher; but of course he was not present in the dialogue to which Plato evidently refers. The spirit of the present dialogue is fairly represented by the figure of the hunt for game, which is revived from the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*; but it is not an altogether disinterested hunt, for the way in which damaging examples under a series of dichotomies are manipulated reminds us of the method of the tenth book of the *Republic*, in which the relation of original and imitation was manipulated for the express purpose of depreciating the artist. The logical method of the *Sophist*, too, the method of repeated divisions, is not really adequate as a general principle of research: Plato indeed takes the pains elsewhere to make the point clear.¹ Yet Plato introduces the method here not without a comic purpose; for it was a favorite method of the eristic sophists, especially of the Megarics of his own day, and they are therefore neatly hoist with their own petard.² The sophist, now no longer an individual, like the respectable Protagoras, but the type of the unenlightened charlatan, the antithesis of the philosopher, is a fair target for bitter attack. The Eleatic Stranger, who realizes that the problem involves an investigation of the meaning of 'not-being', criticizes in turn all the schools of philosophy: the old masters;³ the materialists, who are engaged in a war of giants and gods, and who must be educated be-

(1) Pupil of Cratylus: pluralism. (2) Pupil of Socrates: inconsistent monism; unsystematic ideas. (3) Consistent monism (*Rep.*, etc.). (4) Danger of dualism scented. (*Parmenides*). (5) Revised monism; critical philosophy ('dialectical' dialogues). (6) Applied monism (*Timaeus*; *Laws*).

¹ Reality must be carved at the joints: *Phaedrus*, 265e; cf. *Politicus*, 262e; 287bc; *Philebus*, 16c ff.

² L. Campbell suggested that Plato may have had in mind a Megarian tendency within the Academy. A similar comic motive was at work, as we have seen, in the *Parmenides*.

³ *Sophist*, 242 ff.

fore it is possible to argue with them;¹ and the 'friends of the ideas.'² Only true idealism comes off unscathed; but this means idealism subjected to a wholesome criticism from an Eleatic point of view, and even the Eleatic philosophy has been modified to the extent that it admits categories imposed by the mind. For the Eleatic Stranger has been forced to 'lay hands on father Parmenides'; if he is over-scrupulous, the argument must be abandoned.³ Burnet suggests that his "reluctance . . . to differ from his master Parmenides with regard to his central doctrine (241d) is a hint of Plato's own attitude towards Socrates at this time."⁴ Barring the qualification contained in the words "at this time," and the implication that Plato ever felt any particular reluctance in dealing freely with the Socratic teachings, the suggestion is helpful. Socrates is fast retiring to honorable obscurity. Plato confesses that he really can no longer keep up the pretence that he is only the mouth-piece of Socrates. Bits of the Socratic method persist; but the method, as it appears in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*, is too clumsy for the successful promulgation of new doctrine, except when carefully manipulated in the interest of comedy.

Dramatic fitness is even less regarded in the *Politicus* than in the preceding dialogues. The Eleatic Stranger shows by his allusions to Attic history that he is only an Athenian masquerading as an Eleatic.⁵ The comedy of the dialogue, too, is perfunctory and in the main external to the plot; there are jests, but there is little humor. The subject, to be sure, lends itself to satire; but Plato's mood is earnest and too bitter for such playful comedy as we find, for example, in the *Republic*. The point of view of the Eleatic Stranger is absolutely detached and uncompromising; one might as well, he holds, divide the world into cranes and not-cranes as into Hellenes and barbarians.

¹ *Sophist*, 246; cf. the treatment of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*; it is the implications of a philosophy, not merely the current statement of it, that interest Plato. The principle holds, too, of his interest in the teachings of Socrates. Even Parmenides has to develop his own system to admit difference and change.

² *Ibid.*, 248a ff. Clearly these are such over-zealous friends of the ideas as Plato depicts in the *Parmenides* under the guise of the young Socrates. Cf. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 87, n. 2.

³ *Sophist*, 241c-242a.

⁴ Burnet, *Thales to Plato*, p. 274.

⁵ *Politicus*, 290e; 298.

This method of dichotomy, arbitrarily used, brings the king into the same category with the bird-catcher.¹ The false politician, of Protean shape, now lion, now centaur or satyr, and a most accomplished wizard, is the chief of sophists and the most complete contrast to the true ideal of a statesman. That is the cue, of course, for such ridicule as we have seen Plato habitually heap on contemporary conditions, when he contrasts them with the ideal world; but here his grim mood leads him for the moment to think of the golden age as in the past. When the argument has shown that the name of sophist is rightly fixed on the politicians, the 'satyric drama has been played out';² and all that remains is to bow these satyrs and centaurs off the stage with rather less courtesy than the poets received in the *Republic*, and to discuss the 'royal science' in a sort of epilogue.

The *Philebus* deals with a truly Socratic subject, though in a metaphysical vein that the historic Socrates could not have encompassed. Socrates leads the discussion; but little of his character remains,³ despite occasional bits of irony,⁴ and the fear of his fellow enquirers that he may leave them in the lurch, so that the discussion may end in a general bewilderment.⁵ The dialogue seems to have been written as a refutation of the heresy of Eudoxus, one of Plato's associates in the Academy;⁶ and the tone is positive in its brushing away of conflicting dogmas, though Plato does not pretend that he has exhausted the subject. So, for example, Socrates is content to leave that threadbare discussion about the One and the Many to the Cynics and the Eristics; it is a familiar puzzle that young men in their first infatuation for philosophy practise on their parents and even on their pet animals.⁷

¹ Plato recognizes well enough, as we have seen, the principles on which division should be practised (cf. p. 113, n. 1): the strictures of the Stranger on the younger Socrates for dividing too rapidly are just, as general criticism, but in the particular case (*Politicus*, 262a) the younger Socrates is quite correct, and the longer process substituted by the Stranger is a piece of trifling intended merely to discredit the type of the statesman.

² *Ibid.*, 303c.

³ Yet the awe that Socrates affects about the gods' names has a close parallel in the motive of the palinode in the *Symposium*.

⁴ E.g., his attribution of his ideas to former discussions, which he heard whether awake or in a dream: *Philebus*, 20b; cf. 25bc.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 19e f.

⁶ Cf. also p. 113, n. 2.

⁷ *Philebus*, 15e f.

Socrates assumes the office of a door-keeper, letting in those goods and pleasures that present good credentials;¹ and is confident that there can be no pleasure in the life of an oyster.² Socrates has dogmatically propounded his position, that mind is better than pleasure, at the beginning of the dialogue;³ and he reaffirms it, after long debate, in the form of a proclamation, to the effect that though both mind and pleasure are inferior to the good, 'mind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than pleasure'; from this position he will not move in spite of the testimony of all the animals in the world.⁴ Yet the dialogue closes with a hint of inconclusiveness: 'there is a little which yet remains,' says Protarchus, 'and I will remind you of it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to give up the argument.' For it is the argument itself that has been the avowed antagonist of Socrates;⁵ and however dogmatical Plato may be with regard to his main position, he does not exaggerate his achievement.

Plato nowhere more explicitly gives his own theory of comedy than in the *Philebus*.⁶ It is based on an appreciation of the nature of the ridiculous as the condition most at odds with the Delphic inscription enjoining self-knowledge. Self-deception, whether about one's wealth, or about one's personal appearance or about one's wisdom and virtue, is the essence of comedy. But the ridiculous gives rise to a mixed emotion into which pleasure and pain both enter; and the pain is the greater as the self-deception occurs in the case not of harmless but of powerful persons. The theory is well illustrated in Plato's own writings. So long as the individual sophist or statesman or artist merely betrayed a slight lapse from truth, he was mildly satirized; but the more Plato realized how great is the gap that divides the typi-

¹ *Philebus*, 62c.

² *Ibid.*, 21c; cf. the contempt of Glaucon for the 'city of pigs,' *Rep.*, 372d.

³ *Philebus*, 11ab.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 67ab.

⁵ Pleasure, in fighting for the palm, has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low; and Socrates in taking up the cause of mind, which is struggling for the place above pleasure and second only to the good, has to forge new weapons, — namely, a metaphysical system of classification. Cf. 41b: Socrates proposes to Protarchus that they approach and grasp the new argument like wrestlers. But the argument proves to be merely a sparring partner for Socrates; it even speaks in his behalf, 50a; 51c. The modesty of the closing sentence is thus the more remarkable.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 48–50.

cal sophist and his fellows from the true philosopher, and how potent is the sophist to prevent philosophy from guiding the state, the more bitter was Plato's attack on the whole army of deceivers.

VI

Toward the end of Plato's life, he yielded again to the temptation to imagine his ideals realized in concrete moulds. The *Timaeus* is the result. Plato represents Socrates as desirous of seeing his state in motion or in conflict, in the world of growth and decay.¹ Of course the discussion is not really about the state that Socrates has been supposed to found, but about Platonic metaphysics in its relation to physics. Whether or not the historical Socrates was ever seriously interested in physical speculations, there is no doubt that in the years of his maturity he had renounced whatever speculations of this kind he had ever entertained. It would be an idle pretense to carry on the present discussion principally through the mouth of Socrates; by giving the stage to the Pythagorean, Timaeus, Plato at once avoids such an absurdity and disclaims personal responsibility for the views that are to be expressed. "We are led by Plato himself to regard the *Timaeus*, not as the centre or inmost shrine of the edifice, but as a detached building in a different style, founded, not after the Socratic, but after some Pythagorean model."² How far Plato supposed the Pythagorean accounts to be convincing, or how far he attempted in the manner of the eclectic to appropriate truth from them, is a question incapable of exact solution. But it is probable that any solution will fail that does not reckon with certain evasions on the part of Plato. In the first place, Plato is dealing with a subject that is by its very nature incapable of absolute certainty:³ that is sound Platonic doctrine, entirely in accord with all that Plato has said elsewhere. But his more important scruple is one of interest: how seriously does he take any attempt to deal with the particulars of the world of sense? The greater part of the *Timaeus* appears to be a perfunctory attempt to fill a gap in Plato's system which does not greatly interest him, and which he treats in the same semi-mythical, semi-humorous spirit in

¹ *Timaeus*, 19b.

² *Timaeus*, 29bc.

³ Jowett, tr., Plato, III, p. 345.

which he discusses the 'perfect number' and the 'tyrant's number.' A greater earnestness and positiveness appear as soon as the theological aspects of the question are considered. In the *Timaeus* all explanations are referred to teleological grounds; Plato is a good enough Socratic to wish to know that all things are ordered for the best. That was the object of the reputed interest of Socrates in science; but science failed to satisfy this requirement.¹ Now that Plato sets forth an account of what is for the best, he speaks not through Socrates but through Timaeus. The reason is not obscure. Not because the investigations of the Pythagoreans themselves hold the truth, but because Plato's own investigations in the dialectical dialogues have given him a vantage ground, he finds himself in a position from which he may condescend to put in mythical form the answer to the reputed questions of Socrates.² By using Timaeus as a mouth-piece he avoids responsibility for statements in dealing with a field which is avowedly the province of uncertainty, and which the Pythagoreans have in a sense made their own. Of course Plato is not wholly trifling in the *Timaeus*; yet he is only doing his best, with imperfect and borrowed instruments of thought, to deal with a subject that is, he thinks, in itself incapable of exact treatment, and that at best is for him of only relative importance. He attaches no exaggerated degree of veracity to the result: Timaeus prays that his words may endure 'in so far as they may have been spoken rightly.'³ As Aristotle is the unconscious butt of the *Parmenides*, hosts of readers, ancient, mediaeval, and modern, have been taken in by the *Timaeus*; Aristotle did not realize that Plato had anticipated all that could be said against the theory of ideas; the readers of the *Timaeus* have not realized that Plato was fully aware that elements of a sound metaphysic and conjectures

¹ *Phaedo*, 97c ff.

² The imperfect relation between the *Timaeus* and the *Republic* is thus explained. The *Timaeus* professes to be a continuation of the *Republic*, though the characters are different, the subject of the *Republic* is only partially stated, and the summary of the *Republic* in the *Timaeus* is incomplete. From this incompleteness it is not necessary to conclude that Plato is either referring to an earlier form of the *Republic* or contemplating a new edition of it: he merely intends to make no use in the *Timaeus* of the metaphysics of the *Republic*, since it has been further developed in the dialectical dialogues.

³ *Critias*, 106a.

about the natural world (which often have been proved strangely near the truth) were mingled with poetry and absurd dogma. A *tour de force* like the *Timaeus* must be warily approached. Like all myth, it defies the sort of analysis that insists on drawing a clear line between fact and fiction, between sober truth and whimsical inventiveness. The legend of Atlantis is probably the fiction of Plato himself; whether he speaks by the voice of Socrates or of Timaeus, he 'can easily invent Egyptian or any other tales.'¹ The legend abounds in circumstantial detail; and Socrates remarks gravely that the fact that the tale is no invention but a true narrative is greatly in its favor.² Again, due allowances being made, the account of the creation of the universal animal in the *Timaeus* bears a relation to Pythagorean mathematics and astronomy similar to that borne by the Aristophanic myth in the *Symposium* to current mythology. Much of the detail elsewhere is offered in a spirit of mock seriousness. Altogether, the serious contributions of the *Timaeus*, which are many, would gain in philosophical value by being disentangled from the hazardous conjectures that accompany them; but the task of extricating the serious contributions is both delicate and impossible to accomplish completely. And, after all, to many it will seem better to enjoy the *mélange* of philosophy and comedy, with the assurance that Plato himself was far from wishing to say definitely where truth ended and the borderland of comedy began.

Nothing need be added to the remarks of Jowett³ to show that the *Critias* is one of Plato's 'noble lies,' carried out with a mixture of pure imagination and verisimilitude. It is typical of his myths, in that it embodies truth in the form of fiction. The theme is more difficult than that of the *Timaeus*; for it deals with men, not with unknown gods, and a greater degree of correctness is to be expected in a picture of human than of divine things. The speaker therefore craves indulgence.⁴ Perhaps we may fairly argue from this that Plato's claims for truth in parts of the *Timaeus* are modest; and possibly the reason for the incompleteness of the *Critias* is nothing more than the difficulty of the theme.

¹ *Phaedrus*, 275b.

² *Timaeus*, 26e, cf. the irony in 40d ff.

³ Tr. Plato, III, pp. 524 f.

⁴ *Critias*, 106c ff.

The spirit of the *Laws* is not unlike that of the *Timaeus*. The philosopher who has contemplated the intensity of reality again imagines himself to return to the illusory world of human vicissitudes, and again the return is reluctant. Metaphysics, or its sister, religion, is the occupation worthy of ardent pursuit, and there is something trivial, if not actually ridiculous, in mundane cares. ‘Human affairs are hardly worthy of serious consideration, and yet we must consider them seriously,—such is our ill luck. . . . To serious matters man should give serious consideration; to a matter which is not serious he should not give it; and God is by nature worthy of our most serious and blessed veneration, but man . . . has been created to be the plaything of God, and this indeed is the best part of his nature.’¹ The Athenian, therefore, like a shipwright laying down the lines of a ship, tries ‘to distinguish the designs of life, and to lay down their keels according to the characters of men’s souls.’² A double point is in Plato’s mind: the insignificance of man, which may be a fit subject for either tragic or comic treatment, and the grim necessity of making something of human life. The ambiguity appears in the words of the Athenian: he refers to the whole discussion as ‘our old man’s sober game’,³ or as the ‘old men’s rational pastime’;⁴ Cleinias, a little puzzled, interposes, ‘You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit.’ And the Athenian, dismissing the subject with the answer, ‘Perhaps,’ goes on to another matter. This ambiguity of motive, together with Plato’s waning literary powers, accounts sufficiently for the comparative absence of comedy in the *Laws*. Humorous figures of speech and vivid dramatic scenes are rare;⁵ but a dry humor is at times not absent. The dissertations on the three kinds of funeral⁶ and the two types of doctor,⁷ and the account of the early life of children (who wail and shout continually for the first three years of life)⁸ show an observation of life that is one of the strongest assets of

¹ *Laws*, 803bc; cf. 804b.

² *Ibid.*, 803a. The eyes of the Athenian are fixed on human nature, rather than on the world of ideas, though the ideas are not discarded (cf. 965bc.). That is the justification for such comedy as exists in the *Laws*; yet the tone is in the main solemn, and the speakers are ‘tragic poets’ (817b).

³ *Ibid.*, 685a.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 769a.

⁵ Cf. Jowett, tr. Plato, V, pp. xix f.

⁶ *Laws*, 719d.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 720.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 792a.

the *Laws*. But of the brilliant comedy that in the earlier dialogues constantly arose from the interplay of minds, there is nothing. The *Laws* dogmatizes: and the Athenian dominates the dialogue. If 'the argument' formerly was the personified hero, now it is the servant of the chief speaker. 'The argument, like an animal, ought to be pulled up from time to time, and not allowed to take the bit in his mouth, so that we may not, as the proverb says, fall off our ass.' The reasoning of the *Laws* sits firmly in the saddle; but its solidity is bought at the expense of resiliency.

VII

Enough has been said, I trust, to show that Plato was on the whole a laughing rather than a weeping philosopher. The epithet must be understood, to be sure, in no trivial sense; for Plato is no easy optimist, and no idle jester. It is, however, with confidence that we may claim for him a place among the world's great comic writers,—Aristophanes, Juvenal, Cervantes, Molière, Shakespeare, and Meredith¹,—who have known how to hold something very sacred, and to express it perhaps most often by methods of indirection. Plato's works are the personification of philosophy in the spirit of comedy; and their special merit as literature lies in a persuasiveness far exceeding their purely logical appeal. The secret of this persuasiveness is not infrequently to be found in their comic garb.

The results of the present study are of two kinds. We have seen that there is more comedy and satire in the Platonic dialogues than most readers have generally recognized, and that they may often be best understood as philosophical mimes. On this side, it is helpful to recall Plato's own definition of comedy as the exposure of all pretension;² so far the comedy is negative, but the setting of limits is in itself

¹ Meredith's theory of comedy and his practice are alike Platonic; curiously enough, he does not mention Plato in *The Idea of Comedy*. Especially noteworthy is the spirit of detachment in which he professes to view his characters; it reminds one of the personified argument stalking in the background of Plato's dialogues. Think of the argument offered τὸ δὲ τρίτον 'Ολυμπικῶς τῷ σωτῆρι τε καὶ τῷ 'Ολυμπίῳ Δαι (Rep., 583b); or of the three waves in the *Republic*; and the sentence, à propos of the matrimonial prospects of the second of the three Harrington sisters, 'Then Joy clapped hands a second time, and Horror deepened its shadows' (*Evan Harrington*, p. 18).

² *Philebus*, 48–50. Cf. p. 116.

an achievement, and prepares the way for further achievements. A readiness to believe that Plato is not averse to jesting, or at least to mingling jests with serious thoughts, will save many a blunder.¹ We must be ready, on the other hand, to discern in the midst of Plato's comedy a more serious motive than has sometimes been admitted. We must not be deceived by the apparent inconclusiveness of a dialogue or by the satirical vein of a discussion; a real conclusion or a kernel of truth often lies behind the mystification. At the root of the matter is Plato's sincere conviction that truth is, humanly speaking, only approximately to be attained, and that the personal element in the quest prevents, for better and for worse, any final reduction of truth to a formula. Hence dialectic, with its turns and oblique vistas and its indeterminateness, is the chosen method for communicating such truth as transpires; and comedy is the natural outcome of Plato's use of such a wayward literary instrument as the dialogue in the service of so stern a master as absolute truth. The remarks of Pater on this point throw light on Platonic comedy.² "What Plato presents to his readers is . . . a paradox, or a reconciliation of two opposed tendencies: on one side, the largest possible demand for infallible certainty in knowledge, . . . yet, on the other side, the utmost possible inexactness, or contingency, in the method by which actually he proposes to attain it. . . . The humour of Socrates . . . was welcome as affording a means of escape from the full responsibilities of his [Plato's] teaching. It belonged, in truth, to the tentative character of dialectic, of question and answer as the method of discovery, of teaching and learning, to the position, in a word, of the philosophic *essayist*. . . . The irony, the Socratic humor, so serviceable to a diffident teacher, are, in fact, Plato's own."

Again, with due caution, a gradual progression in Plato's adventures in comedy may be detected. At first we found him chronicling with great freedom the method and the partial results of Socrates. Next we saw him proceed, in the spirit of comedy, to use the dialectic method

¹ Cf., for example, the absurdity of J. Wagner, noted by Adam, ed. *Euthyphro*, p. xxvii; Socrates is represented as saying that he is so eager to speak that he would gladly pay to have auditors; Wagner objects that Socrates had no money! The often repeated fallacy that Plato condemned poetry is another instance.

² *Plato and Platonism*, pp. 156 ff.; esp. p. 169.

to get rid of obstacles and to throw problems into relief, having his own conclusions in mind in each dialogue, though not fully aware, of course, of the conclusions that he was to reach later. Then in the golden dialogues of his prime, we noticed how he evoked so vivid an ideal world that he was able to assume it as present, and contrasted with it in a comic spirit the paltry 'facts' of this imperfect world. And, finally, in the last great dialogues in which Plato endeavored to bring ideals and facts together, we looked for comedy almost in vain; it proved to be incidental.

Dangerous in the extreme it would be to rely overmuch on the presence of comedy in Plato; and the temptation so to err is the stronger because of the frequent inconsistencies in his writings. It would be so easy to treat as mere jest all that does not square with an arbitrary notion of Plato's thought. The more arduous course is to realize that much has been written *ταῦδες χάριν*, but that not Plato himself would have always cared, or dared, to say just how much is in earnest, and how much is comedy.

ITHACA: A STUDY OF THE HOMERIC EVIDENCE

By FRANK BREWSTER

IN the opening lines of the Ninth Book of the *Odyssey*, Odysseus thus describes his home:¹

And I dwell in clear-seen Ithaca, wherein is a mountain Neriton, with trembling forest leaves, standing manifest to view, and many islands lie around, very near one to the other, Dulichium and Same, and wooded Zacynthus. Now Ithaca lies low, furthest up the sea-line toward the darkness, but those others face the dawning and the sun: a rugged isle, but a good nurse of noble youths; and for myself I can see nought besides sweeter than a man's own country.

In Book 1, 245 ff., and again in Book 16, 122 ff., Telemachus says:

For all the noblest that are princes in the isles, in Dulichium and Same and wooded Zacynthus, and as many as lord it in rocky Ithaca, all these woo my mother and waste my house.

In Book 19, 131 ff., Penelope says:

For all the noblest that are princes in the isles, in Dulichium and Same and wooded Zacynthus, and they that dwell around even in clear-seen Ithaca, these are. . . .

These passages establish conclusively that, to the mind of the poet, Ithaca was one of a group of four principal islands, with other and presumably smaller islands in their vicinity. The account of Telemachus's trip to visit Nestor at Pylos and Menelaus at Sparta further establishes that these islands lay off the west coast of Greece in the vicinity of the entrance to the great gulf which separates Peloponnesus from Northern Greece. This will appear clearly later in the discussion of the voyage.

In fact, four of the Ionian Islands are situate just in this place, and there are many smaller islands lying in their vicinity on their landward sides. The most northern of these four is Santa Maura,

¹ Quotations from Homer are from the Translation by Butcher and Lang unless otherwise stated.

located close to the northwest coast of Acarnania and called in ancient times Leucas; its dimensions are about 19 miles from north to south and 8 miles from east to west; the modern population is about 30,000.¹ Just south of this island is Cephalonia. Its northern point, Cape Vlioti, lies southward five miles from Cape Dukato, the southern extremity of Leucas. Cephalonia is about $27\frac{1}{2}$ miles long north to south on its east coast, with a varying width of $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 19 miles; the modern population is about 71,000.² Just east of Cephalonia is Thiaki, or Ithaca, as it has always been known since historic Greek times. This island is much the smallest of the four. Its total length north to south is about 13 miles, its greatest width about 4 miles; the modern population is about 12,000.³ Ithaca, or Thiaki, is separated from Cephalonia by a narrow channel about 12 miles long and from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide.⁴ South of these two islands and separated from Cephalonia by a channel 8 or 9 miles wide is Zante, known from historic Greek times as Zacynthus, of which its modern name is an Italian corruption. Its length from northwest to southeast is about 19 miles, its width about 9 miles; the modern population is about 42,502.⁵

Here, at first glance, would seem to be our four Homeric islands, and the identity of the old names of two of them with the Homeric names would seem to render this identification easy. This is only in seeming, however. The subject apparently bristles with the gravest difficulties.

To the ancient Greeks, Leucas did not seem to be an island, but a peninsula. Professor Manly, in *Ithaca or Leucas*,⁶ cites the authorities and agrees with this view. So also do Victor Bérard, in *Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée*, and Eduard Engel, in *Der Wohnsitz des Odysseus*. Walter Leaf, in *Homer and History*, and T. D. Seymour, in *Life in the Homeric Age*, reach the opposite conclusion.

¹ *Mediterranean Pilot*, vol. III, p. 456. References to the *Mediterranean Pilot* are to the American Edition, 1917. Distances quoted from the *Pilot* are in nautical miles of about 2000 yards each.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 475, 476.

³ *Ibid.*, III, p. 488. The last edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* gives the population as 13,000.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 476, 477.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 493.

⁶ *Univ. of Missouri Studies*, II, no. 1.

The fact seems to be that Leucas is a sort of amphibian and can without great liberty be looked at in either way. Surrounded for the most part by deep water, it is separated at its northeast corner from the mainland only by a shallow lagoon. The Admiralty Chart copied by Bérard¹ shows this lagoon to be about three miles wide from north to south and to be composed of mud flats covered by about one foot of water. The northern border of these flats is cut off from the open sea by a sand-spit which, starting from the northeast corner of Leucas, projects northeasterly towards the mainland, but curves more northerly as it approaches the mainland and is always separated from it by a narrow branch of the lagoon. The enlarged chart by Partsch, copied in Professor Manly's article, shows the same conditions. Bérard calls this an isthmus of mud, marsh, and pond-holes, and believes that the present conditions go back to Homeric times and that the island was then, as now, not circumnavigable. Both he and Professor Manly refer to the Greek accounts of the Corinthian colonists digging a channel through here for their ships about 700 B.C. Apparently, ever since that time down to the modern era, there has been more or less continuously a channel made by man, through which small boats could pass. To-day the channel has been deepened by further dredging. Bérard thinks that this island has always been open to invasion by land forces; and, whether or not the mud flats could have been waded, it would seem that the sand-spit could always have been reached and must have afforded such a passage.

The whole question seems largely to depend on what is the definition of an island, and particularly what was the definition in the time of Homer. If by island is meant a body of land so surrounded by water that it cannot be reached by man without swimming or the use of a boat, there would seem to be good reason to infer that Leucas could not be one of the Homeric islands. On the other hand, if by island is meant any land surrounded by water, whether navigable or not, then Leucas would appear to be unquestionably an island.

As a matter of fact, it has always been customary with our race to describe a piece of solid ground surrounded by salt marsh as an island. Oak Island, in the Lynn marshes, is an example which readily occurs to me. Romney, in the Anglo-Saxon period, seems to have been such

¹ Victor Bérard, *Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée*, II, p. 429.

a marsh island.¹ Even Bérard says the same of the place he identifies as Circe's island:²

Le Monte Circeo, pour les marins, a toujours été une île, bien qu'il tienne par l'une de ses façades à la plaine du continent. "Située à l'extrême sud des marais Pontins, cette montagne a l'apparence d'une île quand on la voit à distance," reprennent les *Instructions nautiques*. C'est bien une île, en effet: la mer libre la baigne sur les faces du Sud et de l'Ouest; elle trempe dans les lagunes et les marécages, dans la mer des marais Pontins, à l'Est et au Nord. 'Cette Montagne de Kirkè est vraiment insulaire entre la mer et les marais,' dit Strabon.

The copy of Partsch's chart annexed to Professor Manly's article is marked "Original — Karte der Insel Leukas." The *Mediterranean Pilot*³ simply refers to it as the "Island of Santa Maura, ancient Leucas." The Encyclopaedia Britannica merely names it as one of the Ionian islands, without any suggestion of its being a peninsula. Even Bérard, when not thinking, speaks of it as an island. In Vol. II, p. 434, we read, "Aujourd'hui, nous appelons Sainte-Maure cette île que," etc.; and again, a little further down the page, "C'était, à l'autre extrémité de l'île, une pointe abrupte, un rocher blanc, la Pierre Blanche"; and again, p. 435, "qu'un détroit navigable sépare de cette île l'Acarnanie."⁴ It seems perfectly natural for us to-day to think of Leucas as an island, and yet up to within a comparatively recent date, there was no difference between ancient and modern Leucas, except the fact that man had dug a channel through the lagoon and sand-spit which, according to Bérard, had but three feet of water and could be used only by small boats, and which indeed seemed to him more like a moat than a canal.

If it is natural for us to-day to think and speak of Leucas as an island, it is certainly reasonable to assume that the people of Homer's days entertained similar views. The fact that the Greeks of the historical period regarded it as a peninsula is not conclusive as to what the Achaeans thought. The lagoons were very likely deeper then. Bérard says the filling is mud, not sand, and is brought down by the torrents that fall from the hills of Acarnania in times of flood. These

¹ Isaac Taylor, *Words and Places*, N. Y., 1909, Ch. XV.

² *Op. cit.*, II, p. 267.

³ III, p. 456.

⁴ For similar views, cf. Walter Leaf, *Homer and History*, London, 1915, pp. 143 ff., and J. I. Manatt, *Aegean Days*, Boston, 1914, p. 385.

LAT 39°S

LONG 21°E



ACARNANIA

OKIA IS



ELIS

PYLOS

S STROVATHI IS

MAP OF THE FOUR IONIAN ISLANDS

Scale of Miles
0 10 20

Compiled from U.S. Chart

LAT 38°S

torrents have been working for nearly three thousand years since Homer wrote, and it certainly seems probable that this work has had some effective results. At all events, it is clear that, if Leucas is not one of the four islands, it is very difficult to explain the Homeric text. Apparently all the writers agree that Zante is the Homeric Zacynthus, and if one of the other three islands is missing, it must be Dulichium.

Homer says there was a small island named Asteris between Same and Ithaca. Now there are only two islands situated between these four islands: one a little rocky knoll between Thiaki and Cephalonia; the other a larger island called Arkudi between Thiaki and Leucas. If Leucas is not an island, and was not considered an island by Homer, then we have only the little rock between Thiaki and Cephalonia to answer his description. Cephalonia would then be Same, and Thiaki Ithaca, or vice versa, and Dulichium would be missing. This is a very serious question, as Dulichium was evidently the most important island of the four. According to the *Iliad*, it sent 40 ships to the Achaean army, the other three all together only 12. It supplied 52 of the suitors, the other three all together 56. The poet tells us distinctly that all the princes in the four islands had gathered for the wooing. We have a right to assume, therefore, that Dulichium had far the largest population and was probably the largest island.

Bérard tries to find Dulichium in Meganisi, a little island about three miles long and two broad, with a long and apparently uninhabitable spur projecting southeast from its southwest corner. The *Mediterranean Pilot* says of Meganisi:¹ "There are about 1000 inhabitants, who are generally poor; water is scarce." A comparison of this figure with the 70,000 of Cephalonia makes it obvious that this island could not be Dulichium.

Professor Manly says:² "Two views are held of the location of Dulichium, each supported by some evidence." The first maintains that it is identical with Pale, the western peninsula of Cephalonia, and that this was an island in Homer's time. Aside from the difficulty that as a land area it seems entirely inadequate to represent an island of the character of Dulichium, it certainly is hardly credible that the

¹ This sentence is taken from the English Edition, vol. III, p. 379.

² *Ithaca or Leucas*, p. 10.

isthmus which connects it with the rest of the island and is now, as Professor Manly says, over 4000 feet wide and 500 feet high, was elevated by nature in the few hundred years that elapsed between the time of Homer and the time when Greek history began. The second view, that it was one of the Echinades and was joined to the mainland of Greece by deposits of the Achelous, which empties into the sea by them, seems equally improbable. Leaf¹ says there has been no such change in the existing islands in the last 2400 years, and therefore it is extremely improbable that any change occurred in the coast line between the time of Homer and Herodotus. Professor Manly also refers to a third suggestion, that the island may have been washed away. This seems equally improbable. It takes a long time for the waves to submerge an island composed of gravel, and there does not appear to be any evidence that the Greek islands were so composed. Dulichium was obviously, in Homer's time, the largest and most important of the four islands. It certainly does not seem likely that any natural event would have caused the disappearance of the largest and most populous of the four islands in the short space of a few hundred years, leaving the three other islands unchanged. It is certainly more probable that the Achaeans regarded Leucas as one of the four islands named than that Dulichium disappeared completely between their time and that of Herodotus. At all events, it is clear that, if Leucas was not one of the four islands, no satisfactory explanation of the disappearance of Dulichium has yet been offered; and, if we assume that Homer was right, the only reasonable inference is that Leucas was one of the four.

The next question, as to the identification of these four islands with those named by the poet, is much more difficult. Homer was not writing a treatise on geography, and he naturally says little about the relative location of the islands to one another. There is no other contemporaneous evidence. The only way of arriving at a solution is by comparing what he does say with the actual facts and deciding which identification best suits his descriptions.

So far as Zacynthus is concerned, the several English writers cited by Mr. Shewan in his article *Leukas-Ithaca*² do not seem to differ.

¹ *Homer and History*, pp. 162, 163.

² A. Shewan, *Leukas-Ithaca, Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXXIV.

Apparently, all are satisfied that Zante is Zacynthus. We can, therefore, take this for granted. As to the other islands, there is a wide diversity of opinion.

In regard to Ithaca, we have, first, the statement contained in Odysseus's speech, already quoted. The poet here seems to tell us that in his mental picture of the four islands Ithaca was the more westerly. Leaf's interpretation of this westerly direction as rather northwesterly, making Ithaca the last island towards the lands of the Adriatic, towards the lands of the unknown, and the last Achaean land, is very reasonable. So interpreted, these lines of the poet seem to fit Leucas only.

¹ On the other hand, when Telemachus replies to Menelaus's offer of a chariot and horses, he says:

And whatsoever gift thou wouldest give me, let it be a thing to treasure; but horses I will take none to Ithaca, but leave them here to grace thine own house, for thou art lord of a wide plain wherein is lotus in great plenty, and therein is spear-reed and wheat and rye, and white and spreading barley. In Ithaca there are no wide courses, nor meadow land at all. It is a pasture land of goats, and more pleasant in my sight than one that pastureth horses; for of the isles that lie and lean upon the sea, none are fit for the driving of horses, or rich in meadow land, and least of all is Ithaca.

The poet, it is true, does not name the other three islands in this speech; but as the four are grouped together, and it would be unnatural to compare Ithaca with islands not in its group,² this speech contains the positive statement that, while none of the four islands is fit for chariot driving, Ithaca is the *least* fit of all.³ This comparative statement is not true unless the poet is thinking of Thiaki as Ithaca.

Leaf says:⁴ "Kephallenia has large plains in the southern part, still famous for their fertility." Professor Manly says:⁵ "Leucas has good meadows and is suitable for driving horses. In the north-eastern part there is a fertile well-watered plain four kilometers long by from one to two and a half wide." The *Mediterranean Pilot*, describing Santa Maura or Leucas, says:⁶ "The island has several rich

¹ Od. 4, 600 ff.

² Manly (*Ithaca or Leucas*, p. 9) draws the same conclusion.

³ G. H. Palmer's translation here is "Ithaca least of all."

Homer and History. D. 151.

⁵ *Op. cit.* p. 31.

• III, p. 456.

and fertile plains, of which the largest extends westward and southward from Santa Maura or Amaxiki, the capital town." Leaf writes:¹ "The immediate neighbours of Ithaka, though all are hilly, have at least low lying plains, and can in one part or another be considered 'low.' But save for one little stretch on which the town of Vathy lies, Thiaki has not an acre of low ground; all round the hills rise straight and steep from the sea, not leaving even a strip of beach to carry a path." The above mentioned charts in Leaf's and Bérard's books should also be consulted on this point. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, describing Ithaca, says: "The island consists of two mountain masses, connected by a narrow isthmus of hills, and separated by a wide inlet of the sea known as the Gulf of Molo.² . . . As there are only one or two small stretches of arable land in Ithaca, the inhabitants are dependent on commerce for their grain supply; and olive oil, wine, and currants are the principal products obtained by the cultivation of the thin stratum of soil that covers the calcareous rocks. Goats are found in considerable numbers on the brushwood pasture of the hills." We have, therefore, in these two passages comparative statements by the poet as to the position and characteristics of his Ithaca in regard to the other islands, which, as applied to the facts, seem absolutely contradictory of each other. The first statement, that Ithaca was the most westerly, or perhaps northerly, of the four islands, fits Leucas only. The second, that Ithaca was the *least* fit of the four for driving horses, applies only to Thiaki.

As affirmations, there does not seem much to choose between these two propositions; but from the point of view of evidence merely, the second would appear to have the greater value. It is a well established rule in the construction of deeds that courses and distances are always controlled by the monuments referred to. Thus, if a lot of land is described as bounded northerly by a road, easterly by land of Jones, southerly by the Charles River, and westerly by land of Robinson, and it appears, in fact, that the land in question is bounded *southerly* by a road, westerly by land of Jones, northerly by the Charles River and easterly by land of Robinson, the Court would reject the compass directions and go by the natural landmarks. This procedure is founded on the well-known fact that mistakes are much more likely to

¹ *Homer and History*, p. 147.

occur in giving compass directions than in describing the monuments. Merely turning a plan upside down would create just such a mistake as above described, and is by no means an uncommon accident. Thiaki is conspicuously the least fit of the four islands for driving a chariot and horses. Such a characteristic is analogous to a monument in a deed. It is a characteristic landmark not likely to be lost sight of or misdescribed. Following the rules of law for the interpretation of a deed, we should be obliged to disregard the compass course in the description of Ithaca in favor of its well known physical characteristic.

If, however, we do not insist upon this distinction, and if we assume for the purposes of argument that the two statements are of equal probative value, it is obvious that the question of identification will then depend upon which of the two descriptions is best supported by the other evidence.

Telemachus's speech also contains this statement: 'In Ithaca there are no wide courses nor meadow land at all.' This assertion, also, is true in fact of Thiaki, but not of either of the other islands. Meadow land means level ground, often that through which a brook or stream flows. Thiaki has but one brook, a tiny stream in its northerly part, which flows through a gully into the harbor known as Port Frikes. The other two islands have brooks or streams flowing through plains.

Again, in Book 13, 242 ff., when Athena explains to Odysseus where he is, she says: 'Verily it is rough and not fit for the driving of horses, yet it is not a very sorry isle, though *narrow* withal.'¹ These words are a much more accurate description of Thiaki than of either of the other islands. Cephalonia could not possibly be called narrow; and Leucas, which Professor Manly says is 30 miles long and 10 wide, could hardly be called narrow except by a violent stretch of the imagination.

When the suitors find that Telemachus has succeeded in obtaining a ship and has gone to Pylos, they plan to waylay and kill him on his return; and for that purpose Antinous takes a ship and twenty oarsmen and goes to Asteris, which Homer, at the end of the Fourth Book, describes as follows: 'Now there is a rocky isle in the mid sea, midway between Ithaca and rugged Samos, Asteris, a little isle; and there

¹ Palmer translates these lines: 'It is a rugged land, not fit for driving horses, yet not so very poor though lacking plains.' This equally fits only Thiaki.

is a harbour therein with a double entrance, where ships may ride. There the Achaeans abode lying in wait for Telemachus.' In the beginning of the Fifteenth Book, Athena refers to this ambush in the strait; and, in Book 16, 348, Amphinomus, one of the suitors, while they were sitting before the hall of Odysseus and discussing the return of Telemachus's boat, looked up 'and saw the ship (the suitors' boat) within the deep harbor, and the men lowering the sails, and with the oars in their hands,' and says: 'Either some god has told them all or they themselves have seen the ship of Telemachus go by, and have not been able to catch her.' A little further on, Antinous says: 'All day long did scouts sit along the windy headlands, ever in quick succession, and at the going down of the sun we never rested for a night upon the shore, but sailing with our swift ship on the high seas we awaited the bright Dawn, as we lay in wait for Telemachus, that we might take and slay the man himself.' Bérard says that the Greek words above translated "double entrance" properly mean "Twin Havens," and Leaf¹ translates the passage in this way.

Now, of the only two islands situated between any two of the four larger islands, Daskalio, between Thiaki and Cephalonia, is a mere barren rock, without height, without havens, and without anything called for by the poet, except location. Arkudi, the other, as we shall see, fits the description better. Bérard believes that Daskalio is Asteris. His theory is that the poet drew his description of the voyages of Odysseus and Telemachus from some ancient periplus, or coast pilot, and that the brevity of description in such documents led the poet to think that the Twin Havens and windy heights referred to were in the island itself, while, in fact, they were on the large island, Cephalonia, adjoining; and he quotes, as it seems to me successfully, several examples from ancient periplooi to show the possibility of such an error. He admits frankly that the island Daskalio has no such Twin Havens; but he finds them in Port Guiscardo in Cephalonia which is near by. The *Mediterranean Pilot*² describes it as follows: "Guiscardo Bay is a small bay in Ithaca Channel, about 2 miles southeastward of Cape Vlioto, the northwest point of the entrance. The bay is about 600 yards deep in a northwest direction and 200 yards wide in the narrowest part where a point projects from the

¹ *Homer and History*, p. 152.

² III, p. 477.

western side abreast the custom house, within which is a small inner harbor, with a depth of 8 fathoms, good holding ground, but limited space. . . . In westerly and northwesterly gales, vessels will find shelter in the bay in 11 to 14 fathoms with the lighthouse bearing about 5° , 300 yards; here there is room for a large ship to moor." Daskalio islet is $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles south of this lighthouse. This harbor does not seem to answer to the requirement of Twin Havens. A small inner and large outer harbor could hardly be so described.

On the other hand, Arkudi, which is just at the east entrance of the channel between Leucas and Thiaki, has at its southeastern corner a natural mole projecting southeastwardly about seventy yards, with a rocky knoll or islet at its outer end. The shore curves away in a similar fashion from each side of the shore end of the mole; and Professor Manatt, in his *Aegean Days*,¹ writes: "And now we are passing for the third time, as we are to pass it again on the morrow, the real Asteris — the key to the whole problem. In the wide channel (eighteen miles wide) between Ithaca and Leukas, Arkudi rises some 400 feet above the sea, a stony islet but sprinkled with olives and enlivened by a brook; and it is the only island lying between two larger ones in all this region. How Dörpfeld's heart throbbed when he first approached it and discovered the double harbor not unlike — to compare small things with great — the twin havens of Mitylene and still sheltering on occasion the small craft that do business in these waters. With *carte blanche* to invent an Asteris, one could hardly have hit it better." The width of this channel is given by Professor Manatt as eighteen miles, but this dimension is evidently wrong. The *Mediterranean Pilot*² says: "Cape Vlioti, the northern point of Cephalonia, lies southward 5 miles from Cape Dukato, the southern extremity of Santa Maura." And again it says;³ "Arkudi Island is separated from Lipso Point by a channel $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide, and from Marmaka Point at the northern end of Ithaca by a passage 3 miles wide. Arkudi is nearly 2 miles in length north to south, 1 mile in width, and 441 feet high on its western side, the eastern part being flat." This would make the channel between Ithaca and Leucas at the most not over $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide, and rather disposes of the argument used by some authorities that it is too wide to be called a strait.

¹ P. 384.² III, p. 476.³ III, p. 459.

Bérard's identification of Asteris with Daskalio seems to be largely influenced by his opinion that the ancient sea-route to the Adriatic went from Pylos on the western coast of Greece via the channel between Thiaki and Cephalonia; and, on the basis of the chart only, this would seem most probable, as it is almost on the direct course. But the *Mediterranean Pilot*, says;¹ "Vessels under sail should not enter Ithaca Channel except with a fair wind, as the water is too deep for anchoring should it fall calm, and the currents are uncertain, and, at times, terrific squalls blow from the neighboring high lands." Bérard supplements this statement with various tales of old travelers being prevented for days at a time from getting through here in sailing vessels, and assumes that the ancient voyagers must have waited in the harbors at either end for a favoring chance, and then have gone through the twelve miles of the channel by rowing.² In the time of sailing vessels, he says³ the Venetians avoided this channel between Cephalonia and Ithaca on account of its tempests, pirates, and poor harbors; but that now it is used by the British, Austrian, and Italian steamships, just as it was used by the Cretan or Phoenician sailors in the time of the *Odyssey*. 'To-day, for the torpedo boats and little ships of war, Guiscardo will take the place which the city of Ulysses held. This city of Ulysses answered better the needs of the primitive mariners, who, using the oar, drew under the cover of Ithaca to ascend the channel against the winds of the north.' This theory evidently depends upon the proposition that, to pass by the southwestern promontory of Leucas, in sailing for Corfu from the south, the ancient mariners preferred the twelve mile row through the channel between Thiaki and Cephalonia, to the longer course to the eastward of Thiaki. Obviously, if they had to row, this would be the natural course; but, if on the contrary, by keeping to the eastward of the islands they could avoid this rowing and the squalls that blow from the mountains of the two islands, the latter course would be the more probable.

The *Mediterranean Pilot*⁴ says:

In settled summer weather, when the barometer is high . . . land and sea breezes prevail. The land wind blows from the mountains through the valleys and reaches a longer or shorter distance from the coast according to

¹ III, p. 477.

² *Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée*, II, p. 417.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 489.

⁴ III, pp. 417 ff.

the season, occasionally, but very rarely, 20 miles, though usually not beyond 10 miles. This wind is light, and in Epirus (north of Leucas) blows from north to northeast; in the Gulfs of Patras and Corinth, from northeast to east; on the coast of Arcadia, from north to northeast.

It commences to blow two or three hours after sunset and increases in force until after midnight, when it decreases, falls calm at sunrise, freshens again with the rising of the sun, veering some points eastward until 9 h. A.M., after which it dies away and is succeeded by the sea breeze.

The Imbatto, or sea breeze, sets in between west-southwest and northwest generally about 10 h. A.M., and at times an hour or two earlier, but rarely so late as noon. It increases in strength in the first two or three hours, attaining its maximum about 3 h. P.M., when it blows fresh and then gradually decreases in force and dies away an hour or two after sunset.

The prevailing wind in the offing in summer is from between west-southwest and northwest; it is general during the months of July and August, producing a clear sky and dry atmosphere in Greece, and varies in direction during the 24 hours, veering southward of its normal direction during the forenoon, and then by degrees to the northward of it, when it remains steady during the night.

The Tarantata. — As in winter during two or three days, so also in summer for 24 hours, a strong breeze from the northwest blows in the eastern part of the Ionian sea; it is called the Tarantata because it comes from the direction of the Gulf of Taranto. These strong winds or gales are of such force that small craft have to bear up before them.

The Sirocco, or southeasterly wind, predominates in November and December and in February and March. . . . During August and at times also during July this wind gives place to the dry Sirocco, a moderate wind without rain. . . . This Sirocco is more easterly during the morning, more southerly in the afternoon, and at times during the night veers to southwest; its force in the daytime is then always greater than at night."

Again, at page 473 — Dioni Bay:

The British man-of-war Goldfinch, during the survey in this vicinity, when resorting to this anchorage on several occasions, found a heavy-breaking swell to quickly rise with westerly and northwesterly winds in a depth of 12 fathoms, Makri Island affording but little shelter. These winds, of moderate strength, may be expected in the summer season to set in daily by midday, continuing till near midnight.

Makri Island is off the coast of Acarnania, just north of Oxia Island, and the last quotation would seem to imply that in summer the prevailing sea breeze off this coast during the day was from west to northwest. Oxia Island is at the entrance of the Gulf of Patras, and if the

night or land breeze in this gulf is northeast to east, it would seem to imply that the land breeze extended out beyond the island; but it is not clear how far north this direction might prevail.

Assuming that Bérard's description of the boats in use in the time of the Achaeans is correct, they must have been similar in build to the Nydam boat. This boat, found in a bog near Slesvig, Southern Jutland, was in shape much like a modern whale boat. Its length was about 75 feet, its beam $10\frac{1}{2}$ feet. It held 14 benches and was rowed with 28 oars, the average length of which was twelve feet. The bottom plank, which is not a keel proper, is 45 feet 3 inches long, and of a single piece. The mast was stepped about midship, and the sail was a square sail, with yard. Such boats could obviously not make to windward. The best course would be before the wind, or with wind over the quarter; but they probably would sail fairly well with wind nearly abeam. Even a dory, which would have less hold on the water, will sail fairly well without its centerboard with wind nearly abeam.

Pylos, the southern end of the Adriatic sea-route, according to Bérard, is located on the shore of the Gulf of Arcadia on the west coast of Greece at about the center of the Gulf. The course from here to the next Cape north, Katakolo, or Cape Pheae as called by the poet, is about northwest by west. From there to Cape Trepito, it is about northwest, hence to Oxia Island about north, and from Oxia to Arkudi Island about northwest.

In the *Mediterranean Pilot*,¹ it is said: "Southward of the Adriatic the winds are less variable, and in fine summer weather, and often in winter, land and sea breezes are usual. The prevailing summer wind is between west-southwest and northwest, and belongs to that atmospheric column which traverses the whole length of the Mediterranean from the Strait of Gibraltar to the coast of Palestine, backing southward of its normal direction during the day and veering northward of it at night." Bérard's theory is that the ancient trade routes from the East to the Adriatic and the West came up the Laconian Gulf, crossed by a land route to Pylos, then reshipped and went on. It seems reasonable to suppose that, if the ancient mariners could not have left Pylos under sail, they would have selected some other port for the terminus of their land route which would have permitted it. We

¹ III, p. 37.

may assume, therefore, that the ordinary summer breezes were such that they could leave the vicinity of Pylos under sail. If they could fetch Cape Pheae with the ordinary summer breezes there would seem no difficulty in at least reaching the vicinity of Oxia in the day-time. From here on the night breeze would probably be more favorable, but the evidence given in the *Mediterranean Pilot* is not conclusive. We have, however, on this question other evidence.

Bérard's further theory is that the voyages of Telemachus and Odysseus are based on the facts as stated in an ancient periplus, and that all the incidents are taken from such a document. On this theory, we have the right to assume that all the particulars of the return voyage of Telemachus followed the course of the ancient trade-route, at least so far as it did not have to divert from that route to satisfy the story. In going back to Ithaca, Telemachus would, therefore, follow the old trade-route until diversion was necessary. The poet describes the events of this return voyage as follows.

In Book 15, 28 ff., Athena tells Telemachus:

The noblest of the wooers lie in wait for thee of purpose, in the strait between Ithaca and rugged Samos, eager to slay thee before thou come to thine own country. But this, methinks, will never be; yea, sooner shall the earth close over certain of the wooers that devour thy livelihood. Nay, keep thy well-wrought ship far from those isles, and sail by night as well as by day, and he of the immortals who hath thee in his keeping and protection will send thee a fair breeze in thy wake. But when thou hast touched the nearest shore of Ithaca, send thy ship and all thy company forward to the city, but for thy part seek first the swineherd. . . .

Telemachus immediately sets out from Sparta, spends the first night at Pherae, and at some time during the next day reaches Pylos. He proceeds promptly to embark:

They raised the mast of pine tree, and set it in the hole of the cross plank and made it fast with forestays, and hauled up the white sails with twisted ropes of ox-hide. And grey eyed Athena sent them a favoring breeze, rushing violently through the clear sky¹ that the ship might speedily finish her course over the salt water of the sea. So they passed by Crouni and Chalcis, a land of fair streams.

¹ Compare this expression, 'clear sky,' with the description of the general breezes in the *Mediterranean Pilot*, III, p. 418.

And the sun set and all the ways were darkened. And the vessel drew nigh to Pheae, being sped before the breeze of Zeus, and then passed goodly Elis where the Epeans bear rule. From thence he drove on again to the Pointed Isles,¹ pondering whether he should escape death or be cut off.

The poem then goes back to Odysseus, and when we next return to Telemachus he is landing in Ithaca as morning breaks, but we are not informed how he reached land.

Now, on Bérard's theory, two things are noticeable: first, the injunction of the goddess to keep far from the islands and to sail by night as well as by day; second, the course for the Pointed Isles after passing Elis. The chart shows that there are no islands between Thiaki and Pylos to keep away from, except Zante and Cephalonia. We have already seen that in the reply of Telemachus to Menelaus's offer of a chariot and horses, the reference to the islands probably means the four large islands which compose the group. It seems reasonable to believe that this speech of the goddess, if Bérard's theory is right, is a repetition of the sailing directions for the coast navigation, and therefore points to a course to the eastward of the islands, that is, outside of the channel between Thiaki and Cephalonia.

The Pointed Rocks referred to in the last course are most probably the mountain peaks of Oxia and the neighboring islets. In the *Mediterranean Pilot*, under title "Oxia Island," we read:² "The peak of Oxia, with Mount Kutzulari, form excellent marks for the Gulf of Patras"; and again:³ "At night, after losing sight of Oxia Light, Oxia Peak, Makri Peak, Vromona Island, Stamothi Island and the summits of Petala Island are usually noticeable; it is difficult to recognize the other islands from any distance." Telemachus was sailing by night when he headed for the Pointed Rocks. The landmarks above named are all islands close to the Acarnanian coast and grouped about the mouth of the River Achelous, and were known to the Greeks as the Echinades Islands, Oxia being the most southerly, and by far the highest. Leaf,⁴ after quoting their description from the *Mediterranean Pilot*, speaks of them as "this poor cluster of Rocks."

¹ Palmer translates this line, 'From here Telemachus steered for the Pointed Isles.'

² III, p. 475.

³ III, p. 473.

⁴ *Homer and History*, p. 165.

The peaks on them are, however, quite high. That on Oxia is given by the *Mediterranean Pilot* as 1380 feet; Makri Hill, 417 feet; Vromona Island about 500 feet; Stamothi Island 229 feet; and Petala Island 832 feet. The name, 'Pointed Rocks,' would seem peculiarly applicable. Telemachus, therefore, was probably sailing in the direction of this group. Bérard says, as it seems to me truly, that sailors of old would use the same marks, and follow the same directions as our sailors of to-day. Shewan thinks these same islands were meant by the expression 'Pointed Rocks.' He says that the modern name of Oxia is derived from the same word used by Homer and translated 'Pointed,' and that, in fact, these islands are the only landmarks that correspond with the expression 'Pointed Rocks.' The advice given to Telemachus, to sail by night as well as by day, also seems to confirm this interpretation. To judge from the directions in the *Mediterranean Pilot*, the course from near Oxia to Arkudi would be more likely to have a fair wind by night than by day. The return voyage of Telemachus, therefore, fits in with the theory that the course of the ancient mariners lay to the eastward of Thiaki, and that Arkudi was the Homeric Asteris. So far as the story is concerned, however, the course pursued by Telemachus as above suggested is, perhaps, the natural one, if he turned off before the Pointed Rocks were actually reached.

Bérard's theory that the Montague Rocks were the Pointed Isles does not seem sound. According to the *Mediterranean Pilot*, they are a shoal in the channel between Zante and the mainland; but the shoalest rock is given in the *Mediterranean Pilot* as more than fifteen feet under water, and could not possibly form a mark to steer by or for; nor would the Montague Rocks seem to be especially dangerous to the shoal draft boats of the ancient mariners. Bérard points out that since the ancient boats were open and without sleeping or cooking accommodations, ports or resting places, where the crews could go ashore for cooking and sleeping purposes at the end of a day's run, were of great value and use. For such ports and their trading stations, they preferred coastal islands, or islets, with a good hill to watch from, a haven, a water supply, a cavern in which to take refuge, and woods for repair work. Coastal islands were preferred as less likely to attack by natives, small islands to big ones, and, failing such, rocky peninsulas of a similar character connected with the shore in such a way

that the isthmus might be easily defended. Deep, close harbors were objectionable as more difficult to enter and leave, on account of adverse winds, and more dangerous on account of the greater liability to attack. This was true, he thinks, so long as the mariners were traders merely. When they became colonists also, the deep ports were chosen, because the colonists controlled the surrounding country. These considerations are supported by him with such a wealth of examples from ancient and modern history and other sources, and, indeed, are so obvious that it is not necessary to quote him at length.

Now Arkudi seems to be well adapted for just such a stopping place for the commerce of Homeric times. Corfu is now, and has always been, the great point of vantage to hold for the Adriatic trade. Here Bérard is most full. Arkudi is about the half-way mark between Corfu and Pylos. Telemachus goes and returns from Pylos in about half a full day each way. Therefore, Arkudi is within about a twelve hour sail. It has the necessary havens, water-supply, and hill for a watch tower. It is well removed from the land. The mole above referred to with its little island knob would be a perfect shelter from all southerly gales. From the west and northwest the island would protect. On the northeast, Meganisi extends its long spur clear across this direction about three or four miles off. There is nothing, however, to indicate northeast gales here in the summer. If there were one, it would be easy to launch the boats and take the other side of the mole. The situation of the island is such that it commands a view of the sea out past Cape Dukato and south to Elis. It appears to be the only small island so situated.

On the other hand, the havens, the water-supply, the watch-tower of Daskalio were all on Cephalonia, and all objectionable from liability to attack by the people in possession of the island. For the Achaeans, masters of both islands, Daskalio might have a use; but for traders merely, not masters of the islands, it would not compare with Arkudi.

There is another argument, however, in favor of Daskalio which remains to be considered. On the west side of Thiaki just opposite Daskalio, there is a good harbor known as the Bay of Polis. On the east side of the island just opposite it, is Port Frikes, and there is a brook running into this port, which is the only brook to-day on the island; in the time of Sir William Gell, who described the island from

a personal visit, a little after 1800, it was the principal brook in the island. There is an easy pass between the two ports. In Book 1 of the *Odyssey*, Athena, disguised as a trader, tells Telemachus that she has left her ship in Port Rheithron, under wooded Neion away from the city. In Book 3, Telemachus tells Nestor that Ithaca, the town, is under the same mountain. According to Bérard, Rheithron means the harbor with a brook. If so, it should be identical with Port Frikes. In that case the most probable site for the Homeric city would be at Polis Bay.

Now, if the ordinary route from Elis to the Bay of Polis was via the channel between Thiaki and Cephalonia, an ambush on Arkudi, which does not command a view of this channel, would be useless. If the ordinary route back was by a course to the eastward of Thiaki and round its northerly end, then Arkudi would be the natural ambush. It is obvious that to return by a course to the eastward of Thiaki, round its northern end and some three miles down the Ithaca Channel is much longer than straight back up the channel. The Homeric boats could be rowed. It is not perfectly certain that by keeping to the eastward of Thiaki they could sail all the way. The probability that the longer route was on the whole the easier, seems distinctly less than for the general trade route. If we knew for certain that by the longer route the crew would escape a long, hard row, it is certainly likely that the longer route would be the favorite, and there is nothing positive to show that this was not so.

There is also one point in the story which is not probable on the theory that Daskalio was the site of the ambush. Telemachus lands early in the morning. He at once sends his boat and crew to the city. As soon as they land and haul up their ship, they send a herald to tell Penelope, who reaches the Hall at the same time as Eumaeus. The herald delivers his message in the hall. The suitors hear it and are troubled. They go out to plan together. Their first thought is to send a message by boat to the watchers to return; but even as this is suggested they look up and see their friends' boat entering the harbor. Amphinomus then exclaims that there is no need. 'Either some god has told them all or they themselves have seen the ship of Telemachus go by, and have not been able to catch her.' When the watchers return, they relate how they kept watch by day, and patrolled

the 'high seas' by night, 'but meanwhile some god has brought him home.' This talk seems to imply that they did not see the ship go by.

Now, if the ambush was in Daskalio and the Homeric City was at the Bay of Polis, this narrative is not probable. Daskalio was about a mile from the Bay of Polis, and, according to the *Mediterranean Pilot*,¹ just opposite the Bay. The whole course of the channel was visible from it. The boat of Telemachus must have been easily seen for a number of miles. If Homer had thought of Asteris as an island in the Ithaca Channel just off the entrance to the city's harbor, he would certainly at the very least have brought the two boats in together. The fact that he did not, but suggests quite strongly that the watchers, while they kept good watch, never saw the boat of Telemachus at all, although it returned in open day, would seem to indicate very clearly that Daskalio was not Asteris.

If, on the other hand, we assume that the ordinary course from Pylos to the Homeric City was by the route to the eastward of Thiaki, the whole story of the return is very realistic. In those rude times, Telemachus would naturally expect an ambush on his way back. The warning of the goddess was merely a poetic way of expressing this. If the ordinary course was east of Thiaki, Arkudi, commanding the first narrower channel on that route, was the natural spot to expect it. It might also be located at Daskalio, which commanded the entrance to the harbor. He would escape both by landing at the south end of Ithaca. His crew was not at all likely to be attacked, and for them there was no danger. But if the ambush was in Daskalio, from whichever end of the Ithaca channel the boat approached the city, the boat would have been seen and stopped. That it was not, indicates that the Homeric Asteris was Arkudi, as otherwise there was no reasonable chance that the boat could have got by without being seen and searched.

On the whole, therefore, the location of the Homeric city at the Bay of Polis does not seem to be inconsistent with the location of the general trade-route to the eastward of Thiaki and the identification of Asteris with Arkudi.

The story of Mentes further confirms this. Sailing with a cargo of iron from Taphos to Temesa, he had stopped off to see Odysseus.

¹ III, p. 479.

Leaf identifies Taphos with Corfu, or Corcyra, and Temesa with a place in the island of Cyprus. Mentes was, according to this supposition, on the trade-route from the north of Ithaca southward. Now, if the Homeric City was on the Bay of Polis, and the trade-route was via the Ithaca channel, why did he not enter the city harbor? He says he did not, but left his ship in the harbor named Rheithron beneath the same mountain as the city. In this case it can only be Port Frikes, on the east side of the island. If the trade-route ran north and east of Thiaki, this was, in fact, the only port for him to make. If the trade-route ran by the channel, then we must resort to the improbable assumption that he was afraid to leave his ship in the city harbor.

The identification of Asteris with Arkudi is also confirmed by another incident. Odysseus, answering the question of Eumaeus as to how he reached Ithaca, concludes his narrative by telling him that the King of the Thesprotians sent him in one of their ships, just then starting for Dulichium, with orders to bring him to King Acastus; that the Thesprotians, after reaching the high sea, stripped him of his clothes and planned to sell him into slavery; that, reaching Ithaca in the evening, they bound him with a rope and went ashore themselves to take supper by the seashore, and that he slipped his bonds, swam ashore and hid in the woods, and so escaped them. Eumaeus receives this explanation without question; and we must infer, therefore, that the poet meant it to be accepted as a reasonable incident. Now, the hut of Eumaeus was in the southern end of Ithaca. The poet expressly tells us that it was in one end of the island. He also tells us that Telemachus (who had been told by the goddess to land on the nearest shore of Ithaca) reached land at daybreak, breakfasted with his crew, then sought Eumaeus, whom he finds at breakfast with Odysseus. We are also told that Eumaeus and Odysseus were making ready their breakfast at dawn when Telemachus joined them. It follows, therefore, that Telemachus must have landed within easy reach of the swineherd's hut. The topography of the south end of Thiaki suits this narrative. The *Mediterranean Pilot* describes two ports in the southern part of Thiaki, both still used by coasters: one, the Port of St. Andrea, on the southern shore, at its westerly end; the other, Port Lia, or Ligia, on the eastern shore, at its southerly end;

both near the cliff and spring identified as Raven Rock and the spring Arethusa. Bérard has given such a full description of this part of Ithaca and the identification seems so reasonable that repetition is unnecessary.

Odysseus does not say specifically where the Thesprotians landed, but the shores of Thiaki are so steep and rocky that it is not possible for sailors to go ashore everywhere. They must have sought some of the ports or landing places which small boats still use. The other ports of Thiaki, except Opis Aito, lie on the south shores of the Gulf of Molo, or in the northern part of the island. The poet does not say that Odysseus did not land in the northern part of the island, but, if he did, he would have doubtless met other Ithacans first, and the context seems to imply that the hut of Eumaeus was the first refuge he found.¹ It seems more probable, therefore, that the poet conceived of the landing as somewhere near Eumaeus's residence, and, if so, it must have been in one or the other of these ports, or possibly in Opis Aito. Now, the ship was bound for Dulichium, and it also is reasonable to infer that one or the other of these ports was not far distant from its natural course. No one would believe to-day that sailors would make an unnecessarily long detour for the sake of supping on shore, and there is no reason to suppose that the men of Homer's time would look at the matter differently. It follows, therefore, that the trade-route to Dulichium, or at least to part of Dulichium, lay near the southern shore of Ithaca.

If the island Asteris is the rocky islet called Daskalio, in the strait between Cephalonia and Thiaki, then one island is Same, the other Ithaca. Leucas must then be Dulichium. Thesprotia is north of Leucas. On the assumption that Thiaki is the Homeric Ithaca, it is evident, from the chart, that the sea-route from Thesprotia to some port or any port in Leucas does not pass near, or anywhere near, the southern end of Thiaki. As a matter of fact, it would make the sailors take an entirely unnecessary trip of some thirty or forty miles. It is five or six miles from Cape Dukato to the northern point of Ithaca, and thirteen miles from there to its southern end. As the

¹ In Book 17, 516, Eumaeus says 'He came to me at once on escaping from his vessel'; and in 573, Odysseus says 'because it was of you I first sought aid.' (Palmer's Trans.)

ship would have to go at least as far back, the whole journey would be thirty-four or thirty-six miles in a straight line. Neither modern nor Homeric coasters would depart so far from their course merely to go ashore for supper. The same reasoning would apply, though less forcibly, to a landing anywhere on Thiaki.

If, on the other hand, Arkudi is Asteris, Cephalonia must be Dulichium. One of the two best harbors in Cephalonia is the Bay of Samos, just opposite the southern end of Thiaki. The sea-route from Thesprotia to the Bay of Samos would be either through the channel between this island and Thiaki, or round Thiaki by the easterly route. The first route would pass within a mile or two of Port Andrea, and would also pass the harbor of Opis Aito, — "a small bay with a sandy beach on the western shore of Ithaca $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles northward of St. Andrea Point."¹ If it went round Ithaca by its east side, it would pass both Port Ligia and Port Andrea. It would be perfectly natural for a coaster on either route to stop in one or the other of these places for supper.

If Asteris is Arkudi, the story of Odysseus is perfectly reasonable on the basis of the geographic facts. If Asteris is Daskalio, it is not reasonable. If Asteris is Arkudi, it does not follow from this fact alone that Leucas is the Homeric Ithaca. All that the description in the poem requires is that the island shall be in the strait between Same and Ithaca. So far as this fact goes, it is equally true whether Thiaki is Ithaca, and Leucas Same, or vice versa. The question which of the two is Ithaca must depend on other evidence.

Now, the identification of Ithaca with Leucas raises a very serious difficulty in the story of the ambush. We have already seen that the last place before Ithaca which the poet mentions in his account of the return of Telemachus is the Pointed Rocks, and that these are probably the peaks of the Echinades Islands. To sail from this point, or its neighborhood, to the south end of Leucas, Telemachus would have to pass close by the ambush on Asteris. On the other hand, his home, on the Leucadian theory, was at Port Vlicho, on the east side of Leucas, north of Meganisi. The chart shows clearly that to avoid this ambush, the best course would be to keep east and north of Meganisi, and so go straight home. Telemachus was either a fool of a seaman, or

¹ *Mediterranean Pilot*, III, p. 479.

the poet was not well-versed in geography. On the other hand, if Thiaki is Ithaca, the course is perfectly reasonable. Unless he went clear to Oxia and sailed across in the light of day, the suitors were not likely to catch him.

So, also, with the story of Odysseus. Why should the Thesprotian sailors go out of their way to skirt Leucas for some miles to reach a stopping place for supper, when they must have known there were other stopping places close to their course? It is not probable.¹

The identification of Asteris with Arkudi accomplishes two things. It proves beyond question that Cephalonia was the Homeric Dulichium. Taken in connection with the actual facts, it renders it probable that, in Homer's mind, Thiaki was Ithaca, and Leucas was Same.

In the opening lines of the Twenty-fourth Book of the *Odyssey*, Hermes leads the souls of the suitors from the hall: 'Past the streams of Oceanus and the White Rock, past the gates of the Sun they sped and the land of dreams, and soon they came to the mead of asphodel where dwell the souls, the phantoms of men outworn.' This passage is regarded by both Manly and Shewan as inconsistent with the identification of Ithaca with Leucas. Both writers identify the White Rock with the great marble bluff that makes the southwestern promontory of Leucas. This theory seems most probable, and if we believe that the poet was thinking of the coast line as running east and west, and the course of the souls as westward, it necessarily implies that Ithaca lay to the eastward of this promontory, and excludes Leucas from identification as Ithaca. But it is by no means certain from what the poet says that the flight of the souls was due westerly. They might have started from the palace of Odysseus and flown over the sea down the eastern side of Leucas, rounded the promontory, and so to their place. If this was the course of navigation from the east side of Leucas, such a direction for their flight might not be improbable. It is doubtless more probable that the poet and his hearers would think of the flight of the souls of the suitors as straight to the realms of the departed, but, in the absence of express statement, this explanation cannot be regarded as conclusive.

¹ Of course, if the trade-route from the north ran between Leucas and the mainland, this argument would be valueless. But the reference to the White Rock in Book 24 would indicate that the trade-route ran by it.

Odysseus in the speech of Book 9, above quoted, says, 'Now Ithaca lies low.' Leaf thinks that $\chiθαμαλή$, which is here translated 'low,' means near the land, and quotes a modern Greek use of a similar word in that sense. From this he argues that the Homeric Ithaca must be Leucas, which is the only one of the four islands that is near the land. The difficulties with this argument are that it all depends upon the meaning of $\chiθαμαλή$ and that the meaning 'near the land' in Homer's time is not established by modern usage. The most that may be inferred is that the word might bear such meaning. As a matter of fact, we shall see later that a perfectly rational interpretation of the passage may be had without departing from the ordinary meaning of the word, and if so, this evidence is of no value in deciding between the two islands. A conclusion based on uncertain evidence is of no value against positive testimony. It is like an attempt to prove handwriting by disputed specimens, which no court would ever permit.

Leaf's argument that it would have been impracticable for Odysseus to have kept his herds in Elis if he lived in Thiaki, owing to the difficulties of transport, but that if his home was in Leucas it would have been a simple proposition to have ferried them over the shallow lagoon in a flat punt, does not seem to fit the facts. There is no mention of flat-bottom punts in the poem. On the other hand, Noemon, a resident of Ithaca, inquires of the suitors when Telemachus will return, as, he says, he wants his ship to go to Elis where he has a herd of twelve brood mares with mule colts, one of which he would like to get to train.¹ And, in Book 21, 20, we read, 'for the men of Messene had lifted three hundred sheep in benched ships from out of Ithaca.' Among the seal stones of Crete there is one with an impression of a ship like the Homeric vessels carrying a living horse. There can be no question, therefore, that the transport of live-stock from Elis to Thiaki was entirely possible and practicable.

Bérard says that the west coast of Peloponnesus was famous from antiquity for its herds. Homer calls Elis 'the pastureland of horses.'

In Book 20, 187, we read: 'Moreover a third man came up, Philoetius, a master of men, leading a barren heifer for the wooers and fatted goats. Now ferrymen had brought them over from the mainland, boatmen who send even other folks on their way, whoso-

¹ *Od.* 4, 636.

ever comes to them.' This passage would indicate that the herds of Odysseus were on the mainland and that there was a regular trade-route from their neighborhood to Ithaca. Such a route, we know, existed from Elis,¹ but not, according to what knowledge we have, from Acarnania. So far as the positive evidence of the poem is concerned, it points to Elis as the pasture-land of the Ithacans. To assume without any evidence that Acarnania was this pasture-land, and then that Leucas, because it was nearer to this main land, was the Homeric Ithaca, is an unwarranted procedure. We may dismiss, in a similar way, the Dörpfeldian theory of the telescoping of the islands, as set forth in Leaf's book. Let us assume it to be true that the Dorian invasion did overrun the island Leucas and drive out the Achaeans there. This does not prove that these dispossessed Achaeans invaded Thiaki, drove out their kindred there, and renamed the island. The facts given in the poem distinctly contradict such an assumption. Ithaca furnished only twelve suitors, Same, twenty-four; Same was, therefore, in all probability the more populous. To hold that the smaller population could first be harried by the Dorians, then attack their more numerous brothers and dispossess them so completely as to rename their island, is contrary to reason. If the assumed Dorian invasion and the town name of Samos in Cephalonia prove anything, they prove merely that the northern island was called Same. It is distinctly more probable that the dispossessed Achaeans sought refuge peaceably among their brothers on the largest island, than that a smaller and decimated population made such a successful attack on their own more numerous kindred as to drive them entirely from their original homes. If the town Samos in Cephalonia was founded by dispossessed Achaeans, who gave it the name of their island home, it is distinctly more probable that there was but a single migration, and that the Same they came from was Leucas, not Thiaki.

Shewan remarks very justly that rocks, caves, springs, and havens are too plentiful in all these islands to afford very important evidence

¹ In Book 13, 271-275, Odysseus says: 'So after I had slain him with my brazen pointed spear, I straightway sought a ship, asked aid of the proud Phoenicians, and gave them from my booty what they wished. I bade them take me on their ship and set me down at Pylos or else at Sacred Elis where the Epeians rule.' (Trans. by Palmer.)

as to identification; but it is also true that no such identification is possible unless the natural features comply with the descriptions in the poem.

As a matter of fact, there seems to be no reasonable doubt that the topography of Thiaki does fit the narrative. The poet mentions three harbors besides the place where Telemachus lands. Thiaki has such harbors all rationally placed to suit the narrative. Port Frikes is the only harbor with a brook, and might well have received, therefore, the name of Rheithron, or Brook Harbor. In that case the Bay of Polis on the west coast of the island is situated in entire conformity to the narrative. Eduard Engel, who has himself seen all the places, says the ruins there are Mycenean.¹ Shewan says that the expression 'deep harbor' suits the Bay of Polis but not Port Vlichos in Leucas, where Dörpfeld locates his Homeric city. Port Vathy, a land-locked harbor on the south side of the Gulf of Molo, answers very well to Phorcys Haven. Manatt writes of it as perfectly answering the poet's description, and Engel says there is not another harbor in all Greece which is so calm. The fact that there is no suitable cave to serve as the grotto of the Naiads may well be because the poet has allowed his imagination some play in this respect. At the south end of the island there is another small harbor called Port Andrea, from which there is an easy and short passage to the plateau above the striking cliff and the spring at the southeastern end of the island. This cliff, Bérard says,² is twenty or thirty metres high. From it a rocky valley descends to Port Ligia, and part way down is a spring of never-failing water to which the peasants still come to draw their supplies. Such a cliff and spring near a small harbor may well have been given a special name, and the plateau above the cliff is suitably situated for the hut of Eumeus. Manly thinks this region is too far from Polis Bay for the location of the town of Ithaca; but here again the poet may well have overlooked the difficulty of driving pigs that distance. Manly apparently finds no difficulty in identifying the various localities mentioned in the poem with suitable localities on the island Thiaki, and Eduard Engel declares positively³ that Ithaca,

¹ *Der Wohnsitz des Odysseus*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 25.

² *Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée*, II, p. 514.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

by which name he calls Thiaki, furnishes all the places called for by the poet's narrative and Leucas none of them.

Neither Leaf nor Seymour, the two writers in English who believe that Leucas is the Homeric Ithaca, gives any detailed description of its topography. It seems reasonable to infer that there is nothing in that topography which suits the poet's narrative better than the topography of Thiaki. Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how it could be otherwise. The poet does not give any detailed descriptions of any of the particular places on Ithaca which he mentions, and without positive earmarks nothing more can be shown than that Leucas fits the narrative in this respect as well as Ithaca. Even if this possibility is admitted to be a certainty, it proves no more than that either island might be the right one. Nothing, therefore, is to be gained by a detailed study of the topography of Leucas.

If Thiaki is the Homeric Ithaca, and Arkudi Asteris, Cephalonia must be Dulichium, and Leucas Same.

A strong confirmation of this identification is to be found in the number of the suitors. Homer tells us they comprised the princes of all the first families in the four islands, and he gives their numbers as 52 from Dulichium, 24 from Same, 20 from Zacynthus, and 12 from Ithaca. These are peculiar numbers, and it may be inferred that they are not mere fiction, but represent some historical tradition as to the actual Achaeian kinglets who had settled in the several islands. In Book 1, 393, we read, 'Howsoever there are many other kings of the Achaeans in sea-girt Ithaca, kings young and old'; and what was true of Ithaca undoubtedly applied to the other islands. In Book 24, 140, Antinous, one of the suitors, is called 'King Antinous.' Leaf describes the Achaeans as a ruling race, with a native population subject to them. A natural conclusion would be that the number of Achaeian kinglets who settled in each of the several isles was more or less determined by the extent of its native population. Now, there is a very interesting parallel between the modern population of these islands and the respective number of suitors. If we take Cephalonia as the unit and adopt the identification suggested, we have the following comparisons:

	<i>Modern Population</i>	%	<i>Suitors</i>	%
Cephalonia }	about 71,000	100	52	100
Dulichium }				
Leucas }	30,000	42	24	46
Same }				
Thiaki }	13,000	18	12	23
Ithaca }				
Zante }	42,500	60	20	40
Zacynthus }				

Zacynthus is always described as 'wooded Zacynthus.' Forested areas were always more sparsely populated in primitive times, on account of the difficulty of clearing lands, and the island to-day, therefore, may well contain a comparatively larger population than it did in Homer's time. But the close agreement between the relative populations in the other islands with the number of suitors is striking. The actual percentages are very close.

If it were not, then, for the passage in the Ninth Book, the case would seem very clear. The positive statement that it was least fit of all islands for driving horses is absolutely exclusive. The other characteristics as mentioned by the poet equally suit the historic Ithaca. The island suits the narrative in all other details, and it is the only island that fits it. It is not credible that the poet consciously drew a description of another island from a different source and used it in his poem. The majority of the writers referred to, who favor the historic Ithaca, explain this passage in the Ninth Book by excluding Leucas from the group. This does not seem consistent with the poem or the facts of geography. The question, therefore, is: can any explanation of this passage be found which is consistent with the rest of the evidence and with a fair interpretation of the passage itself? It seems to me that such an explanation is possible, and it remains now to consider it.

First, the intrinsic difference is to be noted between the description of Ithaca as drawn by Telemachus in Book 4 and that by Odysseus in Book 9. Telemachus tells us only about the physical features of the island. It has no meadow lands. It is a pasture land for goats. It is not fit for driving horses. In Book 13, Athena describes it in very similar language. Odysseus, on the other hand, in Book 9, describes the island like one viewing it from the outside and apparently

at a distance. It is clear-seen. It has a mountain standing manifest to view. There are many islands about it. The island lies low and farthest to the west, the other islands lie to the eastward. The description of Telemachus is that of an inhabitant of the island. The description of Odysseus is that of a seaman viewing the island from the distance. Telemachus in Book 3 tells Nestor, 'We have come forth out of Ithaca that is below Neion,' but, in Book 9, Odysseus says, 'And I dwell in clear-seen Ithaca, wherein is a mountain Neriton, with trembling forest leaves, standing manifest to view.' Why should father and son name different mountains as the sign-posts of their common home? There is only one adequate explanation. The poet was taking his descriptions from previously existing material, using one source for the speech of Telemachus, and another for that of Odysseus.

As the description in Book 9 stands, it does not in fact fit either Leucas or Thiaki. Thiaki is certainly not the most westerly or north-westerly. There are not many islands lying around Leucas. There are, however, a number of islands stretching from the northerly end of Thiaki past its southerly end, and they all lie to the dawn and the sun from it. Zacynthus also seems dragged in. It certainly cannot be said to lie round Leucas, and it is practically separated from Thiaki by the great island of Cephalonia. 'Many islands lie around very near one to the other.' This is true of the group of islands east of Thiaki, but it does not seem true if the four large islands are included in this group. There is a considerable space of sea between them and Thiaki and still more between them and the other large islands. This certainly does not look like a geographic description. Indeed there is no reason to expect any such thing. What we should expect is obviously a description of the appearance of the island Ithaca as seen by an observer from some point of view, and I believe that this is exactly what we have in this passage.

The first question is from what point of view the observation was taken. The answer appears reasonably evident from the description itself. The island is said to lie farthest up in the sea toward the west. Whether $\xi\phi\sigma$ means our west or the quarter between our west and our north, it is probable that the observer must have been stationed somewhere in the quarter between east and south, as it is only from

such a position that he could have seen all the details noted. It is also evident that the observation point must have been in the far distance. The poet says the island lies low. As a matter of fact, each of the islands is high. The mountains in Thiaki, the lowest of the group, are each over 2000 feet high. But high land seen at a sufficient distance looks low. Low on the horizon is a common description of land seen from a ship in the far distance. Any one of the islands might well be described as lying low if seen sufficiently far off.

There is also another expression used in this description which, it seems to me, fixes the probable position of the point of view, and that is the expression 'clear-seen.' Bérard says,¹ quoting W. Helbig: "The Homeric epithets translate the essential quality of the object they characterize. They never resort to the secondary qualities, but only those which strike the eye vividly and give the object a peculiar character." Now 'clear-seen' in its ordinary sense is not an epithet which comes within this rule. There does not seem to be any essential difference in the visibility of any of the islands, as seen generally from a distance. They are all high and are all conspicuous. If anything, Leucas would be the least conspicuous from some point to the southeastward, and Cephalonia the most conspicuous, but this difference would seem hardly to justify the use of the epithet. There is, however, one place in this southeastern quadrant where this epithet might have been employed with entire agreement with the poet's usage in regard to epithets of places, and that is in the neighborhood of Cape Trepito, the most westerly cape of Peloponnesus. If we draw a line on the chart from the tip of the Cape next southerly to Cape Trepito, just touching the latter, and prolong it northerly, Thiaki will lie well to the east of it. Therefore, a vessel sailing northerly along the coast would not sight Thiaki until about off Cape Trepito. The southerly mountain on Ithaca is 2135 feet high according to the United States chart. Its distance from Cape Trepito scales about 40 miles. The curvature of the earth causes objects to disappear below the horizon at the rate of 8 inches multiplied by the square of the distance in miles. Therefore, Thiaki would appear from the low deck of a Homeric boat off Cape Trepito only about 1000 feet high; from a point five miles further south only about 800 feet high. From this

¹ *Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée*, I, p. 150.

last point it could only be seen over the land, and a height of about 100 feet a little inland from Cape Trepito would entirely obscure it. The *Mediterranean Pilot* does not give the height of this Cape, but it remarks¹ that the shore north of it is cliffy and is backed by high land, and the chart shows hills ranging along this shore. It seems almost certain, therefore, that Thiaki could not be seen till the boat was off Cape Trepito. Once by the Cape, there is nothing to interfere with the view, and with a height of 1000 feet above the horizon the island would be clearly seen.

We have also noted that the trade route north from Pylos probably coasted the shore till, at some point off the coast of Elis, the course changed and ran for the Pointed Rocks, probably the peak of Oxia. Now a further inspection of the chart indicates the neighborhood of Cape Trepito as being the point where this change would be made, since, from this point, there is a clear course for Oxia. A modern seaman would undoubtedly change his course for the island, if that were his next landmark, as soon as the way was clear; and ancient seamen would undoubtedly do the same.

Ancient commerce was a coasting trade, and in coasting easily recognized landmarks are of great value and will be kept in the memory for use. If Thiaki was the ancient Ithaca, and the first clear view of it by the mariner sailing northward marked the place and time when a change in course became necessary, the expression 'clear-seen Ithaca' would have a special effect and meaning for all sea-captains and mariners. The Achaeans were evidently a maritime people. The catalogue of ships shows all the leaders well supplied with vessels. Professor Chadwick² says the name of the Achaeans is mentioned by the Egyptian historians in the account of the sea-raids on Egypt in the twelfth century. The *Odyssey* itself supplies various stories of Viking-like cruises. From its use by seamen, the expression 'clear-seen' might well become attached to Ithaca as a special and characteristic epithet.

As a matter of fact, we have just such a point of view of the historic Ithaca presented in an ancient poem. In his article already referred to, Professor Manly writes;³ "According to the Hymn to Pythian

¹ III, p. 520.

² *Ithaca or Leucas*, p. 5.

³ H. M. Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, Cambridge, 1912, p. 189.

Apollo, Ithaca is visible from the west coast of Elis. A ship is sailing along the west coast of the Peloponnesus, under the direction of Apollo, bound for Delphi. It leaves Pylos and passes by Crouni, Chalcis, and Dyme and along the shore of Elis, and makes for Pherae. From this position appear under the clouds the steep mountain of Ithaka, Dulichium, Same, and woody Zacynthus." The Greek original, which he quotes in a note, contains, in fact, much of the exact language used by Homer in describing the return of Telemachus. This passage seems to indicate that there was a traditional picture of Ithaca from this standpoint, and tends to confirm the conclusion from the internal evidence that the picture of Ithaca in the Ninth Book was taken from a description of the island as it appeared from this locality.

To one looking northward from the sea off Cape Trepito, Thiaki, the historic Ithaca, would appear like a single mountain peak. This would be the southerly mountain, as the northerly mountain would lie behind it and not be visible. This southerly mountain must be Neriton in order to fit the narrative. Many islands do lie about, and they all, in fact, do lie to the eastward. If Leucas were visible, only its higher peaks could be seen, and these would all appear to the east of Thiaki. Of the higher mountains, whose heights are given on the chart, Mt. Stavrota is the most westerly, and a line drawn from this mountain to Cape Trepito passes east of Ithaca. Of all the other islands, only Zante and Cephalonia could possibly be seen to the westward. Zante square to the west would hardly be noted in a picture of the peaks to the northward; and Cephalonia, centered as it would be in the mass of its great mountain Nero, much nearer the observer and towering far above all other peaks in height, would appear rather as part of the foreground. Therefore, to the observer looking northward, Ithaca, if it is Thiaki, would be correctly described as the most westerly of the low lying peaks on the horizon. The others would be truly described as lying easterly of it. This, it seems to me, is just what this famous description fairly means, if we exclude the names of the other three large islands. These names fill, in fact, just one line, and can be omitted without affecting the metre or the sense. If we omit them, the lines run thus:

And I dwell in clear-seen Ithaca, wherein is a mountain Neriton, with trembling forest leaves standing manifest to view, and many islands lie

around, very near one to the other. Now Ithaca lies low on the horizon toward the darkness, but those others face the dawning and the sun.¹

I have used the word 'horizon' to translate *παντεράτη εἰς ἀλί* because it seems to me that this is what Homer meant by that expression. Liddell and Scott define *παντεράτος* as meaning 'highest of all.' 'Highest of all in the sea' must mean the horizon, because to an observer that is the highest part of the sea. All who are familiar with the seashore know that the ocean seems to slope upward from the land. When one stands on a height above the shore the horizon seems to be on a level with the eye, while the shore below may be far beneath. Dörpfeld says the old Greeks thought of the ocean as an inclined plane sloping up from the land. Since we are all familiar with the fact that the ocean does not so slope, the optical illusion is never thought of. We call the top line of this slope the horizon; but an observer, ignorant of the scientific fact and noting only the appearance, might well speak of the horizon as the highest part of the sea, and of an object on the horizon as lying highest of all in the sea.

If, now, we apply these lines to the actual picture, it can be seen at once that they fit Thiaki, the historic Ithaca, perfectly. From a point off Cape Trepito the historic Ithaca would be clear-seen, its southerly mountain would be Neriton and would stand manifest to view. It would be low on the horizon and it would be the most westerly of the peaks on the horizon. There are many islands lying to the east of it, and they are, in fact, near to each other. The poet does not say they are near Ithaca, only that they are near each other.

The line containing the names of the three other large islands should be omitted for the purpose of making this comparison, because the internal evidence shows it was not originally a part of the description. As the text stands these three islands are included in the expression 'many islands, etc.' Obviously they do not fit here. The 'many islands' are described as lying 'very near one to the other.' This is not true if the three larger islands are included in the group. Three islands are not many islands in themselves. To make a group of many islands the numerous small islands to the east of Thiaki must

¹ *ἄλις* is defined in Liddell and Scott as here meaning 'far away, distant,' and if this line could be rendered 'but those others far away toward the dawning and the sun,' it would make this description fit the view northwards more accurately.

be added. There are some twelve or more small islands, lying off the coast of Acarnania, now known as the Echinades and Dragonara islands. They are in fact near to each other, but not to the larger islands. The southernmost of them, Oxia, is probably the landmark called the 'Pointed Isles' in the poem. It is, as we have seen, the next landmark to steer by in sailing north from Pylos after passing Cape Trepito. It was natural in a nautical description of the view from off Cape Trepito to include this group. Indeed, if we believe the description was taken from a sea poem describing the trade route up the west shore of Greece, the inclusion of this group was necessary, as the group contained the landmark which a sailor should know to direct his course. Any reference to the three large islands would only confuse the narrative if this were its object. It is reasonable, therefore, to infer that the original did not contain this particular line in this connection.

Its presence in the poem itself, however, may be readily explained. Homer was not composing a treatise on geography or a coast pilot for seamen. If he drew his material for the description in the Ninth Book from some poem describing the sea-route on the west coast of Greece, he would naturally adapt it to his own uses. The lines previously quoted from the words of Telemachus and Penelope¹ show the three names linked with that of Ithaca in the parts of the poem treating of events in Greece. The three names occupy in these passages a single line just as here. These lines are identical with the line in the passage in Book 9 except for the case endings. They differ, however, in the fact that this line cannot be omitted in these other passages without affecting the context. They resemble the formulae the use of which by the poet is referred to by Chadwick² and Lang.³ Their appearance in these passages in identical terms indicates a traditional use of the three names in this manner which the poet may well have felt required their introduction into any important passage describing Ithaca. If Homer wished to employ a description for his Ithaca, drawn from a different source, which did not contain these three other names, it would be natural for him to have inserted the accustomed

¹ *Od. 1, 245 ff.; 16, 122 ff.; and 19, 130 ff.*

² *The Heroic Age*, p. 320.

³ Andrew Lang, *The World of Homer*, London, 1910, p. 254.

line. Its inconsistency with the truth would not be apparent to any one not personally familiar with the locality or not possessed of at least a good map. There is no difficulty, therefore, in explaining its presence here.

There is a further consideration which tends to confirm the theory that the description in the Ninth Book was drawn from some narrative describing the sea-route north from Pylos. If the theory be right, the essential features would be: first, the signal marking the time and place for a change of course; second, the means for identifying such signal; third, the next landmark to steer for. These facts are all to be found in this description, and indeed they constitute the whole description, if we omit the doubtful line. 'Clear-seen Ithaca' and its mountain Neriton are the first. Low-lying on the horizon to the west the second. The group of many islands with its peak of Oxia lying to the eastward is the third. The description embodies everything the sailor needs and nothing more.

On the other hand, if we try to interpret the picture from a landsman's standpoint, there is no adequate explanation for the inclusion of the group of small islands to the eastward. They must have been very inconspicuous objects from the shore of Elis. They do not seem to constitute a characteristic descriptive detail in connection with any one of the four large islands, and it is very difficult to see why a landsman should refer to them in any way. There is also the difficulty in this case of giving any special meaning to the epithet 'clear-seen.' From the point of view of a landsman the description does not seem natural; from that of a seaman it is just what we should expect. If a theory is to be tested by its explanation of the given facts, the one proposed is the only one which the evidence justifies.

This theory also serves to explain another contradictory passage. In Book 21, 343 ff., Telemachus says:

My mother, as for the bow, no Achaean is mightier than I to give or to deny it to whomso I will, neither as many as are lords in rocky Ithaca nor in the isles on the side of Elis, the pasture-land of horses.

These words seem fairly to imply that the poet conceived of Ithaca as the most distant of the four islands from Elis. Leaf argues that this proves Leucas was the Homeric Ithaca. It seems on the con-

try to prove merely that Homer had never seen the islands himself. Without having seen the islands himself and without a correct chart it would have been impossible for the poet to form a true picture of their geographic relations. The maps of the ancients are a conspicuous example of the impossibility of drawing a correct coast line from descriptions only. With only one description before him, in which Ithaca was represented as the most westerly island, it would be very natural if the poet had formed for himself the conception that it was, in fact, the most westerly island. A description intended to direct a sailor on his cruise might well mislead a poet.

Besides, it may well be that Bérard's theory that the town Ithaca was the last Greek port on the trade route is true. The settlements in Leucas were apparently on its eastern shores; and if the trade route ran out by the strait between Leucas and Thiaki, as seems probable,¹ it is obvious from the chart that it would save distance to stop at these ports first and then at Ithaca, and not vice versa. The flight of the souls of the slain suitors as described in Book 24 is confirmatory. They leave Ithaca, fly over the streams of the ocean and past the White Rock. They pass no port or place in this trip. If Homer never saw the islands, he could only have known this from such a description of the trade route as indicated Ithaca as the last Greek port.

Even if Ithaca was not the last port of call the narrative of the trade route may well have described it last, just as the *Mediterranean Pilot*, after describing Leucas, runs down the Acarnanian Shore before describing the other islands. Either way would have been sufficient to produce the conception that, as the last Greek port before passing the White Rock, Ithaca was the farthest Greek land from Elis.

It does not seem necessary to assume that Homer was personally familiar with the islands in order to explain the great accuracy of his poem in the description of his Ithaca.

In his book on the *Heroic Age*,² Professor Chadwick says, "The history of heroic poetry falls naturally into four stages. To Stage I belong the court poems of the Heroic Age itself; to Stage II, the epic and narrative poems based on these"; and again he writes,³ "The

¹ W. Dörpfeld in *Das homerische Ithaka* (*Mélanges Perrot*, pp. 79 ff.) recognizes the White Rock as the limit of Greek waters.

² Ch. V, p. 94.

³ Ch. XI, p. 221.

first is that of strictly contemporary court poetry, dealing with the praises or the adventures of living men." In the same chapter, after discussing the evidence, he concludes that the Homeric poems are a product of court minstrelsy and belong to the second stage. If the Homeric poems were based on poems by court poets, who sang about contemporary events, it does not seem improbable that in such poems the scenes of the adventures, at least in the home lands of the poet, were correctly described. If Homer could have correctly described such scenes, why could not his predecessors? That the poet himself believed in their statements, is evidenced by the praise of Demodocus which he puts in the mouth of Odysseus. In Book 8, 487 ff., we read: 'Demodocus, I praise thee far above all mortal men, whether it be the Muse, the daughter of Zeus, that taught thee, or even Apollo, for right duly dost thou chant the faring of the Achaeans, even all they wrought and suffered, and all their travail, as if, methinks, thou hadst been present or heard the tale from another.' It does not seem possible that Homer could have put this statement in the mouth of his chief character, if he himself had not valued accuracy as one of the most important elements of the poet's art.

There is more difficulty in the assumption that Homer was familiar with some poem or narrative correctly describing the places, ports, and courses known to the world of his time. But as to this there is some other evidence. It is apparently now established by archaeological researches that there was an extensive commerce throughout the Mediterranean long anterior to the Achaean period¹ and that this commerce was largely in the hands of the Cretans during their supremacy. Sir Arthur Evans² has expressed the opinion that the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* took much material from a Cretan Epic. Bérard goes much farther than this and believes that all the sea-tales and voyages described in the *Odyssey* were taken by the poet from some Phoenician Coast Pilot to which he had access. These two views are

¹ T. E. Peet, *The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy and Sicily*, pp. 284 ff., p. 341, pp. 490 and 491; A. Mosso, *The Dawn of Mediterranean Civilisation*, pp. 266 ff. and 360 ff.; V. Giuffrida-Ruggeri, *The Origins of the Italian People*, in the *Journal of Physical Anthropology*, I, pp. 317 ff.; Donald A. Mackenzie, *Myths of Crete and Pre-Hellenic Europe*.

² A. J. Evans, *The Minoan and Mycenaean Element in Hellenic Life*, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXXII, pp. 277 ff.

not necessarily inconsistent. Between the time of Cretan Supremacy and that of Homer, Crete had been overthrown and her traders scattered. Evans believes¹ that many of them settled on the coasts of Palestine and that the Phoenicians borrowed or learned from them the art of alphabetic writing. If they borrowed their alphabet, the Phoenicians would have been just as likely to borrow their knowledge of the ports and sea-routes of the Mediterranean; in fact, more likely, as the latter meant profit, which has always been a keen incentive to human energy. The Cretan Epics of Sir Arthur Evans may, therefore, well have reached Homer in the Phoenician language.

It is obvious, I think, to any one familiar with the sea, that no such thing as maritime commerce is possible without a positive knowledge, on the part of the captains or pilots, of the ports, harbors, and sea-routes which must be traversed. Even if exploring expeditions are sent into the unknown, it ceases to be unknown after the expedition returns; and each new venture will add to the accumulated knowledge of the ports and harbors reached. During the many years of Cretan Supremacy there must have been a very decided accumulation of such knowledge of the Mediterranean ports. This knowledge, particularly before writing became common, would naturally be embodied in some metrical narrative. Maine, in his *Early History of Institutions*,² says: "It is extremely likely that the most ancient law was preserved in rude verse or rhythmical prose. In the oldest Irish traditions the lawyer is distinguished with difficulty from the poet, poetry from literature. . . . There is no question, I conceive, that this ancient written verse is what is now called a survival, descending to the first ages of written composition from the ages when measured rhythm was absolutely essential in order that memory might bear the vast burdens placed upon it."

It is well known that maritime nations have jealously guarded the secrets of their commercial routes. The Cretans would doubtless have done the same, and their sea-poems would be adorned with a choice assortment of dangers to deter the uninitiated who might wish to use them from following the routes. A very interesting illustration of this

¹ *Scripta Minoa*, I, Oxford, 1909.

² H. S. Maine, *Lectures on the Early History of Institutions*, p. 14.

is given by Evans.¹ Among his evidence he pictures a seal impression from Crete showing a marine monster attacking a ship with a seaman standing on its deck and striking at the creature with some weapon. The long neck and dog-like head are very reminiscent of Homer's description of Scylla; but they are also suggestive of the long tentacle with its expanded end of the giant squid; and the story of Scylla is more than eclipsed by the modern stories of attacks on ships and seamen by this creature, or its cousin the octopus.² It is also to be noted that the octopus is a favorite item of diet in the Mediterranean region, and a familiar motive in Cretan decorative art. It is further to be noted that Circe's directions to Odysseus for passing Scylla and Charybdis are literally identical, as Bérard points out, with the modern sailing directions of the *Mediterranean Pilot* for passing the Straits of Messina, the traditional locality of these horrors.

Bérard discusses with great fulness the evidence which he believed justified the opinion that some narrative describing the ports and trade routes of the prehistoric world existed in Homer's time and was known and used by him. The opinion of Evans that Homer drew on some Cretan Epic for the material for his poems, in a measure, confirms this hypothesis. Crete was a great commercial nation. Marine subjects are in common use in its decorative art. If it had poets, it is certainly probable that the adventures of its sailors would be a favorite topic. Its art is noted for its realism, and surely its poetry must have exhibited a similar love for truth. No poem about seafaring men could well be composed without some description of the ports and places visited and of the experiences of the voyages. If such poems existed, it is not only possible but probable that the descriptions were correctly drawn. No race of seamen would enjoy compositions which rang untrue to their ears.

That Homer was familiar with stories of trading or viking cruises is apparent from the *Odyssey*. That some of those poems may have correctly described the sea-routes and harbors of the west coast of Greece does not seem improbable. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that Homer might have drawn the description of Ithaca which

¹ *The Minoan and Mycenaean Element in Hellenic Life*, p. 291.

² Paul Bartsch, *Pirates of the Deep, Stories of the Squid and Octopus*, Smithsonian Report, 1916, pp. 347 ff.

he gives in the Ninth Book from some poem or narrative describing this sea-route. The internal evidence agrees with this supposition. It also indicates that the line containing the names of the other three large islands was not originally part of the description. We can see a good reason why Homer might have interpolated this line. On this theory the passage is quite in harmony with all other evidence in the poem and points to the historic Ithaca as the home of Odysseus.

NOTE. The chief difficulty in reaching a common agreement as to the identification of the Homeric Ithaca appears to lie in the passage in Book 9. As commonly translated it affords a very reasonable basis for Dörpfeld's theory. The argument generally advanced that Leucas was not one of the four islands is unsatisfactory. Dörpfeld's view that Arkudi was Asteris and Leucas one of the four islands seems the more probable. Dörpfeld's argument is defective because he does not take into consideration the important evidence contained in the passage in Book 4. It is contrary to all canons for the interpretation of documents to found an argument on only part of the evidence. If Homer was describing a particular island, all his descriptions should reasonably fit some one island. The problem is whether any reasonable explanation of these two passages can be found which will make them both apply to the same island. The solution proposed may not be correct, but it has the merit of affording such an explanation. It may well be that further consideration will develop a better solution.

In addition to the authorities mentioned in the article itself, I have consulted the following:

Sir William Gell, *The Geography and Antiquities of Ithaca*, London, 1807.
Peter Goessler, *Leukas-Ithaca, Die Heimat des Odysseus*, Stuttgart, 1904.
Wilhelm Dörpfeld, *Leukas*, Athens, 1905.
Hugo Michael, *Die Heimat des Odysseus*, Jauer, 1905.
Josef Gröschl, *Dörpfelds Leukas-Ithaca-Hypothese*, Friedek, 1907.
T. W. Allen, *The Homeric Catalogue*, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXX, pp. 292 ff.
William Martin Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, London, 1835, vol. III.

I am aware that I have not cited all the books and articles that have been written on the subject, but as there seems to be little difference of opinion as to what the relevant passages in the poem are, it is hoped that no really relevant passage has been overlooked. The relative weight and value of the different passages as evidence is naturally a matter of judgment, and it did not seem helpful to discuss the various views of the different writers except

in so far as has been necessary to correct inferences that appeared erroneous. The references to Dörpfeld's view of the evidence are to Leaf's statement of that theory, which I thought, after reading both, very clear and complete.

I have been greatly assisted in this study by the references given by Mr. Shewan in the article already referred to, and by his summary of the essential evidence. I am also indebted to Professor Herbert Weir Smyth, who very kindly read the first draft of this article and made various helpful suggestions. He did not, however, undertake to examine it critically, so that I alone am responsible for all errors and omissions.

GENERAL INDEX

Aeschylus, the rule of Zeus in, 5, 7, 13, 21, 29 f.

Agon, 8, 17.

Aigaion, 20.

Apollo, 18 f., 25 f., 37.

"Argument personified," in Plato, 69 ff.

Aristarchus, 47, 54 ff.

Aristophanes, 13.

Arkudi island, 134 ff., 144, 147.

Apposita, 36.

Asteris island, 129 ff., 144, 147.

Athena, 11 ff., 18 f., 23 ff.

Attis, 4.

Baal, 21.

Bacchylides, 11.

Barbarism, 35.

BASSETT, S. E., *Hysteron Proteron*, 39-62.

Bia, 7, 14, 30.

BREWSTER, F., *Ithaca*, a Study of the Homeric Evidence, 125-166.

Briareos, 1, 3.

Characterization, comic, in Plato, 64 f.

Chiasmus, 44 ff., 54 ff.

Circe, island of, 128.

Comedy, The Spirit of, in Plato, 63-123.
Plato's definition of, 116.
Serious purpose in Plato's use of, 122.
Stages in Plato's use of, 122 f.

Consort, in Hesiod's theology, 4, 15, 21, 26, 28.

Crete, 2, 4.

Demeter, 2.

Democritus, 35.

Demogorgon, 6.

Diction, comic, in Plato, 64.

Dionysos, 13, 19, 24 ff.

Dulichium, 129 ff.

Epimetheus, 28.

Erechtheus, 26.

Eustathius, on inverted order in Homer, 41 f., 57 ff.

Father-god, 4, 15, 21.

Feud, between gods, 3, 34.

Five, theft of, 1, 7, 29 f.

Furies, 31 f., 36 f.

Gaia, 1, 25.

Giants, 11, 17.

Gods, 2, 6 f., 13 f., 16, 31.

GREENE, W. C., *The Spirit of Comedy* in Plato, 63-123.

Hebe, 18.

Hephaistos, 7, 12, 23 f.

Hera, 2, 18 ff.

Herakles, 14, 16 ff., 24 f., 34.

Hermes, 18 f.

Heroes, 24.

Hesiod and Aeschylus, 6.

Hittites, 5, 20.

Hysteron Proteron, 39 ff.

Ideal world, 97 ff., 110, n. 3.

Io, 20.

Ionian islands, map of, 128.

Ithaca: a Study of the Homeric Evidence, 125-166.

Keraunos, 7, 15.

Kings, 4, 15.

<p>Komas, 8 f., 12 ff.</p> <p>Kottos, 1, 3.</p> <p>Kratos, 7, 14, 30.</p> <p>Kronos, 1 ff., 13 f., 21 ff., 34.</p> <p>Law, 32 f., 37.</p> <p>Leucas, 125 ff.</p> <p>Lying, Plato's comic use of, 100 ff.</p> <p>Marriage, 15, 18 f., 31.</p> <p>Metis, 3, 6, 12.</p> <p>Mime, Platonic dialogue as, 63, 76, 87 ff. 93, 99 f., 115, 121.</p> <p>Muses, 17.</p> <p>Nike, 7 f., 11 f.</p> <p>'Old King,' 3, 14 f., 20 f., 26, 31.</p> <p>Olympic victor, 8, 10, 14, 17.</p> <p>Olympus, 17 f., 24 f., 30.</p> <p>Orestes, 33.</p> <p>Ouranos, 1 f., 6, 21, 25.</p> <p>Plato, The Spirit of Comedy in, 63- 123.</p> <p>Plato's <i>Apology</i>, Chiasmus in, 60 f.</p>	<p>Poseidon, 2, 6 f., 19, 25.</p> <p>Protagoras, 28, 30.</p> <p>Rhea, 1 f., 4, 25 f.</p> <p>Satire, in Plato, 66 ff.</p> <p>Sin, 32 f.</p> <p>Son-God, 4, 14 f., 19, 21, 26.</p> <p>Tartaros, 3, 22.</p> <p>Themis, 1.</p> <p>Thetis, 32 f.</p> <p>THOMSON, J. A. K., <i>The Religious Background of the Prometheus Vincit</i>, 1-37.</p> <p>Titans, 2 f., 7, 18, 21 f., 25, 34 ff.</p> <p>Torch-race, 30 f.</p> <p>Tuphoeus, 3.</p> <p>Weapons of gods, 60 f.</p> <p>'Young King,' 3, 6, 12 f., 20 f., 23 f., 31.</p> <p>Youngest Son, 1 ff.</p> <p>Zacynthus, Zante, 130 ff.</p> <p>Zelos, 7, 14.</p> <p>Zeus, 1 ff.</p>
---	--

INDEX OF IMPORTANT CITATIONS

Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 31 ff., 36.
'Apollodorus' *Bibl.* (1, 3, 6), 6, 23,
(3, 14, 6), 27.
Archilochus, 8, 10, 17.
Aristotle, *Poet.* (1447 b), 63.
Athenaeus (6, 234 ff.), 17.
Diogenes Laertius (6, 50), 16; (9, 55), 28.
Euripides *Ion* (1528), 11.
Hesiod *Theogony* (132 ff.), 15, 19, 21,
25, 29.
Homer *Il.* (1, 404), 20.
Od. (1, 245), 125; (4, 600), 131;
(9, 21-28), 125, 149; (13, 242),
133; (15, 28), 139; (16, 348),
134; (19, 131), 125; (24, 1-14),
148.
Hyginus *Poet. astr.* (2, 15), 29.
John, Gospel of, 93 f., 95.

Pausanias (1, 1, 3), 12; (1, 14, 6), 27;
(1, 30, 2), 23, 30; (5, 7), 14;
(5, 11, 2), 12; (7, 24, 4), 14.
Philochorus, 17.
Pindar *Ol.* (14, 13), 9, *Pyth.* (4, 1), 10.
Plato, *Apol.* 71 ff.; *Charmides*, *Laches*,
Lysis, 75 f.; *Cratylus*, 86 f.;
Critias (109c), 28; *Crito*, 75;
Enthymemus, 79 ff.; *Euthyphro*,
73 f.; *Gorgias*, 81 ff.; *Ion*, 74;
Meno, 78 f.; *Parmenides*, 110 ff.;
Phaedo, 90 ff.; *Phaedrus*, 106 ff.;
Philebus, 115 ff.; *Politicus*, 114 f.;
Protagoras, 29, 76 ff.; *Republic*,
97 ff.; *Sophist*, 113 f.; *Sympo-*
sium, 87 ff.; *Theaetetus*, 108 ff.;
Timaeus, 117 ff.
Scholiast on Sophocles (*O. C.* 56), 23,
27, 30.
Virgil, *Aen.* (6, 893 ff.), 97.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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Indexes. Plates.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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Indexes.

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